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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the concept of violence during the transition from Republic to 
Principate. Many of the provisions against violence which evolved during the course of the 
reigns of Augustus and Tiberius were a direct response to the violence of the Late 
Republic. They were to a large extent, new and revolutionary, but were not caused by the 
violence of the Late Republic: rather they were developed as part of the new political 
scenario to stabilise Roman society and secure the princeps' position. 
A by-product of these measures was to provide a new context in which violence 
(particularly institutionalised state violence) could occur, be monitored and controlled. 
In chapter one I attempt to define violence and to extract the contemporary Roman attitude, 
without which any conclusions drawn would be inaccurate and unrealistic. I have used 
Roman legislation - especially the lex Julia de vi (c 18 BC) and have examined the works 
of Cicero for the frequency and function of vis, the Latin word which most closely 
corresponds to the English word "violence." I conclude that the Romans had a 
sophisticated understanding of the concept: i) anything that was not conducted through the 
due process of law was considered vis, ii) violence was tolerated only in exceptional 
circumstances, when state security was threatened. 
In chapter two I explore in greater detail the attempts by goverment to legislate against 
violence in particular the lex Julia de vi and the lex maiestatis. Although the latter was not 
employed initially to remove political rivals from the scene, its abuse during the reign of 
Tiberi us became one of the great themes of the historians to illustrate the decline and moral 
bankruptcy of the Principate and to look nostalgically at the Republic. 
Chapter three examines how the structure of the Roman criminal system changed, the 
gradual disintegration of the legal principle of self-help, and the growth and exploitation of 
the cognitio procedure in Roman courts. The state intruded more into the lives of citizens 
and therefore exerted more control. The role of three new jurisdictions, imperial, senatorial 
and that of the urban prefect, in the context of the minimisation and control of violence, is 
also discussed. 
The fourth chapter deals with punishment and considers the theory that there was a trend to 
greater severity in this form of state violence. It examines, against the background of 
Roman penal aims, the evolution of the symbols and rituals which accompanied different 
types of punishment. 
Chapters five and six discuss collective violence, its manifestations and explain the absence 
of revolution by the plebs. The introduction of new forces into the city (something which 
was anathema in the Republic) is discussed in the context of policing and law and order. 
They had a significant impact in the limitation of violence. 
In the Early Principate violence manifested itself in new contexts and was controlled more 
effectively than in the Late Republic. 
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1 
VIOLENCE 
THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE- DEFINITION AND APPROACH. 
INTRODUCTION 
Investigating violence is immediately problematic. To undertake such a task without 
prejudice and preconception is particularly difficult because violence is defined both 
morally and subjectively. Complete objectivity where violence is concerned is impossible, 
to attain. Consequently, it is dangerous to arrive at absolute conclusions too hastily. Wrong 
and misleading judgements are easily made, especially when investigating one civilization 
from the perceptions and attitudes of another. A late twentieth century observer would, in 
accordance with western Judaeo-Christian principles, find the executions in the 
amphitheatre in the first century AD violent, cruel and morally repugnant. Yet it was only 
in the 1930s that public execution by guillotine was abandoned. It is this very kind of 
paradox and irony which complicates objective investigations into violence and can render 
any conclusions attained unrealistic and misleading because modem perceptions and 
attitudes have been superimposed onto an ancient context. 1 Two specific problems must be 
addressed right at the outset of this investigation. 
The first is one of definition. This is difficult, since we are dealing with an abstract 
concept. A modem lexicographical definition can provide a departure point and assist in 
establishing a basis of approach to this issue. The Oxford English Dictionary definition of 
violence is: 'the exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury or cause damage to 
persons or property. Action or conduct characterised by this. Treatment or usage tending to 
cause bodily injury forcibly interfering with personal freedom; undue constraint applied 
to some natural process, habit etc. so as to prevent its free development or exercise.' This 
definition is not, however, to be adhered to absolutely. Although too narrow a definition 
can be both fallacious and inaccurate, we can extract from this elements which can be 
applied to each instance of violence. Physical force is the first element. This need not 
1 Labruna at 3-7, considers the anxiety of overcoming the multiple contradictions and 
tensions within the subject of violence which are caused by the precariousness of 
the cultural and historical moment in which we live and the differences in standards 
of value as an increasingly deepening crisis of approach which both modem and 
classical scholarship has failed to address satisfactorily. 
2 
actually materialize, but there should be at least the situation where such physical force is 
either possible or potential and where the second element, that is injury or damage, may 
realistically result. Injury or damage need not take a material or physical form. It is 
sufficient that there is the fear of its realisation. 'I include in violence a dire threat, even if 
it does not materialize. '2 The third element is the victim of damage or injury, whether to 
person or property. The dynamics of violence can be formulated thus: there must be a 
cause, a method, and effect of violence employed by an agent and exercised upon a victim. 
There is also the dimension of violence as the forcible interference in a natural process. 
This will become clearer when a definite relationship is postulated between the extent of 
violence and social instability on the one hand, and the control and minimisation of 
personal and political freedom on the other. 
At this point a basic distinction must be drawn between the concepts of "violence" and 
I 
"force". Because violence often involves physical force, the connection between "force" 
and "violence" is very close and in some contexts the words become synonyms. 3 In this 
distinction lies a means by which the difficult issue of violence can be understood. 
"Violence" is a loaded concept because it involves negative and hostile connotations, 
whereas "force" does not necessarily have these connotations and is therefore more 
problematic. But the distinction affords particular relevance to this study because the 
Romans used the same word, vis, to denote both concepts. When these two concepts are 
used, other factors are introduced which assist us in understanding violence as a social 
phenomenon and in defining its role in the context of the structure of society. It is not 
enough, therefore, to claim (as Georges Sorel4 did in 1908) that force is used by the state 
to maintain the existing social order, while violence is used to undermine it. The danger in 
accepting "force" as state coercion and "violence" as coercion by other agencies, is that it 
embodies a highly questionable presumption about the nature of state and society which 
inhibits any chance of understanding the complex issues involved in their relationship. This 
distinction assumes that state coercion is legitimate. In these terms violence is not only a 
2 
3 
4 
Daube, 123. 
Cf. Gatver, 819. 
Sorel, 175. 
3 
social but also a political phenomenon. For Macfarlane, 5 political violence is essentially a 
denial of the legitimacy of the state either in itself, or in its workings. In this study I shall 
argue that the relationship between the state and its subjects had a profound effect on the 
character of the violence evident in the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, and that the 
efforts at securing legitimacy made by the emperors played an important role in achieving 
this character. 
The sociologists Graham and Gurr6 shed further light on the distinction between "force" 
and "violence". Violence is 'behaviour designed to inflict physical injury to people or 
damage to property,' while force is 'the actual or threatened use of violence to compel 
others to do what they might otherwise not do.' Thus force and violence are interlinked 
because the former involves a threat if not the actuality of violence while the latter is 
forceful if it is used to change others' actions. But this can also be considered narrow. 
Nieburg 7 distinguishes force from violence by contrasting capacity to act and action. For 
him force is the reserve capability and means of exercising physical power which in 
political society amounts to the threat of violence or counter-violence. Violence is therefore 
simply "force in action." The two concepts merge imperceptibly since violence is necessary 
on occasion to give credibility to its threatened use which is the basis of force. For 
Garver, 8 violence in human affairs amounts to the violation of persons which occurs in 
four different forms based on two criteria, whether the violence is personal or 
institutionalized, and whether the violence is overt or covert. He writes, however, in the 
modem context of a culture of rights which cannot be imputed to ancient society. 
In these definitions, however, there is little attempt to relate the concepts of force and 
violence to those of authority and legitimacy. Wolft9 has tried to show that when these 
fundamental issues are introduced, the concept of violence can be shown to lack any 
coherent meaning. He distinguishes between "power" as the ability to make and enforce 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
41. 
Graham and Gurr, xxxii. 
10-15. 
819. 
602-606. 
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decisions of social importance, and "authority" as the right to make such decisions; 
between de facto authority as the ability to get one's right to make decisions accepted, and 
de iure authority as the substantiated right to command and be obeyed. For Wolff force is 
the 'ability to effect change through physical effort, and violence is the illegitimate or 
unauthorised use of force to effect decisions against the will or desire of others.' Violence 
in Rome must be understood also within the context of state power which 'is unique, 
overriding all other "powers" within the society by its acknowledged right to exercise 
force, even to kill, when its representatives deem such action to be necessary (and also 
legitimate where the rule of law prevails).' 10 
It is important to take into account both the notion of legitimacy and the conflicting claims 
often made to it; the commonly held distinction between force and violence, once made, 
pivots on the legitimacy or acceptability of the actions concerned. This is not to say that 
the benefit of legitimacy should be given to established authorities. Macfarlane, 11 
considering all the factors mentioned above, offers a definition of the two terms which I 
shall use as a basis for my approach to the subject: 'violence is the capacity to impose, or 
the act of imposing, one's will upon another, where the imposition is held to be 
illegitimate. Force is the capacity to impose, or the act of imposing, one's will upon 
another, where the imposition is held to be legitimate.' It must be stressed though, that 
each aspect of the definition is vulnerable to wide interpretation. 
The second problem to be addressed is one of attitude. It can be argued that attitudes to 
violence as well as what constitutes violence have indeed changed over the centuries. This 
must be contrasted with the unobjectionable use of force. The use of moral terminology to 
which the concept of violence is susceptible, runs the risk of inaccurate and unrealistic 
conclusions, and must therefore be guarded against. A higher value is theoretically placed 
on human life today than was two thousand years ago. 12 Today, executions are clinical 
affairs where the primary purpose is to despatch the "victim" across the Styx as quickly 
10 
11 
12 
Finley, 8. 
46. 
See Auguet, on his chapter on Roman Cruelty, at 9. ' ... the life of a man has not 
always had the value that our own morality strives to give it.' 
5 
and as mercifully as possible. They are carried out as a final resort, usually a considerable 
time after the crime and far from the public eye, or at least before a vigorously controlled 
audience. Such consideration and humanity was not usually shown to the condemned of the 
ancient world. It is pertinent, then, when embarking on a study into the violence of the 
Early Principate, to echo Lintott's caveat: 'the ethical standards common to the Hellenised 
Mediterranean world did not place such a high value on human existence in itself as ours 
do now. Arguments based on a catalogue of cruelties are, therefore, liable to prove no 
more than that the Romans had standards scarcely different from those of their 
contemporaries who were not plagued by such political violence. However suggestive the 
facts might appear, we need as much light as possible on the attitudes to them if we are to 
attribute Roman political violence to a defect of character as well as of intellectual 
judgement of interests. ' 13 
VIOLENCE AND THE EARLY PRINCIPATE. 
Why investigate violence of the Early Principate? MacDonald, reviewing Lintott's book, 
expresses the validity of such a pursuit in general terms: 'civic violence, wherever it breaks 
out, draws attention dramatically to itself and invites far reaching speculation as to its 
causes ranging from original sin or human aggressiveness to atavistic irrationalism or, at 
least, social restiveness. This is a proper exercise providing it uses comparative knowledge -
and experience. ' 14 
This study will proceed on the premise that the Rome of Augustus and Tiberius was 
experiencing a transition from Republic to Principate which was not complete but 
evolutionary. The Republic had died. Tacitus could assert that very few had ever seen truly 
Republican government. 15 The Late Republic had seen much violence. 'A violent and 
tumultuous era is the standard description of the Ciceronian age. Certainly it had its fair 
13 
14 
15 
Lintott (1968), 36. 
239. 
Ann. 1.3.7-4.1: 'quotus quisque reliquus qui rem publicam vidisset? Igitur verso 
civitatis statu nihil usquam prisci integri moris: omnes exuta aequalitate iussa 
principis aspectare, nulla in praesens formidine, dum Augustus aetate validus seque 
et domum et pacem sustinavit.' 
6 
share of disruption - more than its fair share.' 16 Nowhere was violence more evident than 
in government. 'To speak of Roman politics in the Late Republic without touching on 
violence would hardly be possible.' 17 Thus Lintott argues that 'violence played such an 
important part in Late Republican politics that it became more than a symptom of other 
disturbances, but rather a disease itself which made its own contribution to the fall of the 
Republican government.' 18 
The Roman society of the E'.arly Principate grew out of the political turbulence of the Late 
Republic. Although Augustus stressed continuity with the past, 19 the political and military 
reality was of domination by one man. The structures of the old system had acquired a new 
level of control above them, and the decay of a once vigorous political system and the 
trauma of half a century of civil strife had taken their toll. In short, from the time of the · 
Gracchi to the battle of Actium violence characterized the Roman Republic. When peace 
finally came, Augustus was able to state self-righteously that while he was princeps the 
doors of Janus were closed three times. 20 Tacitus could write with some justification that 
Augustus 'cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit'. 21 In a professed context of peace and stability, 
then, what is the need to consider violence? 
This context of peace and stability hinged on one critical factor: the acceptance and 
approval of Augustus' government. After Actium the theatre of political activity moved 
from within the ambit of strict constitutional rules to a more fluid and less formal, and 
consequently more unstable and more unpredictable, context. The implications for violence 
in this respect are great. Shaw explains the problem: 'a major problem in Roman history is 
the role of violence in the making of Roman society, and in particular the relationship 
between individual men who wielded violent force and the Roman state. This is a difficult 
question because it necessarily entails consideration of the corollary problems of political 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Gruen, 405. 
Sherwin-White, 1. See also Smith, 257-73. 
Lintott (1982), 11. 
On Augustus as link between Republic and Principate see Eder, 71-122. 
R.G. 2.13 
Ann. 1.2.1. 
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legitimacy and the practical exercise of power. '22 Whether the state exercises violence 
explicitly, for example, in a whiff of grapeshot, or merely through threat of force, it must 
nevertheless do so legitimately. The state's legitimacy rests on the manner in which force 
(or violence) is employed. The political philosopher Max Weber perhaps explains it best 
when he says that the state is meant to exercise political power and that power is 
maintained through force and violence. However, defending the right of the state to use 
force, he says that the state as a political structure upholds a claim to the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order. 23 Thus the state, or any 
official of the state who commits violence must do so within the potestas given by the 
constitution. In the Roman context a distinction must be drawn between potestas and 
potentia. Potestas means power in political, legal or quasi-legal contexts. It is official 
power, whereas potentia is the ability to exercise control, power or influence over others. 
Cicero defines power (potentia), in cold blooded and mercenary terms: 'potentia est ad sua 
conservanda et alterius attenuenda idonearum rerum facultas. '24 It is a distinction which 
indicates the condition of Roman politics and life at the time. These perceptions go a long 
way in clarifying an attitude to violence of the period. 
There are two essential questions which this study will endeavour to address. Firstly, to 
consider the Roman definitions of violence during the period of Augustus and Tiberi us and 
whether these attitudes evolved in response to the new social and political context. If their 
attitudes to violence were hostile, how did they articulate their hostility? Secondly, what 
role did violence play, and how did it make itself evident, in the years of evolution from 
Republic to Principate? 
I will begin by setting the background to the Early Principate. This is necessary because 
much of the violence which occurred during the Early Principate had its roots in the Late 
Republic. For example, it can be argued that Roman penal law evolved from a controlled 
system in the Republic to one characterized by arbitrariness and savagery under the 
22 
23 
24 
Shaw, 3. 
Weber,.407. 
Inv. 2.169. Potentia is later considered one of the 'extraneae virtutes' (lnv. 2.177) 
8 
Empire. I shall argue, as Garnsey does, that the increase in severity in penalties is 
explained in terms of the substitution of monarchy for Republican aristocratic government, 
and the absolutist tendencies of the monarchy. 25 
Also, the study will consider ways in which violence manifested itself. Brigandage, for · 
example, was such a problem that both Augustus26 and Tiberius27 were forced to deal with 
it. Also, riots and public disorder, whatever the cause, were not uncommon and a serious 
threat to public security. Both Augustus28 and Tiberius29 were required to quell violent 
situations by violent means. Moreover, the circus, which itself accommodated violence on 
an increasing scale in the Early Principate, was also the source of major social disturbance. 
The stage, arena and circus were regular scenes of violence30 and Augustus appreciated 
both its dangers and its essential place in the Roman social and political world. There is 
also the prevalence of crime in Rome to deal with, and how authority sought to contain it. 
The study will consider the stationing of military or quasi-military bodies such as the 
praetorian cohorts, the urban cohorts and the vigiles as forces of law and order with the 
specific brief of protecting the emperor, maintaining law and order in the capital and 
preventing fires. These bodies were all creations of the Early Principate. 
VIS AND THE LATE REPUBLIC. 
Through a contemporary Roman definition of violence we will gain a better understanding 
of their attitude to the subject and be able to discuss the role (if any) it had in the politics 
and society of the Early Principate. Here the question must be approached in terms of 
language, by isolating Roman terms for violence, discussing the variety of uses of these 
terms and the different contexts in which they appear. The investigation will concentrate 
specifically on the word vis, which will be examined from two perspectives. Firstly, the 
evolution of the leges de vi will be sketched in order to appreciate the Romans' legal and 
political perception of a problem which first demanded legislative attention in the 70s BC 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Garnsey ( 1968), 141. This will be considered in more detail in chapter 3. 
Suet. Aug. 32.1. 
Suet. Tib. 37.1. 
Suet. Aug. 19.1. 
Suet. Tib. 37.1-2. 
Tac. Ann. 1.77.1 
9 
and was never resolved properly, and which eventually required extra-legislative measures 
and an unprecedented intrusion in the life of the citizen by the state. The role of vis in the 
legal notion of self-help is of particular importance. Secondly, the study will examine the 
wider context of vis through non-legal usage, to establish a social perception of violence. 
In this Cicero's testimony will prove invaluable. 
How did the Romans of the Late Republic and Early Principate express and articulate the 
concept of violence? Vis is the word which will enjoy most of our attention in this respect. 
Ironically, although there is evidence of its use in Early Republican literature,31 violentia is 
found mostly in the Later Empire and very rarely in the works of the Late Republic or 
Early Empire. 32 Violentus is the oldest form and is used most regularly, and another 
adjectival form, violens, appears in Horace33 and Persius. 34 The adverbial form violenter 
is attested from Terence. 35 Emout points out the obvious connection between vis and 
violare but recognizes that the formation of the verb is obscure. 36 
Vis, though, has several meanings attached to it. They include abundance, importance, 
essence, quantity. We are principally concerned, however, with the predominant meaning 
of the word in the context of force, violence, pow.er, lawlessness etc. Em out and Meillet 
gloss vis as 'force, en particulier force exercee contre quelqu'un. ' 37 Daremberg and Saglio 
add the dimension seen also in the Oxford English Dictionary definition, that of 
interference in, or operation against, the will or natural process: 'dans le droit Romain le 
mot vis signifie d'abord en general tout acte accompli contre la volonte d'une personne . .38 
This is expressed by the Realencyclopadie as Willensmangel - thwarting of the will through 
vis - which is one part of a five part analysis of vis under the general classification 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
Plaut. Men. 330; Rud. 839. 
Cicero uses violentia only four times in his speeches and philosophical works, while 
in Livy it only occurs ten times. It appears twice in Seneca the Elder, four times in 
Seneca, twice in Suetonius and fifteen times in Tacitus. Vis is by far the most 
prominent word denoting force and violence. 
Carm. 3.30.10. 
Pers. 5.171. 
Emout, 97-98. 
Emout, 100. 
Emout and Meillet, 1072. 
C. Daremberg and M. Saglio, Dictionnaire des Antiquites Grecques et Romaines, 
(Paris), 5. 927. 
10 
juristische Be griff. 39 The others are vis and ius; vis as self-help; vis in interdicts; criminal 
and penal measures against vis; and vis maior, which has a similar meaning to vis divina 
and suggests force of a supernatural or divine nature. 
From this juristische Begrijfwe will begin the search for a Roman contemporary definition 
of, and attitude to, violence. Since the law is a mechanism for the regulation of the affairs 
of society in general, and the control of violence in particular, a legal definition is one 
response to the problem. Violence threatens not only the community, but it also attacks 
those who seek to control it. Against this background the relationship between law and 
violence is clear. The greater the regulation of society's affairs through law and the stricter 
the mechanisms for the control of violence, the more insecure the law-giving class or 
agency, the more unstable is the society it seeks to govern through those laws. This is 
inevitably so, since the natural process of society and its free development will have been 
interfered with. There is therefore a strong relationship between vis and ius which can be 
understood more clearly when considered against the background of self-help. 
Self-help is a vital aspect of the resolution of disputes in Roman criminal and civil law. 40 
Lintott considers that there are two 'principal aspects of the relationship of violence to the 
law: the acceptance and even prescription of, self-help by the law. Secondly, the 
assumption by the law of the procedure characteristic of self-help. Both of these aspects 
occurred in Rome and are significant for the Roman attitude to violence, the first for 
obvious reasons, the second, because the formalisation of self-help in processes like the 
legis actio per manus iniectionem and vindicatio shows the intimate connection between vis 
and ius that existed in the foundations of Roman law. •41 Lintott continues to say 'self-help 
goes beyond mere self defence, it is the unilateral assertion of a personal right without 
appeal to the power of the judiciary. •42 Cicero shows how this concept was practically 
expressed: 'atqui, si tempus est ullum iure hominis necandi, quae multa sunt, certe illud est 
39 
40 
41 
42 
RE. IX.9. 311. 
See also chapter 2, p41ff. 
Lintott (1968), 22. 
Lintott (1968), 23. 
11 
non modo iustum verum etiam necessarium, cum vi vis inlata defenditur. '43 However, for 
Lintott vis was a 'neutral concept closer to our "force" than "violence", so there was no 
difficulty applying it to both illegal violence and legal self help. '44 
The Romans of the Late Republic, occupied themselves principally with violence as it 
affected public affairs. Labruna's position is that it was not until the Late Republic that 
Roman society attributed to vis a negative judicial emphasis in either public or private 
law. 45 This emphasis found expression in the formalisation of the concept of violence in 
the Late Republic which took a political form in that it dealt with violence as it affected the 
state directly. Even so it only did so because it had no other choice. What occurred 
between individual citizens beyond the parameters of politics and government held no 
interest for those in authority. There would come a time however, when the state was so 
insecure that it felt it could not function properly without reaching significantly into the 
lives of individual citizens and regulating their affairs. This feeling of insecurity stems 
directly from the prevalence of violence in the Late Republic and Early Principate. The 
legislation de vi was the beginning of this trend of intrusion. 
The measures introduced in the first half of the first century BC attempted to define 
violence (qualified in its various attributes as vis) or to address effectively the preceding 
dispositions which were shown to be inadequate for the 'iniquitas temporum. '46 It was 
certainly during these years that the concept of vis, understood as illicit violence, affirmed 
itself in an all-powerful manner. By the 70s BC the problem of violence could no longer be 
avoided and specific legislation against vis began to appear. 47 Between 78 and 76 measures 
were taken after the revolt of Lepidus to put an end to brigandage of all sorts and two 
penal laws were passed against all blows struck against the public peace by bands of 
brigands. The one action, the product of M. Terentius Varro Lucullus, created the private 
delict of rapina for moveable property and the private penal action vi bonorum raptorum. 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
Mil. 9 
Lintott (1968), 22-23. 
Labruna, 10-14. 
Cic. Tull. 46. See also Labruna, 13-14. 
A full discussion of the leges de vi appears in chapter 2, p56ff. 
12 
The other action, the lex Plautia de vi,48 was probably presented by the tribune M. 
Plautius Silvanus and can be identified with a law on the same subject which is attributed 
by Cicero to Q. Lutatius Catulus, 49 and also with the law which, after the death of 
Lepidus, pardoned his partisans in order to re-establish public harmony. Later this law was 
applied many times, against Catiline and his accomplices, 50 against Milo and his 
colleagues, against P. Sestius in 57,51 and against M. Caelius Rufus and M. Tuccius.52 In 
52 BC a special law de vi of Pompey was tabled concerning the subject of the murder of 
Clodius. 
The next laws de vi are leges Juliae de vi publica et privata. 53 Cloud54 argues 
convincingly that there were two leges Juliae de vi, both of which were unitary; that is, 
they covered in one lex both what was later defined as vis publica and vis privata. The one 
was the work of Caesar while the other was the product of Augustus probably between 19 
and 16 BC. Cloud also argues that the distinction between vis publica and vis privata was 
not evident in the Augustan law, but was in fact the creation of classical jurisprudence. 55 
This distinction is not entirely clear. The first category covered going armed in public or 
having an armed gang, even without further action, as well as offences of violence such as 
rape; it also included abuses of power by a magistrate or official. 56 Vis privata, on the 
other hand included violence by unarmed gangs, other offences of violence and self-help 
where one should have used due process of law. 57 The praetor also issued edicts de vi and 
de vi armata and here, at least sticks and stones were -interpreted as arms. 58 
This brief history of vis legislation is important. The frequency of the laws - five within 
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sixty years - suggests an inability to deal effectively with the problem as well as an 
increasing insecurity on the part of the governing class. Also the distinction between vis 
publica and vis privata is indicative of the jurisprudential and the political thought on the 
subject, albeit the thought of over a century and a half later. Moreover, the fact that the 
Augustan law was retained in its basic form, although subject to later minor modifications, 
reflects the relative completeness of the statute. 
Because of the tralatician nature of Roman law, we are justified in deriving from the 
Augustan law the first formal, legal and contemporary definition of vis in the lex Julia de 
vi privata:59 'et cum Marcianus diceret "vim nullam feci"; Caesar dixit: "tu vim putas esse 
solum si homines vulnaretur? Vis est et tunc, quotiens quis id quod deberi sibi putat non 
per iudicem reposcit. Non puto autem nee verecundiae, nee dignitati, nee pietati tuae 
convenire quicquam non iure facere.' This passage is important for an understanding of 
Roman attitudes to violence. Firstly, the definition as a whole is very broad betraying a 
similarly broad understanding of violence and reflecting also the Roman fear of an 
ingrained tendency to violence. Secondly, it confirms that for the Romans physical damage 
is not a necessary or essential element of violence. Thirdly, it shows the deep respect the 
Romans had for law, the rule of law and the process of the courts, which the Romans saw 
as both natural and good. Thus anything which interfered with this process was considered 
violent. In addition this definition places vis in contrast to the great Roman vinutes of 
verecundia, dignitas and pietas. 
Although the law reflects society's needs and attitudes, violence cannot be viewed in the 
legal context only. This is less true of the governed class than it is of the governing class 
especially in the context of political legislation such as the leges de vi when legislation is 
the attempt to formalise, with a view to controlling, something which is a threat not only to 
the orderly functioning of society generally, but more particularly to the interests of the 
law-giving class. Consequently when a state seeks to legislate against violence it is really 
attempting to guarantee and entrench its own position. Those who deplore violence loudest, 
59 Dig. 48.7.7. 
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most publicly and most self-righteously are usually those who wish to maintain the status 
quo. 60 Thus the the language of the legislation will reflect the interests of the law-giving 
class, and the definition handed down in that legislation will be an attitude to violence as 
formulated by the law-giving class only. It may well be completely opposite from the way 
in which other classes may perceive or define violence. This is particularly true of Rome. 
As the nature of the evidence prevents us from being able to establish a general social 
attitude to violence, we are left with an attitude which is for the most part that of the upper 
class. We can, however, search beyond the parameters of the law to ascertain a social 
attitude to violence. This will come down to us through the language that was used in a 
non-legal context. In this respect Cicero is well-placed to give clarity to a contemporary 
attitude to violence. His position in Roman politics, his profession as lawyer, his interest in 
philosophy and even his status as novus homo make him so. It is precisely because he 
makes the bridge between law and philosophy that we are able to divine an attitude to 
violence that is not merely legal, or political, but philosophical and therefore societal. 
Nevertheless, there remains the need to separate the philosopher from the orator. While 
Cicero understands full well the legal and political ramifications of violence, in his 
speeches and philosophical works he often reaches beyond these boundaries of the legal 
and political to dwell on its societal aspects. Depending on the case, however, he may need 
to play up or excuse violence. In Pro Milone, for example, he argues that there are 
instances where violence is justified. 61 The vocabulary he uses, the way he constructs his 
sentences, his style of oratory, even the rhetorical devices and the courtroom tactics in 
which he engages may reveal a general social attitude to violence. To Cicero vis and ius 
were diametrically opposed: 'nee iuri quidquam tam inimicum quam vis'62 and 'sed etiam 
vis ea quae iuri maxime est adversaria iudicio confirmata esse videatur. '63 Ius represents 
order, security and stability, while vis seeks to break it down. This contrast forms the 
backdrop for many of Cicero's speeches for those of his clients who had been charged de 
vi. 
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Occasionally in these instances Cicero confronts the subject head-on, part of the strategy of 
defence being to define the charge and to contest its applicability in the specific instance. 
Often Cicero had great difficulty in doing this because of the broadness and scope of the 
legal definition. Nevertheless Cicero's attitude to violence was clear. Being a fervent 
adherent of constitutional government and the rule of law, he considered that vis was the 
antithesis of constitutional government, and of proper and peaceful political functioning. 
The De Legibus was started in about 52 BC64 as a sequel to the De Re Publica. In it he 
gives the reader the full benefit of his legal, political and philosophical experience. The 
attitudes he expresses in his philosophical work are personal and the result of his 
reflections on years of political and social strife: 'deinceps sunt cum populo actiones, in 
quibus primum et maximum: vis abesto. Nihil est enim exitiosius civitatibus, nihil tam 
contrarium iuri ac legibus, nihil minus civile et inhumanius, quam in composita et 
constituta re publica quicquam agi per vim. •65 It is doubtful whether this respect for due 
process, the rule of law, and constitutional government was shared by all classes, given the 
role of violence in Republican politics. 'During the Republic violence was used to force 
measures through an assembly, to influence the control of an election, and to intimidate or 
even kill political opponents. Although a number of constitutional means were designed to 
check it and nullify its effects, these were not proof against persistent violence on a large 
scale. '66 
Vis is anathema to civilization itself: 'atque inter hanc vitam perpolitam humanitate et illam 
immanem nihil tam interest quam ius atque vis. Horum utro uti nolumus, altero est 
utendum. Vim volumus extingui; ius valeat necesse est, id est iudicia, quibus omne ius 
continetur. Iudicia displicent aut nulla sunt; vis dominetur necesse est. •67 Here, in a 
speech which contains some of the orator's finest passages, the attitude to violence is 
crystal clear. Ius and vis are again diametrically opposed. In his defence of Sestius who 
was indicted for violence for the riots of 57 BC, Cicero argues that civilization is based 
fundamentally on the replacement of violence, which is the "law of the jungle", by the 
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law. It is part of a call to mitigate the violence of political enmities. Ius facilitates the 
peaceful resolution of disputes. In a discussion on war Cicero postulates two ways of 
achieving this; the first 'per disceptationem ', the second, 'per vim'. The former is a virtue 
of man while the latter is a characteristic of beasts. It is for this reason that, 'in re publica', 
there are rules even in war which must be strictly observed. 68 
Violence is itself unnatural, so unnatural that nature instructs wild beasts to repel it in any 
way possible even through violence. Therefore what is unnatural for wild beasts is even 
more so for human beings. In the Pro Milone Cicero expresses this particularly well irt 
defence of yet another client charged de vi: 'sin hoc et ratio doctis et necessitas barbaris et 
mos gentibus et feris etiam beluis natura ipsa praescripsit, ut omnem semper vim, 
quacumque ope possent, a corpore, a capite, a vita sua propulsarent, non potestis hoc 
facinus improbum iudicare, quin simul iudicetis omnibus, qui in latrones inciderint, aut 
illorum telis aut vestris sententiis esse pereundum. •69 It is a speech which many ancient . 
critics considered his masterpiece. For Grant it 'has a another and sadder distinction, for it 
casts a lurid light upon the savage chaos and vendetta which signalised these last moribund 
years of the Republic, and helped to make it inevitable that this once mighty institution 
should come to an end and be replaced by an autocracy. ' 70 In this passage Cicero argues 
that there are occasions when violence is justified, most particularly self-defence. There is 
thus no place for vis in the natural ordered world, and the only time it may be justified is 
when it is used as an instrument only under certain conditions to combat a greater form of 
vis which threatens to break down law and order. 71 
Although Cicero realised that vis was contra rem publicam, that is not only specifically 
against the state but also against the rule of law and the public good, he understood the 
subject's subtleties and contradictions: 'quia nulla vis umquam est in Iibera civitate 
suscepta inter cives non contra rem publicam - non enim est ulla defensio contra vim 
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umquam optanda, sed non nunquam est necessaria. '72 His view is that the security of the 
state is the sovereign political and social value to which all other actions and ideals must 
yield. 73 When state security was jeopardised, as in the case of the Catilinarian conspiracy, 
those with executive power should, if necessary, engage in extra-legal measures to 
extinguish the danger. 74 
However, it is a fundamental contradiction that the final sanction or strategy against 
violence must necessarily be violence itself. This contradiction was expressed in Roman 
law and philosophy by the maxim vini vi repellere licet which was a fundamental principle 
of Roman law. 
Although the vim vi repellere licet principle was accepted between individuals, violence on 
a wider scale was regarded with a lot more suspicion by governments. Progressively so in 
the Late Republic and Early Principate. Thus suppression of violence on a wider scale was 
the province of the state alone. When the legitimate arenas for political and social 
expression such as the courts, the law, and even the assemblies, cannot satisfy a society's 
political and social needs, the state must use methods at its disposal which are beyond the 
limits of the authority which society is willing to tolerate normally. These methods must 
ultimately be violent. This can become a problem especially in the context of a politically 
insecure upper class and an economically unstable lower class. 'Qui cum videret sceleratum 
civem aut domesticum potius hostem, si legibus uti liceret, iudicio esse frangendum, sin 
ipsa iudicia vis impediret ac tolleret, audaciam virtute, furorem fortitudine, temeritatem 
consilio, manum copiis, vim vi esse superandam, primo de vi postulavit; postea quam ab 
eodem iudicia sublata esse vidit, ne ille omnia vi posset efficere curavit. '75 The more 
insecure an upper class becomes, the more justified they feel in using violence. The upper 
class will exploit arguments of state security to overcome the contradictions inherent in 
state violence. This kind of violence, which attempts to secure the socio-political position 
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the socio-political position of the upper class, is validated on the grounds of "patriotism" 
and state security. 
The ideal conditions in which a state functions properly are those in which law and order 
prevail. A government therefore seeks to acquire the acquiescence of those over whom it is 
to govern. It does this either through the voluntary participation or inducement of the ruled 
where the state's legitimacy is either recognized or unquestioned, or through the 
application of force, real or potential, where legitimacy is challenged or in doubt. The 
submission of the governed must be obtained, and the relationship between ruler and ruled 
is nothing other than a power-relationship. However, the state will rely more on sanctions 
than on inducements as a basis for a continuous power relationship because sanctions 'do 
not have to be continually used, or even explicitly threatened to to be effective in 
modifying behaviour. It is sufficient that people know "their place". •76 No-one understood 
this dimension of government better than Cicero who expresses this in the De Re Publica, 
a work which is sometimes thought to J:\ave had real influence on the theory and practice of 
the Early Principate: 77 'quae si consuetudo ac licentia manare coeperit latius imperiumque 
nostrum ad vim a iure traduxerit, ut, qui adhuc voluntate nobis oboediunt, terrore 
teneantur, etsi nobis, qui id aetatis sumus, evigilatum fere est, tamen de posteris nostris et 
de ilia immortalitate rei publicae sollicitor, quae poterat esse perpetua, si patriis viveretur 
institutis et moribus. •78 Again the contrast between vis and ius is stressed. Here Cicero 
appears to anticipate the constitutional dilemma which Augustus and other emperors would 
have to face in the next hundred years as well as the dangers of rule by force and fear. 
However, force is only one way in which submission to authority is achieved. The state 
would prefer to attain this through non violent means. In De Officiis, Cicero's last work, 
written in 44 BC, the philosopher attempts to reconcile expediency and virtue, a struggle 
which reflected the crises and difficulties of the time, when submission to authority had to 
be realised in any way possible: 'atque etiam subiciunt se homines imperio alterius et 
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potestati de causis pluribus. Ducuntur enim aut benevolentia aut beneficiorum magnitudine 
aut dignitatis praestantia aut spe sibi id utile futurum aut metu ne vi parere cogantur aut spe 
largitionis promissisque capti aut postremo ut saepe in nostra republica videmus, mercede 
conducti. ' 79 Important things are foreshadowed in this passage. Firstly, Cicero produces 
two valid reasons for the voluntary submission to authority: benevolentia - goodwill - and 
beneficiorum magnitudine - gratitude for favours conferred. Cicero does not suggest that 
one should obey authority because it is the correct thing to do. It would be too much to 
expect the practical realization of such a Stoic sentiment. Acquiescence on such a basis 
would imply an unquestioned faith in the authority in dispute. 
When clients were on trial for violence, Cicero often had difficulty clarifying the charge. 
Consequently, in the effort to formulate and define the charge, he gives us wider moral 
perspectives on the concept. For a broader Roman perspective on force and violence and 
its place in society, it is helpful, to return to the Pro Caecina which is a case involving 
subtle legal points connected with land which had been left to Cicero's client. Caecina had 
agreed to meet the rival claimant, Aebutius, on the land in dispute and submit to a formal 
"ejection" from it. On arrival, Caecina was prevented from entering and driven away by 
threats of Aebutius and his armed followers. Piso, who represented Aebutius, argued that 
there was no vis involved; no one had been hurt. Cicero's response was that vis, in the 
legal sense, means any extra-legal means of redress. Here, in a case which has no political 
aspect, Cicero seeks to define and clarify what is meant by vis: 'an in coacta multitudine, 
in armis, in telis, in praesenti metu mortis perspicuoque periculo caedis dubium vobis fuit 
inesse vis aliquis videtur necne? Quibus igitur in rebus vis intellegi potest, si in his non 
intelligetur. ' 80 This passage is particularly illuminating because it introduces us to the 
Roman language of violence. The meaning of a word, especially an abstract one such as 
violence, as well as the social attitudes to that word, can be ascertained to a large extent, 
by the company it keeps. Thus we are given a verbal context in which vis operates. 
References are made to arms, weapons, danger, fear of death, murder. These are only 
some of the words which will indicate meanings of, and attitudes to, vis. 
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A particular difficulty is that of implied damage or threat. The passage also sheds light on 
this other requirement in our touchstone definition of violence. Bearing in mind the 
broadness of the definition in the law, we look yet again at Pro Caecina: 'etenim 
recuperatores, non ea sola vis est quae ad corpus nostrum vitamque pervenit, sed etiam 
multo maior ea quae periculo mortis iniecto formidine animum perterritum loco saepe et 
certo de statu demovet; ' 81 'quae vis in bello appellatur, ea in otio non appellabitur? ..... et 
vulnus corporis magis istam vim quam terror animi declarabit?' 82 Actual physical damage 
need not be evident. We are able also to appreciate how seriously Romans of Cicero's time 
considered the connection between fear and violence - vis et metus. Damage can be 
psychological as well as physical, and for Cicero what Wood calls "psychic violence" was 
a more potent means of control than physical violence: 83 e.g. 'quod igitur fugiebat? 
propter metum. Quid metuebat? Vim videlicet. ' 84 Metus and vis are frequently found 
together, eg. in the phrase per vim et metwn. 85 Furthermore these two words often occur 
accompanied by a verb of compulsion, e.g. coactus vi et metu, thereby expanding the 
meaning of vis and giving it an aspect of something which works against will. 86 Fear in the 
context of vis is not only found as a noun but with verbs which denote fear such as metuo, 
pertimesco, timeo and terreo. 87 
From the perspective of the victim, vis also works against the will. The Romans 
appreciated that there was a natural order to things and that consequently anything which 
interfered with this process was necesssarily a vitiwn which imposed itself through force -
per vim. What the Realencycloptidie expresses as Willensmange/88 is articulated through 
verbs of compulsion. Of these cogere is the most common. 89 Vis is a means through which 
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objectives are reached usually in a manner which is at best irregular, at worst, illegal. 
Consequently the verb of compulsion is most often accompanied by an ablative90 or 
preposition. 91 There are other verbs of compulsion: coercere, 92 compello, 93 depello94 and 
expello95 are all used in the same sense. The use of opprimo broadens vis giving it a 
societal and political sense of something that suppresses will. 96 
Over and above the idea of fear and. compulsion, there are other concepts which indicate 
violence. The choice of verbs, for example, can add flavour and force to what a sentence is 
attempting to say. Cicero imports the language of the battlefield to a non-military setting in 
order to convey the violent context of his topic. Thus verbs such as adgredi, obsidere, 
certare, inruere, armare and oppugnare appear with vis where the context of the sentence 
is not necessarily a military one. 97 Similarly there are verbs which indicate interference 
with the natural order of things such as disturbare, impedire, detrahere and debilitari. 98 
The agencies of power have the means of physical force . 'The means of physical force 
give those who possess them the ability to obstruct, constrain, hurt, harm or destroy those 
who lack them, and to compel them to action or inaction through the threat of such 
inflictions. '99 In this way the verb in the sentence which contains vis can indicate the 
nature of the violence as well as its effect. Thus verbs such as eripio100, erumpo101 , 
frango 102 and peifringo103 not only impart a negative bias but also express the destructive 
nature of v.is and the means by which the destruction is achieved. 
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Another aspect to the meaning of vis can be ascertained by examining words which occur 
in agreement with it. Adjectives and participles are particularly useful in this respect. Also 
nouns as complements can be of assistance. To deal firstly with adjectives and participles. 
Vis is dangerous, deadly (fatalis). 104 It is something mad, irrational (furiosa), 105 certainly 
wicked (nefaria) 106 and even destructive or disastrous (ealamitosa). 101 It is significant that 
vis appears rarely in the works of Cicero with an adjective. Even participles are rare. Vis 
armata is a notable exception which is very common. 108 The number of adverbs is limited 
but verbs are more frequent. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that adjectives 
can diminish the force of the word as well as amplify it. With a word such as vis Cicero 
appreciates the risk of overkill. If it is accompanied by adjectives or coupled with a noun 
there is the danger of "going over the top" or introducing a whole new set of inappropriate 
associations. 
When vis does appear in conjunction with another noun to form one unitary concept, its 
meaning is both expanded and amplified e.g. vis et metus or vis et iniuria. 109 An example 
is provided in Cicero's Post Reditum ad Quirites: 'mihi quod potuit vis et iniuria et 
sceleratorum hominum furor detrahere. ' 110 A tricolon crescendo effect here lends extra 
force, while the words furor and iniuria betray attitudes to violence of madness, injury and 
damage. Vis and furor appear more than once. 111 Vis also appears with other nouns such 
as erudelitas 112 
' 
turba, 113 severitas, 114 aeerbitas, 115 
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In a wider perspective, the way Cicero constructs his sentences adds dimension and depth 
to his subject. As a master of rhetoric he employs every stylistic device to achieve this. 
Meaning and attitude will be emphasized in a tour de force of alliteration, assonance, 
anaphora, asyndeton and even tricolon crescendo, e.g. 'nulla contumelia, nulla vis, nullum 
periculum possit depellere'; 120 'nullam vim, nullum impetum metuo'; 121 'ad vim, facinus · 
caedemque'; 122 'vi malo plagis'; 123 'vi, ferro, periculis'; 124 'vi, ferro, m.etu, minis 
obsessid25 and 'ut sine occulto consilio, sine nocte, sine vi, sine damno alterius, sine 
armis, sine maleficio fieri potuerit. ' 126 These are not merely stylistic devices. They 
contribute significantly to the meaning and attitude of the subject, and they convey to us, in 
no uncertain terms, the passion Cicero had thought appropriate to the subject. In some 
cases there is a conceptual progression. What begins with vis, for, example will end, via 
ferrum, arma or periculum, inexorably, in caedes. 
Vis, in the ablative also occurs in a two part formula which shows not only the manner in 
which a certain end is attained, but also the specific means through which the violence is 
manifested. Vi et armis, 127 indicates that the violence was not only physical, but was also 
achieved through the use of weapons. The words together make up one concept and 
illustrate one specific type of violence. With viet minis128 or viet metu, on the other hand, 
the physical element of the type of violence in question is removed or distanced and takes 
on a psychological dimension in which not only physical threats but also intimidation are 
the major features. 
The relationship between arms and violence is critical for a proper understanding of the 
subject. This is expressed particularly through the participle armatus. 129 A common phrase 
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is vi armatis hominibus. 130 The means by which violence is physically inflicted is very 
important. Yet it is never clear what precisely is used. Weapon terminology in the context 
of conceptual violence is rarely specific; vis is accompanied by general terms for weapons 
such as Iapides, saxa, tela and ferrum. The specific vocabulary for weapons, such as 
gladius, lancea, pilum and hasta are all part of the Roman soldier's equipment and 
therefore enjoy a certain measure of respectability which Cicero would not want to 
associate with vis. This may be so because the perpetrators of violence did not have access 
to military weapons. Indeed, it was an offence for the plebs to carry weapons of any kind. 
But the use of vague and generic terms serves also to distance the Roman army, through 
which legitimacy was enforced, law and order guaranteed and Roman imperial glory 
advertised, from those who wickedly sought to overthrow the state by means of violence. 
A distinction must be drawn between the vocabulary of the battlefield 131 which brings 
home the action, cruelty and brutality of military conflict in a general sense, and the 
military vocabulary of a Roman institution which has associations of the heroism of the 
Roman character and t~e illustriousness of Roman military history. Consequently, Cicero 
avoids using military vocabulary with vis because he wants to deny vis the legitimacy of 
such association and to exclude criticism of the state and its legitimate organs of force. 
Moreover, since the law is vague, it can be good courtroom strategy to be correspondingly 
vague. Indeed Cicero did not need to be specific. The lex Julia de vi uses telum which it · 
provides with an appropriately wide definition: 'telorum autem appellatione omnia ex 
quibus singuli homines nocere possent accipiuntur.' 132 Two passages illustrate the 
connection between vis and weapons well. In the first Cicero traces the destructive path of 
violence: 'quid opus fuit vi, quid armatis hominibus, quid caede, quid sanguine?t133 
Because the men are armed there is carnage and bloodshed. In the second Cicero contrasts 
and balances the instruments of violence with the mechanisms of civilization, and comes to 
a definite conclusion as to the effectiveness of violence and thus its desirability: 'quos 
lapidibus, quos ferro, quos facibus, quos vi, manu, copiis delere non potuerunt, hos vestra 
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auctoritate, vestra religione, vestris sententiis se oppressos arbitrantur' .134 The notion of 
weapons is thus central to an understanding of violence and we can therefore understand 
Cicero's impassioned plea, 'vis absit, ferrum ac Iapides removeantur.' 135 
Moving on from Cicero to a wider literary approach, the employment of weapons to inflict 
vis, can consequently be considered a vitium which jeopardises Roman vinutes and the 
ideal Roman way of life as expressed in poetry. Thus we are not limiting ourselves to one 
man's perspective. These attitudes to violence were shared by others, poets and politicians 
alike. The poets of the Late Republic look back fondly to the Golden Age 'quam bene 
Saturno vivebant rege. ' 136 In those days 'non acies, non ira fuit, non bella, nee ensem 
immiti saevus duxerat arte faber. t1 37 The reason for this nostalgia is the social and political 
crisis of the Late Republic. Tibullus bewails the inventor of weapons who is 'ferus et vere 
ferreus': 
Quis fuit, horrendos primus qui protulit enses? 
Quam ferus et vere ferreus ille fuit! 138 
Ovid, in the Metamorphoses, contemplates the four ages of man. The first139 was a time 
when man knew neither law nor fear, 'poena metusque aberant', an age of golden bliss not 
sha~owed by the menaces which military equipment brought. 
non galeae, non ensis erant: sine militis usu 
mollia securae peragebant otia gentes.' 140 
The second, 141 the "silver age" witnessed the emergence of homes, the planting of crops 
and the subjugation of of animals to the will of mankind. The third age142 was the "bronze 
age" - 'saevior ingeniis et ad horrida promptior arma, non scelerata tamen.' But the fourth 
age was one of harsh iron, 143 when all manner of crime broke out and the virtues of 
modesty, truth and loyalty surrendered to wicked vices of deceit, violence and criminal 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
Sest. 2. 
Flacc. 91. 
Tib. 1.3.35. 
Tib. 1.3.47-48. 
Tib. 1.10.1-2. 
Met. 1.89-112. 
Met. 1.99-100. 
Met. 1.113-124. 
Met. 1.125-127. 
Met. 1.127: 'De duro ultima ferro.' 
26 
greed: 'insidiae et vis et amor sceleratus habendi.' 144 Iron (ferrum) was responsible for the 
demise of man. 
Iamque nocens ferrum ferroque nocentius aurum 
prodierat: prodit bellum, quod pugnat utroque, 
sanguineaque manu crepitantia concutit arma.' 145 
Earlier in Ennius the contrast between civilization and the viciousness and barbarity of vis 
is emphasized: 
< Proelia promulgantur, > 
Pellitur e medio sapientia, vi geritur res; 
Spemitur orator bonus, horridus miles amatur; 
Haud doctis dictis certantes, nee maledictis 
Miscent inter sese inimicitias agitantes; 
Non ex iure manu conseritur, sed magis ferro-
Rem repetunt regnumque petunt vadunt' .146 
Vis is one of the principal factors responsible for substantial social deterioration. The 
instruments of violence have taken over and there can no longer be a situation where: 
pace bidens vomerque nitent at tristia duri 
militis in tenebris occupat arma situs. 147 
Contrast is another device through which meanings of violence and attitudes to it can be 
divined. The contrast between vis and ius has already been mentioned. 148 In the Philippics, 
for example, there are several instances of the use of the phrase 'per vim et contra 
auspicia' .149 When C. Manilius, tribune of 66 BC promulgated a bill on the matter of 
voting rights for the ordo libeninus, it was eventually passed, but only through some 
tumult and violence; the bill was annulled by the senate on the ground that had obtained its 
passage per vim or perhaps contra auspicia. 150 Violence stands against all Rome's 
customary practices and the legislative processes. Another example of Cicero's use of 
contrast and balance and other rhetorical devices to drive home a particular attitude to 
violence, can be found in Pro Sestio: 'victa igitur est causa rei publicae et victa non 
auspiciis, non intercessione, non suffragiis sed vi, manu, ferro.' 151 The sentence falls into 
two parts, the first positive, the second negative. 'Victa' is emphatically positioned 
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allowing the reader to anticipate the tragedy that is to follow. It is an emphasis that is 
intensified at the beginning of the next phrase, thus framing the subject of the sentence, 
one which was close to Cicero's heart. This is followed by the positive aspect of the 
sentence made prominent through the use of anaphora. These are the mechanisms of peace, 
the things for which the Republic and Cicero stand. This is undercut through enormous 
economy of language, achieved by asyndeton, when Cicero expresses the agents of the 
Republic's destruction in three short words. Cicero's distaste is such that it must be stated 
as briefly as possible. 
The Republican attitude to violence was clear. This attitude was expressed through the use 
of the word vis. The Romans realized the dangers violence held for society and understood 
the impact it would make should it be allowed to go uncontrolled or unmonitored. Thus 
they sought in the last years of the Republic even to legislate against it. This was part of a 
largely unsuccessful programme to contain violence. In the Principate new efforts would 
have to be made. They would be efforts which can be argued lay mostly be beyond the 
scope of legitimacy or constitution, and therefore more often than not involved the very 
violence they sought to control. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
VIOLENCE AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW IN THE EARLY 
PRINCIPATE. 
INTRODUCTION 
In chapter one I showed that law was a mechanism for the regulation of the affairs of 
society in general and for the control of violence in particular as it threatened the structure 
of society and that law, as it is written, reflects the needs and attitudes of society, and more 
especially the needs and attitudes of the governing class. Furthermore, law is not merely a 
formal system of rules, but is the prime method of ordering society, the purpose of which 
is to attain social harmony and thereby a just society. 1 Even if Augustus could not express 
this in these terms when he embarked on his programme of legislation and social reform, 
he must have appreciated that before social harmony can be acquired, order must be 
realised. It is particularly important for a proper understanding of Roman history to have 
some knowledge of Roman law and the legal system. The abundance of juristic evidence 
left to us sheds light not only on the Romans' social life and institutions, but also on the 
workings of their political and legal mind. In the context of violence therefore, a brief 
discussion of the Roman philosophy of law is relevant, because it will shed significant light 
on the manner in which legislation against violence was approached, as well as the quality 
of the legislation itself. 
On law as a phenomenon that strives to achieve social harmony, there are two perspectives. 
For those who believe that mankind is intrinsically evil, social progress cannot be realised 
without the restrictions of penal laws. In this view, law is the indispensable restraint upon 
the forces of evil, and anarchy and the absence of law is the supreme horror to be warded 
off. On the other hand, those who see the nature of man as inherently good seek to find the 
origins of the ills of man's present condition outside man himself. For them man's true 
nature has become distorted and thus requires for its control the rigours of a punitive 
system of law. Law is a natural necessity after the Fall to mitigate the evil effects of sin. 
1 The magnitude of the jurisprudential debate as to what law is and how it functions· 
lies beyond the ambit of this study. Nevertheless, for an overview of the 
philosophies which have attempted the resolution of this question, consult Lloyd· 
and Harris. 
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The former, having a more optimistic assessment of human failings, are inclined to look 
back to an earlier Golden Age2 of primeval innocence when men lived simple, happy and 
well-ordered lives without the need for any external system of legal rules or coercion to 
restrain their impulses, which were wholly unselfish and directed to the common good of 
mankind. 3 This was a common theme among the poets, historians and philosophers of the 
ancient world. Ovid4 recalls the primitive paradise: 
quae vindice nullo, 
sponte sua, sine lege fidem rectumque colebat. 
poena metusque aberant, nee verba minantia fixo 
aere legebantur, nee supplex turba timebat 
iudicis ora sui, sed erant sine iudice tuti. 
For Seneca5 the Golden Age was a "communist" Utopia where men 'in commune rerum 
natura fruebantur.' On the other hand in his account of Early Man,6 which is neither 
cynical nor sentimental, Lucretius describes a life that was tough and simple, but not 
unattractive. For him the harshness and violence of primitive life led eventually to the 
making of laws and the regulation of society through institutions: 7 
Inde magistratum partim docuere creare 
iuraque constituere, ut vellent legibus uti. 
Nam genus humanum, defessum vi colere aevum, 
ex inimictiis languebat; quo magis ipsum 
sponte sua cecidit sub leges artaque iura. 
In an excursus in the Annales, Tacitus deals with the origins of law, in the context of the 
lex Papia Poppaea, a cornerstone of Augustus' moral legislation. 8 According to Tacitus, 
man was originally good by nature, 'nihil contra morem cuperent, nihil per metum 
vetabantur, '9 and has since degenerated to be egotistic, greedy and self serving; the forces 
responsible for this disintegration were ambition and violence and its consequences were 
tyranny and despotism: 'at postquam exui aequalitas et pro modestia ac pudore ambitio et 
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vis incidebat, provenere dominationes multosque apud populos aeternum mansere.' It is a 
pessimistic view consistent with Tacitus' broader historical perspective. Nevertheless, he 
does appreciate Augustus' pivotal role in the restoration of order. Where, in the previous 
twenty years there had been neither mos nor ius, only discordia, now 'sexto demum 
consulatu Caesar Augustus, potentiae securus, quae triumviratu iusserat abolevit deditque 
iura, quis pace et principe uteremur. ' 10 
Although this is strictly Tacitus' perspective, this passage nevertheless points to a few 
specific aspects which will form the substance of this chapter. Firstly, in order for the pax 
of the principate to materialize, Augustus had to become 'securus potentiae '. Having 
secured power and peace, Augustus could then formulate the legislation for the novus 
status, so that he could retain his position. Secondly, the alliterative phrase 'pace et 
principe' underlines the fact that they are two essential parts of a whole dependent on each 
other. The princeps owed his position to the prevalence of pax; pax, however, could not be 
attained without the agency of the princeps. Thirdly, the princeps himself gave the laws 
which ensured pax. There was a major shift from the Republic, where 'salus populi 
suprema lex esto', 11 to the Empire, in which 'quod principi placuit, legis habet 
vigorem. !12 This chapter will examine the measures which Augustus and Tiberius 
promulgated especially relating to the courts and legal system in which their laws were 
supposed to be applied. If Tacitus is to be believed, Augustus was responsible for major 
innovations in the legal sphere. These innovations were to affect significantly the nature of 
violence in the Early Principate. I will argue that their impact was to be felt even in the 
Late Empire in that they created the scope and legitimacy for government (by this I mean 
authority, and thus institutional violence) to visit violence on its citizens in a fashion never 
before experienced. 
Innovations in the criminal law system will come under particular scrutiny, for here 
Augustus made his most significant contribution. By contrast, in the processes of civil 
10 
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Augustus made his most significant contribution. By contrast, in the processes of civil 
jurisdiction Augustus made a less marked impression; 13 a further contrast will be drawn 
with Augustus' social legislation, which was another means of interference and acquisition 
of state control. While social legislation is a method of moulding society into a particular 
structure,· the criminal law and its provisions of sanction are the ultimate means through 
which obedience to state authority is obtained. Security legislation, for example, is a 
contrivance to satisfy, and render legitimate, political goals through the criminal system. 
Consequently, the relationship between state and citizen becomes all important and is seen 
most obviously in the operation of criminal law .14 For Garnsey, this has a specific political 
aspect: 'the intrusion by the state into the sphere of private jurisdiction.' 15 I will argue that 
the extent of the interest shown by government in the private lives of its citizens reflects 
the political and constitutional uncertainty felt by that government. This is particularly so 
in the case of Rome in the transition from Republic to Principate. The criminal system as a 
whole, and the innovations to which it was subject, is a gauge by which Augustus' interest 
in the lives of his citizens can be measured. The criminal system, according to the political 
philosopher Durkheim, will reflect the quality of the relationship between ruler and ruled. 
In the case of an absolute monarch and his subjects this relationship is not reciprocal but 
unilateral. 16 This position is perhaps too strong for a political context in which Augustus 
was trying to disguise the monarchy with the myth of the restoration of the Republic. In 
reality however, the power of the Roman emperors was absolute and autocratic. But it was 
a power expressed in behaviour which fluctuated between civilitas, the conduct of a citizen 
among citizens (which allowed the relationship between the princeps and his subjects to be 
bilateral), and superbia, the disdainful bearing of a king and superhuman being. 17 
There are two aspects to a criminal law system. In this chapter I will address the first, the 
. 
"pre-conviction" aspect , which comprises the law itself, the procedure which governs it 
and the courts which enforce it. The second, that of the punishment handed down after 
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conviction, will be reserved for a later chapter. 18 Both aspects, however, were subject to 
change and evolution in the Principate; both are significant in determining the nature of 
violence in the period; the first through the disintegration of proper court procedure and 
the consequent arbitrary judgements which the courts handed down - justice became a 
scarcer commodity - and the second through the deterioration, and the greater licence to be 
more severe, in the infliction of punishments. The criminal sphere shows a definite trend in 
deterioration towards violence. 19 Crook comments that 'everyone is struck by the apparent 
contrast and lack of savagery of the penalties for crime in the Republican age of Rome and 
the diversity and increasing brutality of those under the principate. '20 There is a 
relationship between the harshness of punishment and the character of government. 
Durkheim asserts that 'the basic cause of the relative harshness of the Imperial penal law 
was the tendency towards absolutism of government under the Empire. '21 While Garnsey 
uses this as a springboard for an enquiry into the evolution of penalties over four centuries, 
he does not give adequate weight to the evolution of the mechanisms which made these 
penalties possible. I shall argue here that these two aspects cannot be viewed separately and 
that this evolution is responsible for the violence evident in the Early Empire and created 
the structures and context for the violence of the Later Empire. 
In this regard the individual Roman citizen was assailed on two fronts. In the courts he saw 
his legal right to decent treatment as an individual suffer a steady degradation, to such an 
extent that it was only a little modified by touches of humanitas. 22 Politically, the value of 
Roman citizenship declined correspondingly, so that by the time of Caracalla it meant very 
little. Institutional changes, such as those in the criminal law were partly responsible for 
this decline. 23 They gave judges the opportunity to exploit the social divisions within the 
population, thus widening the gap between status groups. This in turn caused the privileged 
status group to become narrower while the lower order group became broader. 
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It is essential to see that these fundamental changes took place against the background of a 
Rome in transition from rule by an oligarchy to what was in effect a monarchy. One of the 
principal considerations in effecting these changes was the need to combat social and 
political violence before it became proper opposition to government and to achieve the 
political goal of ensuring the position of the emperor as the personification of the state. 
The efforts of the emperor in this regard might well have resulted in greater violence, 
actual or potential, of the kind he was hoping to prevent because of resistance to the new 
political regime. But it did not. Instead, the emperor, as government, was given greater 
powers, greater flexibility and greater room to deal with violence without the constraints 
which limited Republican authorities. 
A criminal system, in order to be effective, must function legitimately. The system 
acquires legitimacy through procedure and its role in the political process. Procedure is 
important because it guarantees uniformity - each case is handled in a standard way, in a 
specific arena, and according to specific rules. Participation in the process is important 
because it is by that process that the governed grant to those who govern the right to judge. 
In this equation, therefore, the courts play an essential role in the smooth functioning of a 
political society. They are the mechanisms through which the state enforces its commands. 
And the commands of the state must be obeyed if it is to retain its position. Obedience to 
these commands is secured either through fear and force, generated by the power vested in 
the state, or through allegiance to the state by virtue of a social contract. Such allegiance 
can only be demanded by a ruler who is able to establish a valid claim to control the state. 
Power alone is not enough. 'De facto power in itself has not been regarded as sufficient 
grounds for establishing an obligation to serve and obey. The powers of the state must have 
been acquired legitimately, in accordance with established practice, and be used 
appropriately for accepted purposes. ' 24 This is especially true of the criminal system. 
Rome's entire judicial system underwent radical change from a mild and predictable system 
which enjoyed, if not the support, at least the tolerance of those who fell under its 
24 Macfarlane, 33. 
34 
jurisdiction, to an organ of state the aim of which was not so much justice as social control 
and the suppression of violence. During the Republic, the criminal system had operated ·. 
smoothly under Republic~ conditions. Strachan Davidson exaggerates the position: 'so far 
as citizens were concerned the criminal law of the Roman Republic, in spite of abundant 
threats of capital punishment, became in practice the mildest ever known in the history of 
mankind. '25 MacMullen, however, brings perspective to the subject: 'the vast majority of 
citizens, however, were they to be asked what era they would wish to live in, Cicero's or 
Marcus Aurelius', for the enjoyment of physical safety in the Empire's courts, would no 
doubt have preferred the former. •26 There seems to be consensus on this point. 'The 
accepted view is that the penal system of the middle and late Republic was relatively mild. 
The system as we know it was milder in practice than it was in theory. •27 
The procedure of criminal trials in the Republic indicates this mildness. For example, in 
the standing jury courts of the Roman Republic verdicts were delivered by juries of up to 
seventy-five, and the presiding magistrate restricted himselfto ensuring an orderly conduct 
of the trial (and in this he was usually very easy-going), whereas the trials of the Empire 
were characterised by the cognitio procedure and the increasing intervention of the judge. 28 
In the Republic 'the fairness with which the rules of Roman criminal procedure afforded 
the accused scope for his defence is most impressive and might even seem to us to be 
exaggerated, '29 and was guaranteed by rules of procedure which were consistently applied. 
Kunkel goes further to say that 'the jury courts of the Republic had shown signs of 
developing something like the rule of law and the principle of impartial criminal justice, 
and with their disappearance this tendency was also partly submerged. ' 30 
A reverse took place in the Early Empire to a system which became much milder in theory 
than in practice. This transition can be more easily discerned in the criminal law, but it was 
inevitable that eventually civil jurisdiction would be affected as well, as the state sought to 
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control the lives of its citizens in the interests of national security. 31 This is not to say that 
the Republican system did not strive at social control too. But two factors rendered the 
Republican system inadequate. Firstly, the increase in law suits clogged up the courts to 
such an extent that the system was severely retarded. Secondly, the new political context 
demanded a greater emphasis on state security which the Republican system was not able to 
provide. 
National or state security (which to Cicero was a paramount consideration) was the chief 
motivating factor for these changes. From the very beginning of the Principate personal 
' 
safety was a matter of almost paranoid concern for the emperor. At one stage Augustus 
wore a steel corset and a sword beneath his tunic 'sub veste munitus', and senators were 
not even allowed to approach his chair except one by one and after they had been 
searched. 32 Such was the extent of his fear. Admittedly in this case, Augustus was afraid 
that those excluded by him in the lectio senatus of 29 or 28 BC would attempt his life. 
Nevertheless it exposes the vulnerability of the emperor to assassination, a vulnerability to 
which Tiberius was equally sensitive. His first act as princeps was to call on the 
Praetorians to provide him with a bodyguard. 33 Towards the end of his reign the sources 
represent him as living in a state of terror, 'praetrepidus ... vixerit. ' 34 He became more 
sensitive to attacks upon his position and his power, which resulted eventually in a frenzy 
of treason trials that Seneca could hyperbolically represent as leading to loss of life greater 
than the civil war. 35 
The institutional changes made to the criminal courts and the criminal law were measures 
to achieve security of state by centralizing as much power - in this case judicial power- in 
the emperor's hands as possible. Similarly the delegation of judicial duties to the praefectus 
urbi, the emperor's appointee, was one of the ways in which he retained "hands on" 
control. There are two dangers in such centralization, however. Firstly, government loses 
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its democratic character with the result that participation and faith in the political process 
by the governed evaporates. This places a strain on the state, which consequently becomes 
more absolutist as it relies more on violence and unilateral measures to exercise control and 
secure itself. Thus the arena for political bargaining between state and subject is removed 
from the formal structure of assembly or curia to informal arenas where violence is often 
either the result or indeed the means of political communication between ruler and subject. 
Secondly, as the state assumes for itself the organs of control, the checks and balances 
which may exist and operate against arbitrary government disintegrate and eventually 
disappear. In the end constitutional government itself disappears. The constitutional notion 
of separation of powers is something for which Augustus had no appreciation. This is 
admittedly a modern idea, 36 but one which guarantees a citizen protection against arbitrary 
and tyrannical government through the independence of a judiciary. In modern 
constitutional theory the concept of courts independent of the government is essential to 
stable, efficient and even-handed administration. This independence secures a subject's 
acceptance of court decisions and acquiescence to the commands of the state which the 
legal system and the courts enforce. A modern formulation is instructive: 'I (as a citizen) 
can have no obligation to obey illegal commands of the state sovereign, and under 
constitutional government the legality of any command can be judicially determined by 
independent courts. Constitutional rule is the antithesis of arbitrary rule since it defines the 
limits and the powers of the government. Moreover, by separating the government from 
the state it has been made possible to distinguish between opposition and treason. d? In the 
Republic, the judicial structures did enjoy some independence from government. But 
Augustus realised that the judicial system was no longer adequate for the political and 
social exigencies of the time and therefore required substantial reform. Moreover, it was an 
effective method of establishing social control. Suetonius tells us that although Augustus 
considered the restoration of the Republic, he thought better of it because to divide the 
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responsibilities of government among several hands, 'plurium arbitrio', would be 
detrimental not only to his own life but also to national security. 38 
At this stage two matters of crucial importance must be addressed before discussing the 
nature of the changes to the criminal law of the Early Principate. They are important 
because they reach to the very essence of the Roman criminal law and go a long way in 
explaining the nature of violence in Roman society at the time. First is the structure of 
Roman society itself, for any legal system affects the different strata of society in different 
ways. The second is the role of the concept of self-help in Roman criminal law. As far as 
the first matter is concerned, it is not the place here to discuss in any depth the structure of 
Late Republican or Early Imperial Roman society, 39 or to investigate in any detail whether 
class analysis of ancient society is valid. 40 It is enough to say that Roman society was 
characterised by deep social, economic and political inequality and that Augustus in no way 
attempted to reform this. Rather, the Augustan revolution was essentially conservative, a 
product of the chronic social and political turmoil of the late Republic. 41 Nevertheless, 
social tensions and divisions persisted, but the 'social order was held together by the 
family, by other vertical and horizontal relationships, and by other ideological, legal, and 
the coercive power of the state. •42 
Augustus' social and political efforts were directed at entrenching the separation between 
upper and lower strata, confirming existing social divisions, and indeed accentuating them. 
Uncontrolled social mobility was militated against, 43 a policy which was expressed in 
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Both Augustus and Tiberius endeavoured to restrict and regulate social mobility 
which was considered a threat to state security. Laws to this effect were 
promulgated. For example, the lex Junia (19 BC) bestowed only Latin rights to 
those who were freed. The lex Julia theatralis was introduced to formalize the 
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Augustus' legislative programme in general and was felt in the criminal legislation in 
particular. This was an important aspect of Augustus' rule and needs to be mentioned if the 
question of violence in the early Empire is to be understood. Augustus did not seek to 
reform such a status and hierarchy-conscious society as Rome's, as much as to fashion it 
through legislation in order to maximise political control for himself. 
Augustus' programme of legislation was directed at halting the blurring of traditional social 
lines and the dislocation of social relationships which the political upheavals and civil wars 
of the last century had brought about. Consequently, as Reinhold says, 'in the Imperial 
period, under the influence of the socio-political philosophy of Augustus, the Romans 
developed the highest degree and diversity of formal social stratification, and at the same 
time the highest incidence of social mobility in antiquity. '44 Augustus had to recognise that 
a considerable degree of flexibility in the working of the system of social stratification, was 
required, in fact inevitable, if 'the basic structure was not to be strained and break down 
into social discontent and revolution. '45 
Under the Principate, a tension existed between emperor and nobility. The more autocratic 
the regime, the less dependent was the emperor on the traditional Roman institutions of 
government. The reign of Augustus saw the deliberate establishment of an administration 
which the emperor staffed with officials of his own choice. These officials came largely 
from the Equestrian order, which Augustus had changed vastly and which depended on him 
for professional advancement and patronage. He also employed freedmen and slaves whose 
loyalty and diligence he could guarantee above members of those ranks who had political 
44 
45 
seating in the theatres and circuses according to the ordines. On this see Rawson 
(1987), 83-114. Under the lex Julia de ordinibus maritandis of 18 BC freedman 
were forbidden to marry women of senatorial families. The lex Fufia Caninia (2 
BC) set a limit on the number of slaves who could be given their freedom by will at 
one time, on the death of their master. The lex Aelia Sentia (AD 4) laid down a 
minimum age of twenty for manumission and also made it more difficult younger 
slaves to become citizens by fixing conditions for their freedom. The lex Visellia 
(AD 24) prevented the entry of freedmen into the civic magistracies. Manumission 
of slaves was considered a problem. Early in Augustus' reign it was so 
commonplace that it was considered a threat to the political security of the state 
(See Dion. Hal. 4.24.4; Suet. Aug. 40.3-4). 
Reinhold (1971), 275. 
Weaver, 3. 
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ambitions. In the Equestrian order Augustus had created a source of power on which he 
could rely in the institutional tug-of-war between himself and the senatorial aristocracy. 
Thus the measures at regulating social mobility contributed to securing Augustus' political 
position. 46 
The law was further removed from being an instrument of equality. Indeed, for Tacitus the 
Twelve Tables were the last equitable legislation;47 thereafter laws were carried 'per vim 
... dissensione ordinum,' initiated and passed by the upper strata, for the benefit of the 
upper strata, a system which gave birth to a network of legal privilege denied to those of 
the lower strata who had the misfortune to find themselves in court in the Late Republic 
before an upper class jury or worse, an upper class judge. Although the criminal justice 
system was mild in structure, by Augustus' reign it showed itself to be susceptible to 
corruption and was often plagued by unacceptable delays. The system was in desperate 
need of reform. This reform did not come suddenly. It was a gradual transformation which 
did not abolish the formulary system completely, but rendered it redundant during the 
course of time. 48 
Status was an inherent part of Roman society: 'among Romans, everything depended on 
status. Several large distinctions received recognition in the courts. '49 Nevertheless, this 
discrimination intensified as the upper strata became more insecure. The innovations 
introduced in the law meant that the criminal law in particular, became an instrument 
through which social control, in the political sense, could be gained and retained. In the 
Empire it became a means of oppression designed to favour the interests of the higher 
orders in Roman society. A criminal case favoured the upper strata from arrest and 
indictment to trial and penalty. When a member of the plebs was arrested he was thrown 
into the career where he was to await trial, if in fact he was lucky enough to have the 
benefit of one. This was in effect punishment before conviction, an ignominy which 
members of the upper strata usually avoided. They were often allowed to remain at home 
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until trial and even given the opportunity to escape or to commit suicide if conviction was 
imminent. By Hadrian's time the distinction between honestiores and humiliores was 
formally enshrined in law and all features of legal equality had long since disappeared. The 
criminal legislation which was promulgated proclaimed separate penalties for each 
stratum. 5° 
The nature of crimes could vary, however. Repetundae, for example, was almost entirely 
an upper stratum offence, while it would be rare to find a member of the plebs charged 
with maiestas. These were crimes most often committed by people of standing with 
political connections. But what of offences normally found in the lower classes such as 
vagrancy, petty larceny and minor assault? As the quaestiones were not geared for such 
offences and it is inconceivable that the assembly would be summoned to try such cases, 
lower class offenders were dealt with summarily. 51 Under the Empire too there was a large 
amount of ad hoc justice meted out to those of the lower strata. The tresviri capitales had 
performed this function during the Republic. These were the magistrates responsible for 
prison, 52 and for arresting and incarcerating malefactors. Their role went certainly beyond 
that of mere police.53 David has shown that they were both judges and executioners and 
that they controlled the criminal justice of those who did not have sufficient rank to avail 
themselves of the quaestiones perpetuae.54 
The evidence, however, for the functioning of criminal justice among the masses is 
scant. 55 I will argue in a separate chapte~6 that the masses had very little in the way of 
legal rights, even though they might have been citizens. There was in all likelihood very 
little real jurisdiction and probably only summary punishment exercised by magistrates 
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See Crook (1967), 68: 'As to how the great bulk of ordinary crime amongst the 
humble folk and slaves in the cosmopolitan alleyways of the city of Rome was dealt 
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using their coercitio. This was the special instrument of enforcement which a magistrate 
had at hand and covers scourging and execution (by decapitation with an axe), arresting 
and carrying a disobedient person to prison, imposing a fine. 57 The factors that were 
responsible for the low quality of justice for the poor were even more prevalent in the Late 
Republic and Early Principate. Accused of low status, and even plaintiffs, found 
accessibility to the courts financially and economically prohibitive. Justice became an 
expensive, high-status privilege. The result was, ironically, that dispute-resolution was 
removed from the regulated and controlled atmosphere of a court to the informal arena of 
the streets where inevitably retroactive measures by the state were required. 
In the political sense the people had lost (or abandoned) their recourse to the formal 
channels of political participation. Communication with authority was now made in the 
circus and arena where the people expressed their uninhibited opinion without sparing the 
feelings even of the emperors themselves. 58 The Games became 'as the people lost its 
right to elect magistrates and pass laws, political gatherings where public opinion was 
made known and political demands put forward. •59 In 56 BC Cicero wrote that the people 
could find expression in four different contexts: at assemblies, elections, the theatre and 
gladiatorial contests.60 By the Empire, however, the first two of these had disappeared. 
The product of this was further polarisation between state and subject and inevitable 
tension and violence. 
SELF-HELP AND THE LAW 
As I stated in chapter one the role of the concept of self-help in Roman criminal law cannot 
be over stressed, and its connection with violence already been mentioned. 61 Since it was 
in the Late Republic and Early Principate that the greatest change in self-help occurred, 
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which consequently had a profound effect on the nature of the violence of the time, it is 
essential to concentrate on the role of the concept of self-help in Roman law of this period. 
The intrusion of the Roman state into the life of the individual was for a long time 
minimal. 62 Any wrong an individual suffered and wanted redressed either by retribution or 
restitution was left entirely to the individual himself. He could not elicit the assistance of 
the state. In the Rome of the Kings and Republic the notion of a crime against the state was 
a foreign one for a number of reasons. Firstly, during the Republic the state as an entity 
was well-defined in constitutional terms, and the administration had nothing to fear from 
its subjects. This is to be contrasted with the Empire where Augustus, and to a lesser 
degree his successors, deliberately avoided the definition of the imperial position in legal, 
constitutional terms. Unlike the Republic, the Empire did not have a formally structured 
constitution: any attempt at definition would have exposed all too clearly the fiction of the 
"restored" Republic. Secondly, the state had no interest in securing or protecting the rights 
of an individual. Its main concern was politics and the preservation of its position. There 
was no culture in ancient society of individual human rights being guaranteed by the state 
in a court of law. What rights were available to the citizen were determined by social 
status. 63 The only right a citizen had in this respect was the right of provocatio ad populum 
which itself underwent evolution to appellatio ad Caesarem, a development which offered 
less sure protection for those who found themselves accused or convicted. 64 Thirdly, the 
idea that violations of property or person which occurred between individual citizens 
constituted an offence against society and the state was, in practice, equally alien. 
Thus what would be considered crimes today were originally left to the individual to 
resolve himself. These were delicta, not crimina and fell under the provisions of the civil 
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law. Kelly postulates self-help as the origin of Roman civil procedure. 65 The evolution 
from delictum to crimen is of principal concern to us here, because it has profound 
ramifications for the enquiry on violence. 'There was a constant need during the Principate 
to define new criminal offences, for the criminal law of the Republic had remained 
elementary. •66 
The basic form of self-help, expressed in the legal maxim 'vim vi repellere licet', 67 
'though gradually modified under the Principate, in the Republic was still an absolute 
right. •68 It extended beyond the scope of mere self-defence to the unilaterally expressed 
assertion of a personal right without the facility of recourse to the judiciary. In Rome acts 
of self-help were considered acts of law. In effect an individual, wronged for whatever 
reason, waged a private war on the person or persons who wronged him. 69 The foundation 
for Roman legal procedure, both civil and later criminal, was private action modelled on 
ritualised self- help. 
Whether the issue was retribution or restitution, Roman criminal law rested to a great 
extent on the concept which Mommsen calls Blutrache. 70 Whether the individual felt 
himself strong enough, or whether he sought the assistance of the tribe to lend him armed 
support, self-help was still the primary means of enforcing a claim or repelling an attack. 
This was a situation which begged intervention from the state. Gradually the State itself 
began to assume responsibility for the punishment of crimes, and in the development of the 
private criminal suit 'self-help is completely set aside, and every wrong is subject to the 
compulsory compensation prescribed by the state for the outraged person. '71 One of the 
major reasons for the revolution in the Early Principate of the criminal law was the fact 
that self-help adversely affected interests beyond the parties in dispute. There was no limit 
to the quality and extent of the self-help which could be summoned. Gang wars might 
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escalate out of control, a danger which Augustus appreciated. 72 
It is important to stress that the transition from a system of pure self-help to one where 
claims were enforced by process of litigation, and thereafter to one where this process was 
participated in, or at least monitored by, the state, cannot have been achieved overnight. A 
system of objective judicial decision replaced the use of force as a means of settling 
disputes gradually. Moreover, the operation of self-help as a method of enforcing law 
easily led to inequality, as it relied on a "might is right" approach. Central to the notion of 
self-help is the amount of assistance an individual was able to obtain. The quality of his 
case could rest not so much on the strength of the evidence or even the extent of the 
wrong, as on the amount of physical force he could muster against the opposing party. An 
individual, no matter how much he had been wronged, if he could not summon the 
necessary physical force, that is to say force greater than that of the opposing party, could 
not pursue his case. 73 Consequently this system was both unjust and irregular preventing 
weaker plaintiffs from litigating against stronger defendants, as well as encouraging legal 
action by stronger plaintiffs against weaker defendants who were powerless to resist. 
Theoretically, therefore, the intrusion of the state into this arena should have been to the 
advantage of the weaker plaintiff or defendant, as the state, had the physical resources to 
enforce sanctions on behalf of the weak litigant. This was not so, however. A critical 
advantage of state intervention in the legal lives of individuals in order to form a criminal 
law is the consolidation of the state's own political position by controlling legal affairs. 
This may not have been Augustus' express intention however, even if his initiatives in the 
field of criminal law did bring some benefit. But they were not only initiatives which 
changed the contexts in which violence manifested itself, but were also reforms which 
made it possible for his successors to abuse the criminal system for their own ends. 
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SPECIFIC LEGISLATION AGAINST VIOLENCE IN THE EARLY EMPIRE. 
The nature of the social and political situation at Rome in the Late Republic and Early 
Principate, as well as Augustus' broader political programme of reform, necessitated 
legislation against violence threatening the state. Augustus had to have the security and 
freedom to put his social programme into effect. However, legislating against violence was 
to prove a difficult task. For one thing, there was not much precedent in Roman legal 
history for legislation of this nature. 74 For another, any legislative proposal limiting 
libenas, political or otherwise, would not be received well, thus limiting Augustus' 
freedom to act. The survival of the concept of libertas in the principate must not be 
underestimated. It was a cornerstone of Republican ideology and was one of Tacitus' main 
themes. 75 For Syme the word libertas carried a precise and legal meaning: the legal status 
of the citizen as opposed to the slave. 76 The tension that existed between libenas and the 
accumulation of personal political power was a major issue of interest to the historian of 
the Early Empire. 77 Augustus understood very well the importance of the concept of 
libenas. Elizabeth Green phrases Augustus' political dilemma as a law-maker in this way: 
'Augustus, while establishing for himself a position of supremacy, realised the need to 
avoid an undisguised, blatant accumulation of personal power, and to display sensitivity 
towards the nostalgic regard in which Republican institutions, practices and privileges were 
held. •78 These institutions were encapsulated in the concept of libertas. 
To ensure maximum efficacy for his social reform and his legislation, Augustus attempted 
to secure a climate of opinion in which action against vis was not regarded as sinister, an 
attack on libertas. Augustus did this by enlisting the aid of poets who, through their work, 
propagated the myth or belief that Augustus was the agent who would return society to the 
paradise of the Golden Age. At the beginning of the chapter I set out the view that law was 
the natural product of the Fall of man from the Golden Age. The Augustan poets were to 
employ the idea of the return of the Golden Age as a means to mould men's views in the 
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support of Augustus' regime. 
In his fourth Eclogue Virgil prophesies the return of the Golden Age. It is important to 
realise that the poem only makes sense against the background of the volatile political 
atmosphere of triumviral Rome, when it was written. After all, these were grim days of 
civil tumult where the possibility of a return to war was only too great. Wallace-Hadril179 
believes that the Eclogue is a 'poetical realisation of a widespread attitude, that the solution 
lay no longer in republican institutions, but in a Messiah. It is significant that Virgil needed 
to tum outside the normal Roman ideological vocabulary to express this attitude.' In the 
Eclogue Virgil, although hopeful, offers the reader only fantasy; a wonderful age which 
depended on the birth of a Saviour, and in which sheep would grow purple wool. 80 Yet by 
the late 20s BC, with Augustus in firm control, Virgil could resuscitate the theme and 
confidently recognise the princeps as Saviour. In the Aeneid Anchises announces: 
hie vir, hie est, tibi quem promitti saepius audis 
Augustus Caesar, divi genus, aurea condet saecula ... 81 
In bringing civil war to an end, Augustus had fulfilled an essential condition of the Return 
to Paradise. The absence of war was a characteristic feature of the Golden Age. The gates 
of war were closed and civil commotion, jUror impius, locked away with all its weapons:82 
dirae ferro et compagibus artis 
claudentur Belli portae; Furor impius intus 
saeva sedens super arma et centum vinctus aeni 
post tergum nodis fremit horridus ore cruento. 
However, it is not enough that Augustus restore peace. He has also to abolish the scelus or 
sin from which the Saviour was to deliver his followers. The Roman People could not exist 
without Augustus, or else they would be overcome by see/us. Augustus alone held the keys 
to Paradise; Augustus-alone could offer salvation. For Wallace-Hadrill, 83 the "Fall" myth 
was pressed to an ideological function: that is, to enforce the subjection of every Roman to 
the person of the emperor. For the Greeks, the myth was to explain the present state of 
humanity, for Augustans it put the emperor at the centre of things. 
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If the Golden Age was a life where laws were not necessary, how did the poets reconcile 
its return with the security of property, the unequal hierarchy of rank, and the strict 
legislative structure which the Augustan regime in fact ensured? The possibility of 
redemption through the abolishment of scelus partly solves the dilemma. Horace's picture 
of scelus from before Actium shifts to Augustus' struggle to secure acceptance for a 
programme of moral legislation. After its passing in 18 BC, Horace states optimistically, 
'mos et lex maculosum edomuit nefas. ' 84 The poet is not only writing propaganda for a 
legislative programme, but associates the see/us of immorality, lust and greed with the 
scelus of civil war, the termination of which is not strictly a military affair, but a religious 
crusade against sin that results in expiation. Augustus' laws helped achieve that. They 
ensured a society which could not be improved 'quamvis redeant in aurum/ tempora 
priscum. •85 Ovid specifies the nature of Augustus' role as Saviour: 
quodcunque habitabile tellus 
sustinet, huius erit; pontus quoque serviet illi! 
pace data terris animum ad civilia vertet 
iura suum legesque feret iustissimus auctor86 
Tacitus, however, writing a century later, subverts the official ideology. More realistically, 
he states that the laws were enforced by compulsion, by the hated method of employing the 
hated delatores. Augustus' moral legislation is a bitter bondage, in complete contrast to the 
voluntary pattern that was characteristic of the Golden Age. 87 Nevertheless, the context for 
Augustus' new society was established. He engaged the help of poets to obtain support for 
his regime and his laws. It was so successful that 'the association of the reigning emperor 
with a return of the Golden Age became a recurrent topic in poetry, imperial panegyric and 
the official coinage and it continued to fertilize the imperial ideal long after the classical 
period. ' 88 
However, of all the legislation passed during this time I propose to discuss only two laws 
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which illustrate well the disintegration and change of the criminal process during the Early 
Principate. Consequently they have a direct bearing on our investigation into the violence 
of the Early Principate. The first law, the lex maiestatis was exploited much for the 
realization of political ends, and its record in the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius will 
show a definite pattern of growing state violence executed against its subjects for offences 
which cannot objectively be considered threatening to the security of the state or the well-
being of its citizens. 89 This is theoretically what a treason law strives to do. The second 
law is the lex Julia de vi publica et privata. Here the nature of the violence which the law 
was intended to address and the character of the state's response to it, is evident. Further, 
it also indicates a state attitude to violence, in broader terms, as a social malady. 90 
THE LEX JULIA MAJESTATIS. 
If any legislative measure made a direct contribution to an atmosphere of violence in the 
Early Principate, it was the lex maiestatis. I do not intend to discuss the substance of the 
law in any detail, but rather to focus on those aspects of the law which had a major and 
violent impact on Roman society. 
The law of treason of any nation and its application can be considered a good barometer of · 
how a state perceives itself, as well as of the extent of its security. It is not unusual that a 
state which either is, or considers itself to be, under threat should employ its laws of 
treason more frequently and arbitrarily than those states which are politically secure. A law 
of treason takes its motivation specifically from the political sphere. It relates directly to 
the authority of the state and its legitimacy. 'Traditionally, the most heinous crime which 
could be committed in a political community was treason - action aimed at the death or 
overthrow of the King - where allegiance was owed to the person of the sovereign who 
embodied the state. •91 For if law is the sphere par excellence of social and political 
control, the law of treason is the specific legitimate measure which validates state 
oppression. Thus treason as a political offence against the state is a special category of 
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criminal offence which serves to differentiate one sort of state from another, with respect 
to the range of offences, the types of case brought, and the way in which they are handled. 
Even the most "liberal" states have political offences such as conspiracy, incitement, 
mutiny, sedition and treason. Because the offences are political they are vulnerable to 
imaginative interpretation and application. In modern Western states their use is subject to 
two safeguards: firstly, that the charges must be plausible in terms of the political climate 
and environment of the society concerned, and secondly that they must be openly 
substantiated in court. 92 But the law of treason also relates to the definition of a state, and 
in this context, I will argue that a vagueness and uncertainty of this definition was partly 
responsible for the trend of institutional violence which was to become such a characteristic 
of imperial politics. We shall see that neither safeguard was evident in the Early 
Principate, and that the inevitable consequence was autocratic, arbitrary, and therefore 
violent government. The lex maiestatis saw a great prominence during the reigns of 
Augustus and Tiberi us, even during the good phase. 93 
The first problem concerning the law is its dating. This need only be dealt with briefly, as 
the question has been settled to a large extent by Allison and Cloud. 94 It is clear that the 
law is not Augustan but in fact Caesarian: 'as for an Augustan Lex Julia Maiestatis, it is a 
mirage, an unnecessary fiction which should disappear from our history books, unless 
some. more cogent testimony to its existence is forthcoming. '95 However, it needs to be 
mentioned if only to counter Atkinson's thesis that there was an Augustan lex dated 18 BC, 
which marked a decisive break by Augustus with the old Republican framework. 96 But the 
fact is that by Augustus' accession the lex maiestatis was already being used and was 'in 
ill-repute a quarter of a century before the foundation of the Principate. '97 It is the 
difference in application and interpretation of the law which is of particular relevance to 
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The first maiestas law, the lex Appuleia, which had been passed at the end of the second 
century BC, was directed at those who diminished the majesty of the Roman people. It 
covered sedition, incompetence in the field and unauthorised campaigning. Yet by the end 
of Tiberius' reign the charge of maiestas was being used principally for the elimination of 
political rivals. Also, since it was a law which admitted the validity of evidence obtained 
under torture, it became an instrument for the detection of other crimes. The law 
underwent a definite evolution from its application in the Republic to cases of sedition, 
armed action, conspiracies and the like, to the Empire where the law encompassed libel, 
slander and desecration of images. This extension of maiestas was significant and 
unwelcome to upper class Romans and showed the shift in the balance of power in the 
state. 98 
Tacitus' assertion that Tiberius revived the treason law,99 is not strictly correct. Rather the 
law was being subjected to wide interpretations in order to accommodate a more devious 
political purpose, that is to protect the emperor's power from whatever threat or perceived 
threat, legitimate or illegitimate. Tacitus uses the cases of Falanius and Rubrius as 
examples of the beginning of this 'gravissimum exitium' which had been insinuated 
(inrepserit) on Roman politics, 'dein repressum sit, postremo arserit cunctaque corripuerit.' 
It is clear that Tacitus also appreciated the danger of this law. 100 
A particular danger of Roman maiestas laws was their vagueness which gave the 
opportunity for convenient interpretation. The law was very broadly defined: 'maiestas 
autem crimen illud est, quod adversus populum Romanum vel adversus securitatem eius 
committitur. ,f01 The problem of vagueness and the consequence of malicious interpretation 
and application was not specific to the Roman Empire. Even under the Republic the scope 
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of the law was very wide and afforded ample opportunity for malicious political 
prosecution. 102 Indeed, in a letter to Appius Claudius Pulcher in 50 BC Cicero himself 
states that the law is vague and ambiguous. 103 However, it was certainly in the early years 
of the Empire that the maiestas law came into its own as a means of dictating the course 
and style of Roman politics and government. 
As long as the definition of maiestas was sensible, the application of the law could, but not 
necessarily would, yield fair and just results. Under the Principate the attitude and actions 
of the princeps himself were crucial. That one person could have such discretion in the 
law's interpretation and application was indeed an unhealthy development and led to the 
faith in the legal system as a whole being undermined, especially in Tiberius' reign. 
Augustus could treat political enemies with some level of tolerance. Indeed, Suetonius 
mentions that for circulating a damaging libel on Augustus, a crime that would surely have 
earned him the death sentence forty years later, Junius Novatus was only fined. 104 The 
publication and distribution of defamation and slander did not initially trouble the 
emperor. 105 However, Tacitus rightly marks the key stage in the evolution of the maiestas 
law with the case of Cassius Severus. 106 The interpretation of 'specie' is critical here, 
because it shows clearly that the law at the time (AD 8) had nothing clear to say about libel 
or scandal. As a result of the cognitio101 system and without having to alter the wording of 
the Caesarian law, Augustus was able to extend the scope of the law. Once this disturbing 
precedent had been set, it became impossible to return to the old rule of law. 
Even Tiberius did not allow himself initially to be affected adversely by lampoons and 
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Ad Fam. 3.11.2. 'Verum tamen est maiestas, etsi Sulla voluit, ne in quemvis impune 
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slander, and asserted the right of free speech. 108 Yet later, Suetonius was able to catalogue 
a whole range of far-fetched accusations from beating a slave to carrying a ring or coin 
bearing Augustus's image into a toilet or brothel. 109 Tacitus also observed the disquieting 
trend in the application of the law to such an extent that he could state with a hint of 
sarcasm: 'adolescebat interea lex maiestatis. ' 110 This was an introduction to the case of 
Appuleia Varilla who was indicted for speaking insultingly about the divine Augustus. 111 
By AD 21, according to Tacitus, a charge of maiestas complemented every prosecution. 112 
In this regard two aspects have a definite bearing on the violence of the Early Principate. 
Firstly, the conduct of these cases depended in far too great a degree on the personal 
attitude of the Emperor. It was, for example, only through the personal intervention of 
Tiberius that Lucius Ennius was saved from prosecution for maiestas. 113 Tiberius, in the 
case of Appuleia Varilla, had to insist that a distinction be drawn between disrespectful 
remarks made about Augustus, and those made about himself. 114 This maiestas against a 
deified princeps Levick considers 'the first and obvious novelty of the new Principate.' 115 
In an excess of rhetoric Pliny even claims that Tiberius deified Augustus for the· very 
purpose of employing the law. 116 
The second aspect which requires mention is the impact the transfer of jurisdiction over the 
administration of the lex maiestatis to a Senatorial court in 19 or 18 BC had on Roman 
criminal law and politics. This transferral took place as a result of the trials of Primus and 
Murena, but was not absolute. Only the top cases were selected for trial in the house so 
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law. 
Tib. 58. 
Ann. 2.50.1. 
Tac. Ann. 2.50. Appuleia Varilla was not convicted of maiestas although Tiberius 
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(1976), 191. 
Pliny Pan. 11.1. 'dicavit caelo Tiberius Augustum, sed ut maiestatis crimen 
induceret.' 
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that the maximum political effect could be achieved. Consequently trials involving the 
welfare and security of the state and Senate were to be heard in the house. This 
development led naturally to irregularity, because although some of the procedural rules 
laid down in the leges were maintained, the Senate was allowed to conduct itself much as it 
wished. 117 These irregularities provided the princeps and other senators with opportunities 
for personal intervention, which made a mockery of the rule of law. It is clear that, given 
the political implications of a lex maiestatis, the Senate was not able to adapt properly to 
the responsibilities of a court of law. 'The Senate's freedom to adjust its own procedures 
amounted in the last analysis to freedom to break the fragile restraints imposed by judicial 
formality. The Senate forgot that it had taken on the responsibilities of a court of law and 
acted like the political body it really was.' 118 Moreover, far-fetched cases were brought in 
order either to please the princeps in a most sycophantic fashion or to eliminate political 
and personal rivals "through the back door". 
This leads to another aspect of the lex maiestatis which contributed directly to the violence 
of the Early Principate. This is the growth of the delatores as factor in the bringing of 
cases of maiestas. 119 Criminal cases were brought not by a public prosecutor in the employ 
of the state, but by individuals, and often by the complainant himself. In the case of 
maiestas these were often senators. The ramifications of this were threefold. Firstly, 
because of the scope of the law, political as well as personal rivals could be attacked 
without too much trouble. Thus the court became an arena for the satisfaction for personal 
squabbles. Secondly, for the delator who brought a charge of maiestas there were financial 
rewards. 120 A flood of accusations in the criminal court resulted, naturally intensifying the 
insecurity of the senatorial class and creating an atmosphere of fear which effectively 
neutralised free, political, cultural and social activity. Political opposition, therefore, more 
readily took on a violent aspect in the form of sedition or conspiracy. 
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The role of the delatores must not be underestimated. Delation was a constant factor in the 
history of internal security not only during the Republic, but throughout both the Principate 
and the Late Empire. 121 Suetonius attests their influence: 'nullus a poena hominum 
cessavit dies .... Decreta accusatoribus praecipua praemia, nonnumquam et testibus. Nemini 
delatorum fides abrogata. Omne crimen pro capitali receptum, etiam paucorum 
simpliciumque verborum. d 22 Nevertheless they were not considered with any favour. 
Under the Principate the delatores were hated because of their activities. They acquired the 
princeps' favour and their prosecutions brought them wealth and status while an 
atmosphere of fear was created. 
It is hardly surprising, given this atmosphere, that there was a high rate of suicide among 
the upper class in these years. But since it was the upper class who were mostly subject to 
the lex maiestatis, and since our evidence is strongly biased towards the upper classes, we 
do not know if suicide was a widespread reaction to condemnation in the maiestas court. In 
the reign of Tiberi us, Tacitus mentions ninety-five individuals who had been charged under 
the lex maiestatis. 123 A further twenty-three were mentioned as being involved in judicial 
proceedings other than the maiestas law. Of these twenty-three, six committed suicide; of 
the ninety-five charged with maiestas, twenty-one took their own lives before the court 
could convict them, while forty-two were found guilty. Eighteen of these were executed, 
according to the law. 124 It would perhaps be erroneous to read too much into these figures. 
One must take into account that suicide in anticipation of conviction prevented the dead 
person's property from being confiscated, as well as preserved him from damnatio 
memoriae, because he had died uncondemned. 'Suicide was one way of accepting death as 
the price of virtue.' 125 
Notwithstanding this, there is another aspect which requires attention. Grise discerns a 
marked increase in the incidences of suicide for the period 100 BC to AD 100 among the 
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upper class, and attributes this to the fact that their lives were most affected by the political 
upheavals of the period. 126 It can be argued that the number of suicides committed in the 
context of maiestas reflects a disillusionment and loss of faith not only in the maiestas law, 
but indeed in the entire criminal process. 127 One must question though, whether we have 
the evidence to make a valid comparison with other periods. 
The lex was also abused because it eventually became a means of gathering evidence for 
other charges. 128 An accuser would indict a person on a maiestas charge in the full 
knowledge that his prosecution might fail. However, through an Augustan edict of AD 8 a 
slave's evidence under torture might be accepted. This might produce evidence for other 
charges which could then be instituted, thus allowing the original maiestas charge to fall 
away. Bauman suggests that this caused the crimen maiestatis to become the lynch pin in 
the entire system of criminal justice. The evidence of the slave in cases of maiestas meant 
that in effect, the lex maiestatis would provide the evidence for a charge under a different 
lex which did enjoy the similar privilege of being able to extract evidence under torture. 
Although the offences of adultery and census frauds offered similar facilities the . lex 
maiestatis had particular elasticity. 129 
The impression that the lex maiestatis made on Roman politics and upper class society, 
indeed on society in general, was vast. The resultant implications for violence, are 
obvious. For Seager the operation of the law with all its consequences was a symptom of a 
diseased society for which the principate as an institution must take the blame. 13° From a 
different angle Bauman holds that the crimen maiestatis through its ability to be a creative 
instrument as well as a repressive one, contributed significantly to the institutionalisation of 
the Principate. It was the criminal law which assumed a degree of ingenuity and flexibility 
never exceeded in all its long and varied career. 131 
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THE LEX JULIA DE VI. 
The formulating of a law against violence was problematic, as the history of the leges de vi 
bears witness. 132 What the Digest calls the lex Julia de vi publica133 and lex Julia de vi 
privata134 are the results of sixty years of development and constitute the ultimate 
refinement. As most of the major clauses of the lex Julia de vi publica have Republican 
precedents, 135 why and in what respect did these laws require revision or refinement? 
What was added to or subtracted from the preceding laws? And how did the law evolve to 
the form presented in the Digest? 
In its time the lex Plautia136 had been passed to satisfy a need for further, more 
comprehensive legislation. The lex Lutatia (promulgated in 78 BC specifically to deal with 
the seditio of Lepidus) had proved too narrow because it applied only to citizens who 
engaged in seditio against the state. It provided for a quaestio perpetua which could be · 
used whenever there was a seditio, but it did not have a permanent quaesitor of its own. It 
was then recognised that acts of private violence, especially when directed against public 
figures or involving public issues, also concerned the state. The lex Plautia, therefore, 
regulated the crimen vis by introducing the relevant quaestio (de vi) and authorised it to 
deal with cases of private violence as wel1. 137 In 52 BC the lex Pompeia de vi was passed 
in specific response to the violent disturbances of 52 BC which were the result of electoral 
corruption and competition. It was instituted as an ad hoc measure, to take a firm and 
definitive stance on the recent disturbances and to simplify the procedures established by 
the lex Plautia which were perceived as clumsy, ineffective and time-consuming. Trials 
under the lex Pompeia were to be models of efficiency with severe penalties. Thus the law 
allowed for proceedings to be carried out extra ordinem. However, Pompey did not intend· 
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abrogating or replacing the procedures of the lex Plautia. They remained in force. This is 
proved by the fact that Milo was charged under both laws. Pompey's law was purely 911 
expedient passed for the sake of some dramatic gesture for the preservation of public 
order. 138 Although it was an ad hoc measure it is unlikely that it would ever have been 
repealed. Once on the statute book its usefulness as a device for the speedy removal of a 
perpetrator would have favoured its retention. Nevertheless, it remained an extraordinary 
measure. These expedients which began as ad hoc measures would eventually entrench 
themselves as permanent criminal legislation in the Empire. 
So we come to the lex Julia de vi. Is the law as it stands in the Digest of Augustan or 
Caesarian origin or did both legislate? Yavetz, for example, dates a law (or laws) 
tentatively to 47 or 46 BC, 139 while Cloud, in the most detailed and persuasive treatment 
of the question, accepts the reasonable probability of a Caesarian lex, but postulates a 
subsequent Augustan lex de vi on which the Digest title Ad legem Juliam de vi publica 
(48.6) is based. 140 Philippics 1.23 is the critical text for the proof of both a Caesarian lex 
and the Augustan authorship of a subsequent lex. Cicero asks a rhetorical question of 
Antony: 'quid quod obrogatur legibus Caesaris quae iubent ei qui de vi itemque ei qui 
maiestatis damnatus sit aqua et igni interdici?' Cicero argues here that Caesar had made it 
expressly clear that those convicted of vis and maiestas by the quaestio should suffer the 
penalty of interdictio aquae et ignis. Thus when Antony promulgated a law that those 
convicted de vi and de maiestate may appeal, if they should so wish, 141 he cannot, (as 
Cicero points out) claim to be carrying out the deceased Caesar's desires. It is inconsistent. 
Therefore only vis and maiestas are relevant to Cicero's argument. Cloud defeats Kunkel's 
attack142 on the existence of a Caesarian vis and maiestas statute in three ways. Firstly the 
context of this section of the Philippics (16-26) are the acta Caesaris and those forged by 
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Yavetz (1983), 77. He concedes that it is not only not possible to determine the 
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1987, 82-83. See also Cloud (1988), 579-582. 
Phil. 1.21: 'ut de viet de maiestate damnati ad populum provocent, si velint.' 
Kunkel, RE XXIV. col. 79 quaestio. He argues that Cicero is here not referring to 
Caesarian leges de vi and maiestatis, but to an otherwise unknown chapter of 
Caesar's lex repetundarum of 59 BC in which Caesar laid down interdictio as the 
penalty for persons convicted of vis and maiestas. 
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Antony. These are the acta of Caesar's dictatorship and not of his consulship of 59 BC 
when the lex de repetundis was passed. Secondly, Cloud can find no reason why Caesar 
should have included penalties for vis and maiestas in a lex repetundarum. Thirdly, 
Cicero's use of the plural in legibus and quibus, 143 indicates convincingly that Cicero here 
is referring to two leges; one de vi, and the other de maiestate. The 'itemque' renders 
rhetorical use of the plural unlikely. Having established this, Cloud believes that the only 
difference between the Caesarian law and its predecessor, the Plautian law, may be the 
specification of the penalty as aquae et ignis interdictio. The essential questions therefore, 
must be firstly what is the date of the last lex Julia, and secondly, how did it differ from 
the laws which preceded it? 
Cloud, 144 following Coroi, postulates an Augustan authorship of the law with a 
promulgation date between 19 and 16 BC. 145 If Caesar's law changed only the penalty the 
provocatio clause146 was a subsequent significant addition. Cloud uses this clause to argue 
that the lex must be dated between the publication of Livy Book 10 and the accession of 
Tiberi us. 147 His argument rests on two pillars. Firstly, if the provocatio clause had been 
Caesarian, why did Cicero not use it against Antony's promulgation of a law permitting 
provocatio against an adverse verdict by the quaestio de vi when at the same time Antony 
was claiming to implement Caesar's wishes? Lintott148 cannot see Cicero missing the 
chance in Phil. 1.22-3 of denouncing Antony for granting provocatio to someone who had 
himself ignored it. Secondly, Cloud invokes Livy 10.9.4, where the historian says that the 
Porcian statute of 300 BC on provocatio is the only, and not simply the first, to have teeth 
in it. Due to his interest in the subject, Livy would most certainly have mentioned the lex 
Julia clause had it been passed into law at the time. The earliest possible date for Livy 
Book 10 is 27 BC, thus inducing the conclusion that the provocatio clause was not law 
before that date. This position is strengthened by Luce149 who argues convincingly that 
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Book 9 (and therefore the second pentad) was written before 23 BC. We would not 
therefore, expect mention of the lex Julia de vi in Livy's provocatio excursus. It does, 
however, widen the possible date for the lex in giving us three more years before 19/18 
BC. Moreover the provocatio clause of the Pauli Sententiae150 involving the phrase ad 
populum would be hopelessly anachronistic in any piece of legislation after AD 14, when 
there was no comitial court to which to appeal. 
Cloud correctly ridicules Coroi's argument that because the lex Julia de vi (privata) and the 
lex Julia de adulteriis are the only' two criminal laws to carry the same punishment 
(confiscation of a third of a convicted party's property) they must have been passed at the 
same time. 151 Nevertheless, the dating proposed by Coroi, Lintott and Cloud is plausible. 
Augustus had returned from the east in 19 BC, while in 16 he left for Gaul, leaving him 
three years in which to consolidate his position at Rome. Furthermore, 18 BC was a year 
of great legislative activity. Particular events of the time may have persuaded Augustus to 
look seriously at the question of law and order, not only in a social sense but also in a 
political sense. The events that occurred between 22 BC and 18 BC helped the princeps 
secure his position among the common people who had adopted a somewhat ambivalent 
attitude towards him. There were, for example, riots at the consular elections of 21 BC. 152 
Natural disasters such as plague and famine brought violent mass disturbance. The 
conspiracy of Caepio and Murena 153 had awakened Augustus to the possibilities of 
rebellion. The Egnatius Rufus episode of 19 BC emphasized the need to clarify matters. 154 
In the same year consular elections again witnessed riots and disorder155 of the kind that 
necessitated the Pompeian measures. Under 18 BC Dio writes of anonymous plots although 
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they are not confirmed by other authors and his introductory words 'after these events, 
many immediately and many later ... ' are suspiciously vague. 156 
Such events are the perfect background for legislative action against public violence, 
especially when considered in the insecure constitutional and political context in which 
Augustus found himself. From 30 BC there had been continual attempts at conspiracy. 
Raaflaub and Samons157 believe that political resistance to Augustus at this time was 
relatively small and could not compare with that of his Julio-Claudian successors. But this 
is debatable. Opposition to Augustus _was not, as they allege, of low intensity. It was real, 
and Augustus' political task was difficult. He can be seen as hostile to the senate: on the 
one hand his reforms of the senate had won him many enemies and on the other he can be 
considered as playing the democrat in his capacity as the holder of tribunician power and 
using the threat of popular support to keep the senate in check. The situation was such that 
these years were critical to Augustus' political survival, and he realised this by embarking 
on a programme of reform and legislation of which the lex de vi was part. 158 
What must now be addressed is the title of these laws in the Digest. Lintott suggests that 
the distinction between vis publica and vis privata was an Augustan invention. 159 Cloud, 
who postulates a unitary Augustan law, rejects a separation by Augustus in favour of a 
theory that it was a device of the classical jurists of the second and third century AD and 
. 
that the distinction relates only to differences of penalty: 160 vis publica had to do with 
forms of vis which deserved interdictio and later deportatio, 161 while vis privata concerned 
less serious forms of vis which merited the loss of a third of one's property only ,and the 
disabilities which attached to infamia. 162 Moreover, Cloud argues that 'what was later 
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regarded as vis privata constituted a very small part of the substantial Augustan law and 
such offences were attached to graver analogous but capital offences, thus making it more 
difficult for jurists in later centuries to distinguish them.' 163 Distinctions as to content are 
more difficult to sustain for, as Cloud says, for example, 'it is quite impossible to draw 
any theoretical distinction between the vis publica material in 48.6 and the vis privata 
material in 48.7.' 164 If distinctions are to be drawn, vis publica can generally be said to 
concern specific efforts at seditio. Consequently it aimed at regulating the possession of 
arms in public, and having an armed gang collected for the purpose of sedition or 
conspiracy. 165 This need not be conspiracy against the state, as such an offence would be 
covered by the lex maiestatis. Vis privata, on the other hand, concerned violence by 
unarmed gangs as well as other crimes of violence and offences of self-help where due 
process of law should have been engaged. 
It is in this sphere where the lex is valuable. The Roman appreciation for the rule of law is 
indicated twice in the lex Julia de vi privata: 'legis Juliae de vi privata crimen committitur, 
cum coetum aliquis et concursum fecisse dicitur, quo minus quis in ius produceretur. ' 166 A 
duly constituted court is postulated as the only and final authority for the settlement of 
disputes. Also interference with the working of justice is considered in a very serious light. 
These sentiments are reinforced later in the lex as shown. by the definition of violence: 
'Caesar dixit: "tu vim putas esse solum, si homines vulnerentur? vis est et tunc, quotiens 
quis id, quod deberi sibi putat, non per iudicem reposcit. non puto autem nee verecundiae 
nee dignitati nee pietati tuae convenire quicquam non iure facere. Quisquis igitur probatus 
mihi fuerit rem ullam debitoris non ab ipso sibi traditam sine ullo iudice temere possidere, 
eumque sibi ius in earn rem dixisse, ius crediti non habebit. "' 167 Apart from underlining 
the Roman view that violence was not restricted to the infliction of physical harm, 168 this 
passage shows the growing importance of judges, making evident an increasing infiltration 
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into civil law by the state. This is helped also by the broad definition which vis is given in 
the statute. 
Another aspect to this legislation is the definition of arms: 'telorum autem appellatione 
omnia, ex quibus singuli homines nocere possunt, accipiuntur.' 169 This is also a very 
broad definition which allowed state authorities, should they so wish, to act arbitrarily. 
There is a problem however, which betrays the awkwardness of the way which in which 
the law is expressed. In the very next clause the right of Romans to carry weapons for the 
sake of self-protection is recognised: 'qui telum tutandae salutis suae causa gerunt, non 
videntur hominis occidendi causa portare.' There is no indication how the difference 
between self-protection and 'hominis occidendi causa' is to be determined. This aspect is 
accentuated by another part of the law which states 'armatos non utique eos intellegere 
debemus, qui tela habuerunt, sed etiam quid aliud nocere potest.' 170 Strictly, then, any 
collection of men, armed or not, who are able to inflict damage may be held liable under 
vis publica. 
What are the Augustan additions to this particular lex? It must be assumed that much of the 
law came down to Augustus in tralatician form. The contribution which Augustus made to 
these particular laws (or law) is critical. Cloud deals with this in detail in his second article 
on the lex Julia de vi. 111 I will focus on Augustus' major contribution to the law, the 
clause relating to provocatio. 112 In essence this section ensured the ius provocationis. Its 
inclusion in the lex de vi publica gives the lex a dimension beyond its original target, 
seditio, and looks also to administrative violence. Augustus seeks to regulate the 
jurisdiction of magistrates. Cloud, however, ignores the ideological significance which 
Augustus would without doubt have exploited. Protection of the people rather than control 
over senatorial governors would have been stressed publicly. 
Provocatio was an important feature of Roman criminal law. Its history is long and 
169 
170 
171 
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Dig. 48.6.11.1. 
Dig. 48.6.9. 
Cloud (1989), 427-65. 
Dig. 48.6.7. 
63 
relatively well documented. 173 Originally, a Roman citizen threatened with corporal 
punishment could invoke the help of the people (provocatio ad populum), unless he had 
previously been found guilty in a formal trial. This right of appeal was formally recognized 
in 300 BC by a lex Valeria. In the Late Republic, however, provocatio fell into disuse and 
lost much of its importance 'partly because of the growth of the quaestio perpetua which 
rendered helpless the man who wanted to appeal, partly because in the intenser political 
struggles the senate was reluctant to give its political opponents the benefit of it. ·This lack 
of respect for provocatio reflects the reluctance of the politicians of the Late Republic, 
unlike their forbears, to compromise. 7174 As provocatio had a political significance, its 
reassertion in the lex Julia de vi publica in the Principate is all the more important. In 
Augustus' reign we have an excellent context for the introduction of the provocatio clause. 
Indeed, the clause shows Augustus, having received the tribunicia potestas in 23 BC, as 
seizing the opportunity to present himself as guardian of the people. 'The significance of 
Augustus' inclusion in the lex de vi of denial of provocatio by a magistrate should not be 
underrated, since it demonstrated the princeps' intention not only to do something about 
the maltreatment of Roman citizens in the provinces but, as importantly, to introduce a 
stronger element of control over the activities of provincial governors and their staffs. 
Whatever the origins of provocatio and its early history, the institution was clearly a victim 
of the weakening of social controls that occurred at Rome when the mechanisms of shame 
culture suffered partial failure. 7175 
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174 
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See Lintott (1972). 
Lintott (1972), 262. 
Cloud (1989), 434. 
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CHAPI'ER THREE 
VIOLENCE AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE ROMAN CRIMINAL LAW 
AND PROCEDURE 
INTRODUCTION 
Since Romans had such a sophisticated appreciation for the law and the role it plays in 
society, an investigation of violence in the Early Principate cannot be complete without 
some attention being given to the structure and form of Roman criminal law and 
procedure. This particularly true if we understand criminal law as the social mechanism 
that is used to coerce members of society, through threat of pain and suffering, to abstain 
from conduct which is harmful to the interests of society. Its object is to promote the 
welfare of society and its members by establishing and maintaining peace and order. I shall 
argue that in the Early Principate this social mechanism was not used solely for the 
interests of society, nor for the promotion of its welfare, but to secure the princeps' 
position in Roman politics and society. This encompassed radical departures from the 
Republican structure and form partly because the Republican system was inadequate in 
helping Augustus (and his successors) to attain a position of political security, but also 
because the system itself was ineffective in combatting the kind of violence that was 
characteristic in Late Republican society. 
Criminal trials during the Republic took place within a specific structure according to 
specific rules of procedure. They were brought by an individual, were investigated by an 
individual without any assistance from any government agency such as the police, and 
eventually were heard by a jury court. This structure was to change radically during the 
Early Principate, as the state took a greater interest in its citizens' affairs. 
The single innovation which revolutionised the functioning of Roman justice during the 
Principate was the introduction of the process known as cognitio. I shall argue that it was 
developed as a reaction to the political circumstances of the time. Cognitio facilitated 
greater participation by the state in criminal trials. Its introduction was gradual, but it 
eventually undermined the jurisdiction of the jury courts which, by the Severan period, had 
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become redundant. 1 
In the time of the Twelve Tables, the state punished only treason, murder and arson. By 
the Late Republic, which saw the culmination of this system, offences had expanded and 
some were categorised as "public" and were tried by "public" jury-courts set up by the 
people. This system was to be subverted by the new cognitio procedure which signalled the 
end of private vengeance, which had hitherto formed the basis for the Roman criminal law. 
It also underlined or advanced the principle of the state's responsibility to administer 
criminal justice. 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN THE LATE REPUBLIC 
To contrast cognitio with the procedures of the jury-courts in the Late Republic, illustrates 
better the significant impact it made on Roman procedural law. A fairly precise knowledge 
of the procedure of these courts has come to us through the speeches of Cicero. The whole 
process of trial was officially initiated neither by a presiding magistrate nor by a public 
prosecutor. This was always done through nominis delatio by a private person who laid the 
information either before a competent judicial magistrate or, in certain cases, before a 
consilium formed from the judges of his quaestio. If the information was accepted, the 
person laying the information acquired the rights and duties of a litigant. To him fell the 
duty of convicting the accused of the crime before the court. Every good citizen of good 
reputation was, theoretically, allowed to initiate a prosecution. This aspect must be 
compared with the private suit of the Twelve Tables which was available only to the 
injured or aggrieved party, or (in the case of killing) to his kin. 
Naturally the motives of prosecutors in bringing cases stretched beyond the public interest 
and the mere urge for vengeance. Enmities which had nothing to do with the crime in 
question had also a role to play; avarice, too was a factor. Criminal statutes promised 
considerable rewards for the victorious prosecutor. 2 Consequently, many made a business 
1 
2 
See Garnsey (1966), 157. 
In the case of capital condemnation for example, the property of the condemned 
person was confiscated, of which the delator received a sizeable proportion. See 
Kunkel (1966), 64. In the Republic, the quadruplatores obtained recompense for 
various laws such as repetundae and ambitus. Cf. Plaut. Pers. 1.2.18; Cic. Verr 
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of instituting prosecutions, a trend which, in the Empire, was to reach a scale never 
attained in the Republic. 3 
If the information was accepted by the magistrate, a consilium was then ordered. This was 
a sworn jury, chosen by lot from the album of the quaestio concerned, which decided the 
innocence or guilt of the accused. In the course of this selection both parties had the right 
to reject a certain number of judges. The number of members of this consilium, which was 
sworn in before commencement of the trial, varied at different times and according to the 
quaestio concerned, but might be as high as seventy-five. 
The trial itself was dominated by the accuser who called prosecution witnesses and led their 
evidence. Similarly, the accused was permitted to lead his own evidence and witnesses. 
Both parties were allowed the right of cross-examination. The judges were forbidden to 
speak to each other and listened to the evidence in silence. The presiding magistrate 
confined himself to regulating the proper conduct of the trial. In this he was usually very 
tolerant. The rules of Roman criminal procedure offered the accused an impressively wide 
scope for the making of his defence. He could have as many as six advocates appearing on 
his behalf. Express statutory provisions accorded generous speaking time to them and their 
clients which amounted to half as much time again as there was at the disposal of the 
prosecution. 
The consilium conveyed its verdict through voting tablets which were placed secretly in an 
urn. Equal votes secured acquittal; a large number of abstentions meant a fresh trial. The 
judicial magistrates announced the verdict according to the consilium's vote. In principle, 
no punishment was pronounced at this stage. This would be dictated by the statute on 
which the prosecution was based. Only fines required an assessment, a task which was 
performed by the consilium, which had to meet again after the verdict for this purpose. 4 
3 
4 
2.2.8. In the Empire, it was mainly in matters which touched the crimen maiestas 
that the delator or prosecutor won compensation for successful prosecution. Cf. 
Tac. Ann. 4.30.3; Sen. Ira 2. 7.3. 
The delatores have already been discussed. See also chapter 2, p53f. 
On the monetary fine see chapter 4, p114ff. 
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The execution of punishment was seen to by the presiding magistrate. In the last century of 
the Republic, with the exception of parricide, persons condemned by the quaestio 
procedure no longer suffered the death penalty. These were persons who,. as a rule, were 
much later to be regarded as honestiores and were members of the upper class. Instead, the 
magistrate gave them an opportunity to escape into exile. 
Although it would appear that it would guarantee an accused a fair trial, the jury-court 
system could allow favouritism in at least two ways. 5 For example, the court could bring 
in a not-guilty verdict when acquittal was not justified, or the magistrates could fail to 
carry out a sentence passed on a defendant who had been found guilty. The first could only 
be achieved with difficulty because it required interference with the majority of jurors. The 
second does not attach to the trial itself before conviction. The quality of evidence, though, 
is such that we know very little of the standard of justice administered by these courts; and 
jury-courts had their limitations. The size of the juries made trials clumsy in selection 
procedures alone and they became unmanageably complicated affairs, susceptible to 
intolerable delays. Also litigation became prohibitively expensive. In the Late Republic 
disenchantment with aspects of the system became evident. Although the author of the 
Epistula ad Caesarem did not condemn outright the iudicia publica, he did disapprove of 
jury selection on a high property-qualification, and suggested larger juries drawn from the 
whole of the first class. 6 In Cicero's De Legibus no mention is made of iudicia publica in 
the ideal republic. Criminal jurisdiction went back to the magistrates and assembly. 
Another fault of the jury system was that in certain circumstances a man could be tried 
twice for the same offence. This was often exploited in political trials. However the chief 
defect of the iudicia publica was corruption of jurors, which was said to have been 
rampant in the senatorial courts under the lex Calpurnia. In particular, the system made the 
speedy resolution of justice impossible. Jurors' deliberations and voting procedures to 
determine guilt or innocence were factors which did not hinder a iudex during the course of 
a trial, or prevent his decision at the end of it. 
5 
6 
Garnsey (1970), 4. 
Ep. ad Caes. [Sallust] 7.11: 'sed de magistratu facile populi iudicium fit; iudices a 
paucis probari regnum est, ex pecunia legi inhonestum. Quare omnes primae classis 
iudicare placet, sed numero plures quam iudicant.' 
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COGNITIO AND THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF THE EARLY PRINCIPATE 
Cognitio, the procedure most characteristic of the imperialjudicial system, made a radical 
impact on the jury-court system at both trial and sentencing stages. It eventually became 
applicable in the trial of all offences, as the distinction between delictum and crimen slowly 
., 
declined in importance. In the Republic· the praetor simply presided over the contest 
between accuser and accused and pronounced the jury's verdict. The cognitio system, 
being inquisitorial and unlike the accusatorial jury-court system, affected a trial in two 
crucial aspects: in court procedure an~ in sentencing. Before conviction the judge was now 
free to interrogate the accused and cross-examine witnesses, a task which had hitherto been 
reserved for the prosecution or defence. After conviction, the judge was able to vary the 
penalty according to the seriousn~ss of the crime and according to his own whim and 
fancy. He was no longer bound by statutory penalties nor by the counsel of his advisers 
whom he had a discretion to consult. 7 Limits to punishments were subject only to reason 
and not law and he was thus free to choose penalties not stipulated by statute. 8 Judges who 
tried cases extra ordinem, that is outside the procedures established by statute and tradition, 
enjoyed complete discretion as to penalties, thereby increasing greatly the variety of 
punishments available. The only limits were those laid down by imperial mandates or 
rescripts. 9 This eventually resulted in the dual penalty system under the Roman Empire. 
This kind of inquisitorial system can operate very well (as it does in European criminal 
law), if the presiding officer is someone trained· in law and who realises that there are 
limitations and dangers to his involvement, and therefore acts in good faith, taking into 
account, when he arrives at his decision, that such participation in a trial renders the risk 
greater of a personal and not a legal decision. However, these precautions were not always 
observed in the Empire. There was, therefore, a greater danger than previously of undue 
prejudice against the accused. The situation was tolerable as long as there was no political 
agenda involved. Unfortunately, cognitio, when compounded with the other legal 
7 
8 
9 
Cf. Garnsey (1970), 6. 
See Dig. 48.19.13 (De Poenis): 'hodie licet ei, qui extra ordinem de crimine 
cognoscit, quam vult sententiam ferre, vel graviorem vel leviorem, ita tamen ut in 
utroque modo rationem non excedat.' (Ulpian) 
Jones (1972), 108. 
69 
innovations of the Principate, made inevitable political judgements as well as unreliable 
and inconsistent ones. Also the rules of procedure, which attempted to guarantee consistent 
decisions in the iudicia publica, did not bind those who judged according to cognitio. 10 
This growing interference by the Emperor could result in the tarnishing of the quality of 
justice, because the outcome of a trial depended not on the vote, after debate, of a body of 
jurors, but on the whimsical judgement of a single man who may or may not have had 
legal expertise. In practice there are cases where justice was meted out by the Emperor in a 
way that the jury system could not have, ll but these were exceptions. Moreover, those 
who presided over the special courts, such as the praefectus urbi, where cognitio also 
applied, were closely linked with the emperor. Thus although the emperor could only judge 
a limited number of cases personally, he nevertheless was able to delegate judicial powers 
to officials over whom he could exercise control. 
There is, however, another dimension to cognitio. In the previous chapter I mentioned that 
Augustus' legislative programme took place against the ideology of the return to the 
Golden Age in which the princeps was to be seen as Saviour. 12 Clemency was an essential 
requirement if the emperor was to succeed as Saviour. For Seneca, cruelty multiplies an 
emperor's opponents, while dementia achieves security. 13 Cognitio afforded the emperor a 
splendid opportunity to display dementia. Suetol}ius, for example records that there are 
numerous proofs of Augustus' dementia and civilitas. 14 The advantages of pardoning his 
political enemies are obvious. But Junius Novatus and Cassius Patavinus, both plebeians 
escaped with a fine and a mild form of exile respectively, for offences that would have 
meant execution in Tiberius' reign. Augustus interfered in the prosecution of one Aemilius 
Aelianus, and dropped the whole inquiry. 15 In the case of Gaius Cominius, a Roman 
Knight convicted of a slanderous poem, Tiberius was also able to demonstrate dementia. 
Tacit~s records this as modica laetitia. 16 But Augustus did not confine his dementia to 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Cf. Jones (1972), 94. 
For example Suet. Claud 15.1-2. 
Wallace-Hadrill (1981), 19-36. 
Clem. 1.8.6. 
On civilitas see also chapter 2, p31. 
Suet. Aug. 51.1-2. 
Tac. Ann. 4.31.1-2. 
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members of the upper class. A slave who had complained of him in the vilest terms was 
punished merely by being put in irons - 'non ultra compedibus.' 17 The important feature of 
cognitio was that the emperor, as judge, stood above the law, and could interpret the law 
following the dictates of his conscience, and not the rigid prescriptions of the statute book, 
when ascertaining guilt or assessing penalties. In this way cognitio, with the emperor as 
judge, contributed significantly to the ideology of the emperor as Saviour. 
The principate of Augustus witnessed the evolution of three entirely new criminal courts at 
Rome: i) the emperor himself acquired a judicial role, functioning as a court; ii) the Senate 
now became a court of law as it had never before been; and iii) the court of the praefectus 
urbi, which derived its imperium through delegation from the emperor. 
THE SENATORIAL COURT 
The senate's role as a court must be seen in the wider context of its newly defined and 
acquired role in the Augustan regime. This has been dealt with by Brunt, 18 who has 
rectified the tendency of other authors to concentrate on the powers of the emperor, 
thereby affording little attention to the senate's role in the wider political and 
administrative picture. The emperor has thus been credited with powers he did not possess. 
For Brunt, although Augustus had in effect established a monarchy, and although general 
initiative and ultimate control rested with Augustus, · it was still necessary to obtain 
senatorial approval for his measures. Indeed, it was important for both Augustus and 
Tiberius to preserve the forms of the old Republic, so far as that was compatible with the 
retention of personal power, but also to do all he could to make his policies acceptable to 
upper-class opinion, which was represented in the senate, and at times perhaps to confirm 
that opinion. Consultation with the Senate minimised the possibility of its alienation, and 
facilitated Augustus' hope that he might retain the senate's approval until the ·end of his 
reign. 19 Thus Augustus achieved a government of consent which was likely to be more 
durable. Further advantages were that dialogue with the senate afforded the opportunity to 
17 
18 
19 
Suet. Aug. 67.1. 
Brunt, (1984), 423-444. 
Suet. Aug. 28.2:. 'quid habeo aliud deos immortales precari quam ut hunc 
consensum vestrum ad ultimum finem vitae mihi perferre liceat?' 
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the Emperor of gauging the unspoken feelings of members. 20 Also it was wise to rule with 
the consent of the order from which the emperor drew most of his chief advisers and 
agents. At the very least the senatorial proceedings allowed the emperor to justify and 
publicise his policy. 
The trend of communication with the senate was carried beyond the reign of Tiberius. 
Indeed, in the first twelve years of his reign, Tiberius could not have been more diligent in 
consulting and attending the House. 21 His retirement to exile at Capri in AD 26 proved 
politically imprudent for this reason alone. Despite the fact that supreme authority 
remained firmly in Tiberius' hands, and despite a tense and uneasy relationship with the 
senate (which was exacerbated by his absence from Rome), Talbert22 claims that Tiberius 
had neutralised the possibility of a damaging decline in the scope and nature of the business 
to be handled by the corporate body. The prospect of decline into insignificance was 
averted and the senate continued to be recognised as the symbol of the respublica, the 
institution which transcended individual rulers. The nature of the senate's role which 
Tiberius had encouraged the senate to assume set a pattern which was not to be modified 
for well over a century and a half. 
During the reign of Augustus, many new functions fell to the senate. Brunt writes23 that in 
the acquisition of these new functions whether judicial, legislative or electoral, the senate 
became grander to outward view, just when it was losing that auctoritas by which it had 
previously exercised a generally accepted control over the state in republican conditions. It 
was in the judicial sphere, however, where the senate saw its greatest change which was 
certainly an innovation of Augustus. The senate did not sit as a court during the Republic, 
20 
21 
22 
23 
See Tac. Ann. 2.38.4: 'haec atque talia, quamquam cum adsensu audita ab iis, 
quibus omnia principum, honesta atque inhonesta, laudare mos est, plures per 
silentium aut occultum murmur excepere. sensitque Tiberi us.' 
See Tac. Ann 4.6.2-3: 'iam primum publica negotia et privatorum maxima apud 
patres tractabantur, dabaturque primoribus disserere, et in adulationem lapsos 
cohibebat ipse; mandabatque honores nobilitatem maiorum, claritudinem militiae, 
inlustres domi artes spectando, ut satis constaret non alios potiores fuisse. sua 
consulibus, sua praetoribus species, minorum quoque magistratuum exercita 
potestas; legesque (si maiestatis quaestio eximeretur) bono in usu.' 
Talbert (1984), 489. 
Brunt (1984), 424. 
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even though it is said to have taken part in the sentencing of two men who had allegedly 
conspired against Octavian during the irregularities of the Second Triumvirate. 24 The 
conviction of the disgraced Egyptian prefect Cornelius Gallus in 26 BC was specifically 
left by the senate to the courts, but it passed condemnatory decrees against him to prejudice 
the proceedings.25 The charges of maiestas against M. Primus, Fannius Caepio and Varro 
Murena were similarly heard not in the senate as would almost certainly have been done 
thirty years later, but in the regular quaestio de maiestate. 26 Moreover, although Augustus 
in 2 BC reported Julia's immoral behaviour to the senate, he did not ask it to sentence her 
or her lovers.27 Augustus did, however, ask the senate to approve the sentence of exile on 
Agrippa Postumus in AD 7 which he had imposed. 28 
Nevertheless, by the 20's AD the senate was a regular and well established court, a 
function which was to become one of its most important and time consuming. The earliest 
evidence available for such a role comes from late in Augustus' reign. Jones29 suggests 
that by the time of Ovid's famous complaint to Augustus from exile in 8 AD, the senate 
was a normal court which 'could be spoken of on a par with the iudicia publica.' Under 
the same year Dio remarks that 'Augustus allowed the senate to try most cases without 
him.'30 Also, in AD 8 or 12,31 Cassius Severus was banished by the senate to Crete for 
defamation. 32 In about AD 13 the senate condemned Volesus Messalla on charges of 
saevitia, repetundae, and possibly maiestas. 33 
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Re the praetor Q. Gallius ~ o~ (3ov"A~ Karey{vwCJKE O&varov (Appian B. C. 3.95; cf. 
Suet. Aug. 27.4).The consular Salvidienus Rufus was, according to Dio (48.33.3; 
cf. Suet. Aug. 66.2), accused in the senate by Octavian himself, but that may be 
preliminary to a trial in a proper court despite Suetonius' words. 
Suet. Aug. 66.2; Dio 53.23.7. 
• Suet. Tib. 8; Dio 54.3.2-4. 
Veil. Pat. 2.100.3-5; Sen. Clem. 1.10.3; Tac. Ann. 3.24.4; Suet. Aug. 65.2-3; Dio 
55.10.12-16. 
Suet. Aug. 65.4. 
Jones (1972), 91. Tristia 2.131-2: 'nee mea decreto damnasti facta senatus, nee 
mea selecto iudice iussa fuga est.' 
55.34.2. 
For discussion on the date see Bauman (1974), 28-31. See also Syme (1978), 213-
214. 
Tac. Ann. 1. 72.3; 4.21.3; Dio 56.27.1. 
Tac. Ann. 3.68.1. 
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Both Jones34 and Garnsey agree that the evidence for the senatorial court is comparatively 
well documented and unequivocal. Garnsey ascribes this to the fact that judicial murder 
and the fall of important political figures form part of Tacitus' main theme of the misuse of 
law by politicians, 35 and it was in the senatorial court where this mostly took place. The 
senatorial court became, therefore, the arena in which politics took precedence over 
justice. This contributed significantly to political insecurity and a climate of fear in the 
upper stratum of Roman society. On the other hand, references to the public jury courts are 
few, 36 just enough to confirm their existence and we are therefore in the dark as to how 
criminal justice was administered to those of the lower strata. Neither the jury courts nor 
the urban prefect could have handled political offenders, certainly not those of high status 
who constituted a greater threat to political security. 
It is unclear exactly how the senate evolved into a formal court of law. 37 Lack of evidence 
makes the discovery of the precise legal basis of this new function difficult. Jones38 has 
argued that the senate (and for that matter the emperor) could only have assumed capital 
jurisdiction through the promulgation of an enabling lex. Talbert39 suggests that no formal 
or systematic explanation for the development is appropriate. It is worth noting, however, 
that besides formal trials, the senate also conducted judicial investigations involving 
miscellaneous offences or other matters which fell beyond the ambit of official or statutory 
criminal law but within the limits of the maintenance of law and order. The senate visited 
punishment on individuals for a wide range of crimes including vis publica and privata, 
sacrilegium, iniuria and calumnia as well as negligence which had led to the deaths of 
thousands of spectators at the gladiatorial games. Moreover, the senate invoked sanctions 
against various groups, such as Jews, devotees of Isis, 40 astrologers, 41 whose activities and 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
Jones (1972), 91. 
Garnsey (1970), 17. 
The so-called senatus consultum de Pisone patre now confirms the operation of a 
non-senatorial quaestio maiestatis in AD 20. 
Bauman (1980), 146, considers the origins of the senate's criminal jurisdiction only 
marginally relevant. But he does lay out the various arguments, including a 
majority view that postulates a gr.adual de facto evolution. 
Jones (1955), 464-488. 
Talbert, 462-3. 
Tac. Ann. 2.85.4. These measures were also reported by Jos. A.J. 18.65-84; Suet. 
Tib 36.' Josephus reports two scandals which according to him, precipitated the 
punishment of the followers of Isis and Judaism. In the first, a gullible Roman lady 
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existence were considered threatening to the religious and political life of the state. In 
addition, it moved against other groups for acts of disorder and violence, for example, 
actors and their followers in AD 14 and 15,42 the citizens of Italian Pollentia and Pontic 
Cyzicus. 43 In these cases senatorial decrees did not come at the end of formal trials. They 
were administrative acts rather than judicial sentences, promulgated by the senate in its 
traditional capacity as administrative organ of government and not in its new found 
function as a court. In this regard one should not neglect the senate's role as an agency for 
the maintenance of public order with which the senate was concerned at least until the end 
of the first century. 44 But the measures it passed in response to matters brought before it 
were reactive rather than preventive. Consequently precautionary steps against the 
recurrence of trouble were generally ineffective. 
It is not difficult to understand why the senate came to have jurisdiction over these matters 
and why the jury courts became less competent to deal with them. For instance, the trial of 
Vibius Serenus, governor of Hispania Ulterior in AD 23,45 our only known record of a 
charge of vis publica, is to be explained, according to Garnsey, 46 on the analogy of the 
repetundae trials involving governors. The senate also exercised the functions of a judicial 
commission of enquiry as it did in the case of the Fidenae disaster of AD 27 in which 
50,000 people lost their lives. 47 In theory, the freedman-profiteer Atilius, whose jerry-built 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
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had been raped in the temple of Isis with the connivance of the priests. In the 
second, a convert to Judaism had been induced to send valuable gifts to the temple 
in Jerusalem, which were stolen by the four Jews with whom she had dealt. In 
either case, the husbands, as men of influence, approached the princeps who 
expelled the Jews from Rome, demolished the temple of Isis, threw her statue into 
the Tiber, and crucified the priests. For Goodyear (Vol.2, 441) this is a good story 
but not the whole truth. 'A minor fraud by a few individuals is no credible reason 
for penalising a whole community.' Rather, what caused Tiberi us to depart from 
Augustus' policy of toleration towards the Jews was that he was concerned over the 
success of their proselytism, and Oriental religions were now making converts of 
the upper classes. 
Tac. Ann. 2.32.3. 
Tac. Ann. 1. 77. Measures included praetorian powers to have ballet dancers 
flogged; limitations on actors' salaries; prohibitions against senators entering the 
houses of ballet dancers and against knights from escorting them in public, as well 
as performances outside the theatre. See chapter 6. 
Suet. Tib. 37.2-3. 
Talbert, 386. 
Tac. Ann. 4.13.2. Tacitus does not tell us exactly what Serenus did. 
Garnsey (1970), 30. 
Tac. Aim. 4.63.1-2. The senate decreed that the exhibition of gladiatorial shows 
could only be held by someone financially qualified to do so, and that no 
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wooden amphitheatre was responsible for such a catastrophe, might have been punished by 
the urban prefect rather than the senate. But the disaster was considered so outrageous that 
only the senate could have jurisdiction. The appearance of Annia Rufilla (who had 
previously been convicted of fraud) before the senate48 in AD 21 is explained by the 
distinction between crimes which are self-evidently scandalous (like the Fidenae affair), 
and crimes which can be called scandalous merely because of the status of those involved. 
C.Cestius had complained that he could not gain access to the Forum without facing the 
threatening abuse of Annia Rufilla (who thought she could protect herself by clutching the 
image of the emperor). Drusus was begged to set an example, and Rufilla once convicted 
was clapped into gaol. Garnsey believes it is safe to assume that a non-senator in a similar 
position would have had to proceed against his tormentor 'by the cumbrous processes of 
the civil law. '49 
Even before the senate came to sit regularly as a court matters of a semi-judicial nature 
fell within the scope of the House's business. These matters were usually brought by 
embassies and private members and occasionally resulted in hearings. Consequently, the 
distinction between the judicial and non-judicial business of the House became less defined. 
The formal and regular trials of individuals within the house during the latter years of 
' 
Tiberius' rule particularly mark a significant step beyond such business, but Talbert50 
argues that this development was understandable and that Augustus can be seen to have 
offered the necessary encouragement. He did not intend the senate to share in the ordinary 
routine of criminal jurisdiction - this was the function of the jury courts - but it was in 
matters beyond the normal routine that Augustus consulted the senate. Slowly senatorial 
jurisdiction began to emerge and contemporaries were not concerned to find a strict legal 
basis for it. For Talbert, 51 such 'lack of concern reflected the wider constitutional 
. 
uncertainty of the age. Romans accepted this particular innovation for the same reason that 
they acknowledged the legislative force of senatus consulta: both developments enjoyed the 
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approval and recognition of the emperor.' In the development of the senatorial court a 
means had been devised through which the senate, which had lost a considerable amount of 
its political power to the emperor, could express itself and a means by which upper class 
opposition could be neutralised by that class itself. 
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the cases which the senate most often heard were 
those of maiestas. This was often accompanied by other charges too. 52 The operation of 
the lex maiestatis has already been discussed. 53 However, we are prevented by lack of 
evidence from knowing how far the· other courts were taking such cases. Garnsey writes 
that the barest trickle of cases went to the quaestio and that it must have been virtually 
. 
automatic for accusers to lodge charges of maiestas with the consul or emperor rather than 
the praetor, and for the accusations, once accepted, to be heard in the senate. 54 The reason 
for this was that the senate was pre-eminently responsible for crimes against the state 
particularly when an accused was a person of status. This position, however, has been 
much undermined by the Senatus Consultum de Pisone Patre which clearly indicates the 
existence of a quaestio de maiestate at the time of Piso's suicide in AD 20. 55 Accused of 
lower status may have been despatched to the lower court in numbers and simply have not 
atttracted the interest of senatorial and Equestrian authors. 
Repetundae trials were also almost entirely heard by the senate.56 However, after the 
senatus consultum of 4 BC, 57 the quaestio de repetundis too, seems to have become a dead 
letter. It was in charges of this nature that the senate could demonstrate its judicial 
independence since repetundae was not a crime against the state. Nor was the emperor 
likely to feel that his personal interests were threatened and the senate enjoyed remarkable 
freedom from imperial interference in repetundae cases. In maiestas cases, on the other 
hand, where the emperor could feel his safety and interests jeopardised, the senate was 
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seldom left free to decide independently. The emperor would consider it vital that his 
views be known and expected them to be adopted. The senate, when deciding a maiestas 
case, frequently looked to the emperor's wishes. His attitude was of paramount importance 
and he failed to encourage senatorial independence. As a result the realisation of justice 
was seriously compromised, not merely because it hinged on the personal perspective of 
the emperor. 58 
Another crime which the senate heard regularly was adultery, that is violations of the 
Augustan laws of 18 BC. Adultery was not an obviously political crime, however, even 
though Augustus had emphasised that adultery with a princess of the royal house was akin 
to maiestas.59 Charges of adultery were usually linked with other charges such as maiestas. 
When the emperor was in attendance, his interventions often assisted the accused, e.g. in 
the case against Appuleia Varilla.60 When the emperor was away however, such as during 
Tiberius' retirement to Capri, the additional charges tended to remain as devices for 
securing either the execution or suicide of the accused. It was a means employed by 
senators of eliminating personal and political opposition. It is Garnsey's view61 that the 
senate heard adultery cases because of the special significance which both Augustus and 
Tiberi us attached to the adultery law. They saw the law as having outstanding importanc.e 
for the preservation of the social and political order. Certainly for Augustus the law was an 
integral part of his social legislation designed to rehabilitate marriage. 
Court procedure was another way in which justice was jeopardised in the senatorial court. 
Although there never seems to have been any comprehensive statute governing the conduct 
of hearings, the senate took over from the jury-courts the recognised manner in which 
cases were heard. Levick62 recognises that the senate did retain some of the procedural 
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rules laid down in the leges, but adds that it was still free to conduct itself much as it 
wished. Divergences from the norm in the course of trials and opportunities for 
intervention by the princeps were the natural results. 63 Talbert holds that despite this 'the 
senate's wider powers and functions did offer the opportunity for flexibility in certain 
circumstances, and this was exercised though it was by no means always to the advantage 
of defendants. ' 64 What were these wider powers and functions? In the first place there was 
the aspect of interpretation, firstly by its verdicts in trials before it and by decrees arising 
otherwise than in the course of such trials. 65 Verdicts passed by the senate created a 
dangerous precedent for lower courts. Secondly, the senate was interpreting legislation 
which it had passed itself. This is an unsatisfactory state of affairs. Ultimately, the senate 
had a freedom to adjust its own procedure which amounted to freedom to break the fragile 
restraints imposed by judicial formality. The senate as legislative organ assumed for itself 
the power 'both to reduce and increase the severity of the laws. '66 Soon the senate 
abdicated its responsibilities as court of law, and acted as a political body in its own 
interests.67 A further inherent fault in the senatorial court was the House's remarkable 
power of discretion to accumulate charges under different laws or to hear them separately, 
and to accept new charges as well as those on the statute book. Also it had wide discretion 
on sentencing. The inevitable consequences were arbitrary legislation, convenient 
interpretation and a loss of faith not only in the senate as a political body but also as a 
court of law. The number of suicides in anticipation of conviction in the senatorial court 
can serve to prove this. 68 
The senatorial court played a significant role in relation to the "violence" of the Early 
Principate. It must be stressed, howeyer, that those defendants who found themselves in 
the senatorial court were either senators themselves or at least members of the upper 
stratum of Roman society. Nevertheless the judicial character of the senate gave it wider 
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scope in the maintenance of public order. It was through the senate, by means of extensive 
consultation that the emperor was ~ble to control and impose himself on Roman politics 
and society. 
THECOURTOFTHEEMPEROR 
For Jones, 69 the evidence for the emperor sitting as a criminal court is weak and anecdotal. 
Dio has the story about Maecenas watching Augustus sitting as judge; believing that he was 
about to impose the death sentence, Maecenas flung a note into his lap which read 'Rise at 
once, executioner! '70 Suetonius relates an incident of Augustus, trying a case of parricide 
for which the penalty was to be thrown off the Tarpeian Rock sewn up in a sack along with 
a snake, a dog, a monkey and a cockerel, 71 asking leading questions to prevent the accused 
from confessing. In the same chapter Suetonius records Augustus handing jurors a third 
tablet other than the normal ones of condemnation and acquittal, which afforded witnesses 
to a forged will, who had signed in ignorance, the opportunity of escaping the punishment 
of the lex Cornelia. 72 This was not a substantive innovation in the Roman criminal law, 
Honore says, but just a 'tidy minded way of securing a special verdict. ' 73 In a third story 
from Suetonius the princeps was trying Aemilius Aelianus, a Corduban, on an unspecified 
charge, and reprimanded the accuser for trying to prejudice him by alleging that the 
accused has spoken abusively of him. 74 A more circumstantial story is provided by Dio 
under the year AD 10. A quaestor accused of murder approached Germanicus to be his 
advocate. In the belief that he would exercise undue influence in a normal quaestio, the 
accuser asked Augustus to take the case himself, believing that with the emperor he would 
have a better chance of a conviction. 75 
It is perhaps misleading to speak of an imperial court in the formal sense. Certainly, there 
was no formal legislation which empowered the emperor to act as a court of law. What 
must be investigated then, is the nature of the great and far reaching impact which the 
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princeps and the Principate made on legal affairs. The advent of the emperor's role in legal 
affairs was precipitated as much by the unsatisfactory state of criminal and civil law in the 
Late Republic, as by the need to acquire social and political control for himself. The legal 
system had evoked widespread dissatisfaction at the beginning of the principate. The ius 
ordinarium was considered excessively formalistic, inflexible and characterised by 
unacceptable delay. The quaestiones perpetuae were slow moving, expensive and corrupt. 
The emperor was expected to remedy the situation, and bring equity into the legal system 
and in general to provide a higher authority for law. For Garnsey 'imperial jurisdiction was 
less a conscious creation of Emperors than a response to popular needs and discontents. •76 
This does not mean to say, however, that this aspect of the emperor's duties was not 
exploited in the political sense. The emperor's control of court proceedings and his 
influence as a judge was nevertheless limited by two factors. Firstly, however diligent the 
emperor was, he could not hope to act as judge in all the disputes referred to him. This 
meant that he was forced to choose the matters in which he would act as judge. Those 
matters which did not reach the emperor's court, were delegated to subordinate authorities, 
either individuals appointed to make ad hoc decisions in special cases or special officials 
permitted to settle single cases or entire classes of cases, or to officials who already had 
jurisdiction competent to try the kind of cases now sent down to them. The issue of 
delegation, was therefore essential to the maintenance of political control, because these 
delegated authorities owed their allegiance to the emperor alone. 
This applies not only to the court of the praefectus urbi, but also to other delegated 
jurisdiction such as the senatorial court, 'in the particular sense that individual cases were 
sometimes passed down by the emperor to the senate for trial, and in the general sense that 
the senatorial court was promoted by the emperor and remained under his direct or remote 
control. •77 Secondly, the cases which the emperor did hear were those whose defendants 
were of the upper classes, so the impact that he made as a judge was restricted. Cases 
involving the lower strata were dealt with either on an ad hoc basis by the praefectus urbi 
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or by a quaestio perpetua. 78 
The role of emperor as judge was from the beginning of the principate an established and 
essential part of his duties as emperor. 79 It was a role that was complex and developing, 
and one which the emperors took very seriously. Augustus often sat long into the night 
judging cases. 80 Tiberius prided himself on his knowledge and respect for Roman law. 81 
Justitia was for the princeps a cardinal Roman virtue and those who sought to do him 
honour called him iustissimus princeps. The princeps liked to think of himself as senator et 
iudex. 82 
Honore83 writes that the emperor's primary legal role was judicial, as opposed to political 
and administrative. But his wider role in legal affairs needs to be considered. It was a 
consequence of the enlarged and flexible nature of imperial jurisdiction that the emperor's 
field of interest in law was open-ended. His jurisdiction was unlimited. However, the 
nature of this jurisdiction was characterised by conscious and limited usurpation, something 
which in itself undermined the legal process. There was no statute which empowered 
Augustus to act as a court in his own right. Among the powers voted to him in 30 BC, 
were an extended tribunician auxilium, the right to judge on appeal, 84 as well as the 'vote 
of Minerva' 85 in the iudicia publica. The second and third of these powers are prerogatives 
of mercy in the field of criminal justice. 
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difficult, the former because such a vote could very seldom be used, the latter 
because it would give immense powers and undermine the importance of the 
courts.' See also Reinhold (1988), 230, who notes interestingly that contemporary 
sources such as the Res Gestae are silent on this power of Augustus, and that we 
have no record of his use of a "vote of Athena." 
Dio 5 L 19.7 The "vote of Minerva" was the power of pardon in all courts and 
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Although the emperor interfered in a case whenever he saw fit to do so, his very presence 
in court must have prejudiced legal proceedings. For example, Augustus felt compromised 
in Nonius Asprenas' murder trial. 86 Although he did not testify on Nonius' behalf, he 
made sure he was allowed, by senatorial consent, to remain in court during the 
proceedings. After Augustus had shrewdly explained his dilemma to the senate (if I testify, 
I protect a criminal; if I don't, I prejudice a friend's chance at acquittal), no court, under 
these circumstances would have returned a guilty verdict. Suetonius concedes that Augustus 
did appear on behalf of his dependants, but stresses that he intervened successfully only in 
one case, by personal appeal to the plaintiff, because of the role the defendant had played 
in the disclosure of Murena's conspiracy. 87 But Dio records a case, 88 in 12 BC, when. 
Augustus entered a court room in an adultery case and sat in the praetor's chair. He did 
nothing to disrupt the proceedings, but forbade the accuser to insult either his friends or 
relatives and then stood up and left. Tiberius, on the other hand, made a regular practice 
of sitting in the law courts. Tacitus mentions clearly the influence Tiberius had on legal 
proceedings. 
Nee patrum cognitionibus satiatus iudiciis adsidebat in cornu tribunalis, ne 
praetorem curuli depelleret; multaque eo coram adversus ambitum et 
potentium preces constituta. Sed dum veritati consulitur, libertas 
corrumpebatur. 89 
Tacitus' attitude is clear. The historian's concession to veritas is reluctant, since he 
considers the violation of libertas of greater importance. He depicts Tiberius as a man 
unhealthily obsessed with legal affairs. Suetonius also mentions Tiberius' tendency to sit 
beside magistrates,90 but only in an advisory capacity, and when abuses had to be checked. 
The emperor had the power to determine the nature, course and result of proceedings in the 
court. In one case in which the privileges of Demeter's priests were questioned, Augustus 
cleared the court, dismissed his legal advisers and settled the dispute in camera. 91 The 
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emperor conducted pre-trial criminal investigations too. Tiberius himself investigated the 
murder of Plautius Silvanus' wife Apronia, and afterwards referred the case to the senate 
for trial. When a dagger was sent to Silvanus by his grandmother, Livia's friend 
Urgulania, he assumed that this was a hint from the emperor and committed suicide. 92 
Moreover, the delegation of appeals to the urban prefect or men of consular rank chosen 
province by province according to the source of appeal, 93 can also be considered 
usurpation. Honore94 views it as necessary because there was no other way of securing a 
modicum of uniformity in law and administration. It must be remembered, however, that 
in each case where the emperor sat as judge, an alternative court existed and that for a case 
to arrive at the emperor's court a positive choice was required, normally on the part of the 
accuser - as it did in an appeal on the part of a defendant. It also required a willingness by . 
the emperor to hear the case, since he could refuse or delegate, should he so wish.95 The 
emperor's role therefore was passive since it was on the initiative of others such as a 
governor or plaintiff/defendant that cases came to him, but he was under no obligation to 
try every case sent to him. It is therefore natural that the emperor should choose cases 
which affected his political and personal position. The emperor's primary jurisdiction in 
maiestas cases reflects his right to protect himself and his rule. 96 Tiberius' example of 
refusing to try any maiestas case in person was not followed by later emperors. Indeed, 
Tiberius' policy was opposite even to Augustus' practice who himself considered charges 
against plebeians, 97 and perhaps even higher placed persons. 98 Furthermore, it seems that 
the majority of cases referred to the emperor by governors in the first century were serious 
political charges; such as rebellion, subversion, or offences against the emperor. 99 
The increasing control of jurisdiction had a disquieting, natural consequence. The extended 
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use of the cognitio process by those who were judging, meant inevitably an erosion of the 
existing judicial structures. Millar100 believes that the evidence, though slight, may suggest 
that people tended to approach those possessing exceptional power for justice without 
regard to the constitutional formality or legitimacy of their position. Many of those who 
found themselves under threat of prosecution preferred to take their chances with the 
emperor than to subject themselves to a quaestio perpetua. After all, the emperor was 
always looking for an opportunity to demonstrate his dementia. 101 In this context, the 
eventual demise of the quaestiones perpetuae was assured. 
Inescapable, however, is that from the very beginning of the principate, jurisdiction was a 
central part of the emperor's functions. Augustus and his successors seized this aspect of 
their imperial duties to ensure political security. The emperor frequently judged 
conspirators and supposed conspirators in person, interrogated them and put them to 
death. 102 Cognitio allowed him to be judge, advocate and executioner. Augustus 
demonstrated his imperial cognitio as early as 6 BC103 when two ambassadors from Cnidus 
brought to him a charge of murder against a man (who subsequently died during the 
investigation) and his wife. Augustus conducted his own enquiry, acquitting the woman 
and castigating the city and its magistrates for persecution of the accused. 
Above all, the cognitio procedure employed by the emperor represented a fundamental 
break with republican forms. In the Republic there had been no office holder in the city 
who himself heard any criminal and civil case throughout and himself delivered a 
judgement. The emperor did precisely this. He had acquired for himself the power to 
inflict death, confiscation and exile. This was from the beginning an integral part of his 
role. To Millar, it was an inheritance of the summary hearings, punishments and 
confiscations of the civil war period. 104 It is the ability of the emperor, through this 
procedure, to inflict punishment by his personal decision which is, for Millar, the most 
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concrete and specific of all the features of monarchy which were established from the 
beginning. Although Augustus sat with his consilium (the role of which was essentially 
advisory), he was by no means bound by their verdict. The ultimate decision lay with him. 
But the principal significance of the imperial jurisdiction lies not in the judicial removal of 
political enemies, nor of rich men for their wealth, but in its 'routine nature and often 
insignificant subject matter, the very unimportance of which reflects the subjects' 
conception of the emperor as a source of law and justice.' 105 The emperor appreciated the 
role of the judicial process as a mechanism for the maintenance of political and social 
control in general, and as a means of the containment of violence in particular. Whether 
they be cases referred to him by governors from far flung provinces, or relatively minor 
cases of murder, or cases in which his own security was threatened, Augustus and Tiberius 
seemed to monitor legislative activity closely. If the emperor himself did not hear the case 
(according to the cognitio procedure), then delegated jurisdiction in the hands of those who 
owed allegiance primarily to the emperor, would handle it. 
THE COURT OF THE URBAN PREFECT 
The concept of delegated jurisdiction is important for two reasons: 106 firstly because it was 
exercised by new tribunals using the cognitio procedure. Consequently, the gradual 
replacement of Republican jurisdictions and procedures was made inevitable. Secondly, 
inasmuch as it was exercised by older jurisdictions by imperial sanction, their 
independence and separation from the power of the state was reduced. 
The post of the praefectus urbi is one of the new tribunals which operated under strict 
imperial control, and eventually replaced those legal structures which were in use during 
the Republic. Tacitus says that the creation of jurisdiction of the praefectus urbi was an 
innovation of Augustus necessitated 'ob magnitudinem populi' and 'ob tarda legum 
auxilia' . 107 The duties of the praefectus urbi were to discipline slaves and those who 
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needed threats of force to keep them in order. Dio, putting words in the mouth of 
Maecenas, is more explicit. The role of the praefectus urbi would be to govern the city not 
only in the consuls' absence, but to be in charge of its affairs at all times. He must also 
deal with cases which are referred to him by other magistrates whether as a matter of 
appeal or review and in addition, those which involve the death penalty. His jurisdiction 
should cover not only those who live in the city, but also those who live outside it up to a 
radius of a hundred miles. 108 
The court of the praefectus urbi, as delegated jurisdiction, must be considered in 
comparison with the senatorial court which was under the Emperor's direct and remote 
control, and which saw its major activity in Tiberius' reign where it was nothing more 
than the High Court of the Empire. During this time, when the prestige of the senatorial 
court was at its highest, the urban prefect handled mostly petty offences hardly more 
serious than the theft of a patron's clothes by his freedman. 109 However, by Ulpian's time 
the senatorial court had slipped into decline and had no ambition other than to protect the 
interests of its own membership while the praefectus urbi had become the highest judge 
below the emperor and would hear cases on appeal or referral. His jurisdiction had become 
so vast to the extent that he had emerged as the emperor's deputy in judicial affairs. 110 
The creation of the praefectus urbi, has two aspects. One relates to maintaining law and 
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exercendi; tum Taurus Statilius, quamquam provecta aetate, egregie toleravit; dein 
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order in a crowded city. 111 Augustus' intent was to provide on-the-spot protection for 
Romans against a huge, volatile and self-serving populace. He was therefore appointed as 
an "urban chief of police" 112 but it is possible that Augustus foresaw that that the prefect 
would build up a criminal jurisdiction under imperial supervision which would eventually 
displace that of the quaestiones perpetuae. The other aspect, as hinted at by Dio and the 
Digest, concerns his activities in the sphere of judicial affairs. Tacitus states that the post 
was also created '(ob) tarda legum auxilia ', which may well imply criticism of existing 
civil and criminal procedures. Augustus may have disapproved also of other aspects of 
praetorian justice, including its tendency to corruption and the limitations of the legal 
procedures. 113 
The immediate problem in discussing the the judicial role of the praefectus urbi, 
predictably, is paucity of evidence, especially within the reigns of Augustus and Tiberi us. 
What is certain, however, is that the appointment of L. Calpumius Piso as praefectus urbi 
in AD 12, marks the conversion of the post into a permanent long-term judicial and 
administrative appointment of a nature unprecedented under the Republic. The 
constitutional aspect of the post is consequently of some importance and discussion will 
yield a better understanding of how the praefectus urbi became better equipped to deal with 
violence than any of the mechanisms of the Republic. 
The source and the nature of the powers of the praefectus urbi are problematic. Jones says 
that the 'city prefect presumably derived his imperium from the emperor.' 114 But this is 
hardly adequate. Vitucci 115 attempted to show that the office evolved step by step from 
Caesarian and triumviral precedents. He suggests that the posts conferred on L. Caesar in 
· 47 BC, Plancus and colleagues in 46, Regulus in 42, Maecenas in 36 and 31, Agrippa in 
31 and 19, Corvinus in 25, and on Statilius Taurus in 16, were successive stages leading 
towards the permanent institution beginning with Piso in AD 12. Cadoux116 refutes this by 
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arguing that this list falls into two distinct groups. Firstly, there are those for whom the 
title of praefectus was claimed and whose sphere of action was limited to Rome. They, 
according to Cadoux, were substitutes for junior rather than senior magistrates. They in no 
way foreshadowed the new prefecture, and they resembled neither the old praefecti nor 
those of the Principate and may be regarded as unique. Only Corvinus can be considered a 
prototype of the new prefects. 117 Secondly, there are those who are unofficial but 
influential representatives of Octavian/ Augustus who managed affairs in Rome while the. 
princeps was absent abroad. They are not called praefecti urbi by any reliable authority, 
and they were not chosen because of their standing in the Senate, but as Octavian's right-
hand men. They did not operate alongside or in place of normal holders of imperium, but 
outside the constitution altogether possessing no legal potestas. They were far more 
powerful than any prefect because of the certainty of the support of Octavian. 
Cadoux118 traces the development of the prefecture in four stages. Firstly, Caesar revived 
the old prefecture in 47 BC. Thereafter he appointed a college of subordinates who 
received the same title. Thirdly, Octavian occasionally had cause to appoint unofficial vice-
regents, not called praefecti, to look after Rome and Italy in his absence. Fourthly, m 
about 25 BC a post called the praefectura urbis was created, but it owed little to 
Republican or Caesarian precedents or to Octavian's practice of appointing unofficial vice-
regents, and was an experiment at the time which failed. It was only later that Augustus 
revived the post and made it permanent. 
What also raises difficulties is the means of appointment of the praefectus urbi, and the 
relationship he had with the princeps. Did he derive their legal authority from the 
princeps? What was his constitutional status? As far as appointment is concerned, the 
evidence is extremely scarce. We are, in fact, nowhere told explicitly that the praefectus 
urbi derived his legal authority from the princeps. Nor are are we clearly informed of the 
specific mode of appointment. Tacitus' use of the word sumpsit119 implies that the 
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princeps did indeed exercise a controlling choice. But this does not mean that the princeps 
enjoyed sole right of appointment. The prefects were clearly magistrates120 and enjoyed 
magisterial status. They were not representatives of the princeps121 since his presence in . 
the city did not require their resignation. Nor, however, were they representatives of the 
consuls. The duration of their office which extended over several consulships, and the 
consuls' constant presence in the city, is sufficient evidence against this. 
Independence from the princeps was only nominal, and one can only guess at the mode of 
appointment. Unlike the old praefecti, not being representatives of other magistrates, 
Cadoux makes the conjecture that 'they should derive their authority directly from· the 
People, and it is possible that comitia (preceded, after AD 14, by selection in the Senate) 
were held for this purpose whenever a vacancy occurred. The elections would be presided 
over by the consuls, but the princeps would have a hand in the preparation of the lists of 
candidates and his support for any one of them would be decisive.' 122 Although the 
praefecti urbi were legally independent magistrates, they were also from the beginning 
instruments of the princeps' will. Cadoux123 sees no contradiction in this. To him the 
princeps worked through in'struments of two kinds. On the one hand, there were his legal 
subordinates such as the senatorial legati and the equestrian prefects and procurators. On 
the other there was the whole range of officials who took their authority from the Senate 
and the People. The first group the princeps controlled through his potestas, the second, 
through his auctoritas. 
The post of the praefectus urbi was a unique and original creation of Augustus of about 
AD 12. The mechanisms that had been in use during the Republic were clearly inadequate 
for the purpose of Augustus' political ends as well as ineffective in the context of a 
growing and turbulent city. For Kunkel the praefectus urbi simply replaced the tresviri 
capitales as organs of police justice. 124 But this is unconvincing. 125 Rather, the differences 
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between the tresviri capitales and the praefecti urbi explain the reasons for Augustus' 
inauguration of the post and indicate that the praefectus was a considerable improvement 
on the Republican system. Although the tresviri had police duties, supervised prisons and 
executions and could receive information on crimes, 125 they did not enjoy the far reaching 
criminal jurisdiction of the praefectus urbi. They were neither equipped to deal with large-
scale public disorder, nor did they have the necessary imperium to try citizens. The rresviri 
were young magistrates of inferior rank who seemed to act on their own initiative within a 
narrow sphere of jurisdiction and their one year term meant that they had little time to 
gather experience. The praefecti, on· the other hand, were often qualified legal men of 
senatorial rank, also equipped with invaluable administrative experience, who had a broad 
sphere of jurisdiction. The extended duration of office of the praefecrus urbi had the 
beneficial effect of making possible possible a certain stability in the administration of 
justice. 
The procedure before the praefecri urbi was also in many ways superior to the quaestiones 
perpetuae. It was quicker, cheaper and did not suffer from the delays to which the 
quaestiones perpetuae were vulnerable. Furthermore, the praefectus was usually more 
experienced in legal matters than the praetores who presided over the quaestiones 
perpetuae. Also, unlike the quaestiones perpetuae, the court of the praefecrus urbi was not 
a spedal court whose jurisdiction was confined to certain offences defined by statute; in 
fact judgement could be passed on every offence against public order and security. The 
cognitio procedure allowed the praefectus urbi even to punish offences for which no 
ordinary prosecution was provided by law. He was also freer than the magistrates presiding 
over the quaestiones perpetuae in respect of punishment to be handed down . 
. 
The creation of the court of the praefectus urbi signified a radical departure in the 
administration of criminal justice during the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius. It had the 
dual advantage of being able to dispense to low-status defendants a higher quality of justice 
125 See Cic. Leg. 3.3.6. Here Cicero stresses the auxiliary function and the partial 
authority of the tresviri. Originally their functions were solely auxiliary, perhaps to 
the praetor urbanus. 
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than they were used to in the Republic, as well as creating for the princeps a structure 
which ensured greater social control thereby limiting and controlling violence. The creation 
of this court was not resisted or opposed. Although he held the politically sensitive post of 
the princeps' right hand man in judicial affairs, by the time of Juvenal he could be 
described ·as 'optimus atque interpres legum sanctissimus '. 126 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have discussed the far reaching innovations made to the criminal justice 
system during the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius. The changes in structure and procedure 
came partly as a response to the legacy which the Republic had left - the Republican 
structures were flawed and inadequate - and partly in the context of a greater need felt by 
J 
the princeps for firmer control over his subjects. The three courts which have been 
discussed have in common the merger of administrative and judicial duties, and in the case 
of the senatorial and imperial courts, of legislative duties as well. Another point in 
common was that they were specific creations of the princeps, and as such were under his 
strict supervision. 
The cognitio procedure was common to all three courts and allowed for greater intrusion 
by the presiding officer. The advantages of these courts were that, to some extent, 
corruption was ended, and that the resolution of cases was substantially speeded up. 
Disadvantages were that such a fluid system of court procedure, together with social and 
political considerations, often meant that justice was severely compromised. Also, 
especially in the case of the senatorial court, courts became an arena for the satisfaction of 
personal political battles. 
The result is that such a criminal justice system was susceptible to political exploitation and 
abuse, thus engendering a climate of "violence" and an atmosphere of fear. At the very 
least, these were structures par excellence for the combatting of violence in a political 
society far different from the Republic. Nevertheless, the flexibility which these courts 
126 Sat. 4. 78 ff. Juvenal is here contemplating the praefectus in the context of criminal 
justice. 
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provided meant that the authorities could now combat violence with greater effectiveness. 
They were no longer restricted by the obstacles which were characteristic of the Republic. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
PUNISHMENT AND VIOLENCE IN THE EARLY PRINCIPATE 
INTRODUCTION 
93 
This chapter concerns the third aspect of the legal process - punishment, the medium 
through which state power and state violence can be expressed and advertised legitimately. 
Investigation into Roman punishment will illustrate how an increasingly absolutist state 
related to individuals and its subjects. David Garland explains the broader advantages of 
placing punishment under the microscope: 1 'In common with other social institutions, 
punishment displays a complexity of function and a richness of meaning sufficient to 
challenge sociological understanding and to repay social analysis. Studied with sufficient 
care and attention, it is a form of life which can yield a surprisingly rich crop of insights 
and illuminations about the society in which it takes place and about the people whom it 
involves.' Punishment tells us 'how we react to disorderly persons and threats to the social 
order - (but) also, and more importantly, it can reveal some of the ways in which personal 
and social order come to be constructed in the first place. ' 2 For Garland, penology 
expresses a 'definite sense of how social relations are (and should be) constituted in a 
particular society. It points to society's sources of power and to sources of danger, to the 
principles which hold it together, and those which threaten to pull it apart. ' 3 Furthermore, 
one of the essential reasons for discussing penality in the context of violence, is that 
punishment embodies a fundamental social and moral contradiction which is, as Garland 
points out,4 an irresolvable tension. However well organized, however humanely 
administered, punishment can never escape an unwanted irony, such as attempting to 
uphold freedom by depriving it, or condemning private violence by using a violence which 
is publicly authorized. 
Particular discussion of punishment is justified when viewed against the notion that Rome 
experienced a trend towards severity in its penal system. 5 In this chapter I propose i) to 
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examine the causes of this trend in the context of the political and social events of the time, 
ii) to analyse the nature of the impact made by the legislative and judicial evolution on 
punishments, and iii) to scrutinise the procedures, rituals and technicalities of specific 
punishments in order to establish the extent to which they might reflect a society in 
transition. 
At the outset one must recognize that appearances of brutality may be misleading and that 
diversity is testimony to a more sophisticated and flexible criminal system. 6 I shall argue 
that it was the Roman system of criminal law and penalties which afforded the state - and 
by this I mean the princeps and his delegated jurisdiction - the opportunity to explore 
avenues of brutality and severity with a view to ensuring political control and social order. 
The reasons for this are found not merely in the political and social circumstances of the 
time. Punishment, through an intricate system of procedure, symbol and ritual reflected a 
dimension of the society of the Early Principate which reached beyond the social and 
political into the psychological sphere. 
Cognitio jurisdiction was, unsurprisingly, the principal mechanism through which greater 
severity in punishments was realised. 1 Where, in the Republic, the penalty was fixed by 
the legislation which set up the court, under the cognitio system the judge had the freedom 
to choose which penalty to prescribe. He was only prevented by the bounds of moderatio. 8 
The cognitio system allowed the three new courts of the Principate to work without 
interference or restriction from legislation or process. When assessing the penalty for ~ 
"private" crime (delictum), a judge according to strict Republican procedure, would 
consider two factors. Firstly, he would attempt to evaluate the loss suffered by an 
individual. This was often precisely calculable. In such a case the court would order the 
accused to restore to the complainant that which he had lost, or the monetary equivalent 
thereof. Secondly, the judge would consider the wrong done to society as a whole, 
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something which was not only incalculable but was also vulnerable to different 
interpretations. How does the theft of a person's private property, or the assault of a person 
damage society as a whole? Moreover, during the course of the principate this began to 
receive greater prominence and outweigh the other factors when reaching a penalty. 
Individuals began to look to the state for the satisfaction of their legal grievances. The state 
was more than happy to do this since it was now allowed to regulate more closely the 
affairs between citizens. 
Most of the penalties which emerged. from a context in which the authorities sought to 
monopolise the affairs between citizens for the purposes of tighter control and which came 
to be applied regularly to criminals originated as irregular sanctions with no basis in 
criminal law. New sanctions did not only mean arbitrary and imaginative ones, such as that 
applied to the money lender by Galba, 9 but also the revival of old, established and cruel 
punishments which had since fallen into disuse. 10 On many occasions customary 
punishments were reworked to revise the original ritual meaning that they may have had, 
so as to provide them with a new dimension which, I shall argue, reflected the new 
political and social context. 
This trend to harshness can, to some extent, be explained in political and social terms, 
specifically the substitution of a monarchy for aristocracy. 11 Punishment is the public 
exhibition of the monarch's power over his subjects, a proposition which will enjoy some 
attention in this chapter. But I will also examine punishment in sociological terms to reveal 
not only a further aspect to the nature of the political changes of the Early Principate, but 
also a greater understanding of the dynamics of Roman society. 
We are not to be limited by the notion that punishment is specifically directed towards the 
prevention or control of crime. Punishment is a social phenomenon which has set 
determinants and a social significance which go beyond crime control and cannot be 
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reduced to a single meaning or purpose. For the purposes of this investigation I shall 
employ Garland's definition of punishment as 'the legal process whereby violators of the 
criminal law are condemned and sanctioned in accordance with specified legal categories 
and procedures. This process is itself complex and differentiated, being composed of the 
interlinked processes of law-making, conviction, sentencing and administration of 
penalties. It involves discursive frameworks of authority and condemnation, ritual 
procedures of imposing punishment, a repertoire of penal sanctions, institutions and 
agencies for the enforcement of sanctions and a rhetoric of symbols, figures and images by 
means of which the penal process is represented to its various audiences.' 12 
Before embarking on an analysis of specific punishments, a general discussion of penal 
aims, both ancient and modern, is pertinent, both for a clearer understanding of how 
punishments operate within a society generally and for more accurate conclusions in our 
analysis of particular modes of punishment. Coleman has lamented the lack of discussion 
of Roman penal aims in contemporary juristic sources, as well as the deficiency of any 
modern sociological study devoted to systems of punishments in the ancient world. 
However, it is valuable to mention the modern leading schools of thought even though no 
single sociological model seems to fit ancient society. But each model will shed significant 
light on the Roman penal system. 13 
The tradition established by the sociologist Durkheim emphasises punishment's moral and 
social-psychological roots in addition to its putative solidarity-producing effects. The 
Marxist perspective considers punishment's role in a class-based process of social and 
economic regulation. Revisionists such as Foucault, on the other hand, argue that that 
disciplinary punishments operate as power/knowledge mechanisms within wider strategies 
of domination and subjectification. They have constructed a model of oppressive and 
exploitative authoritarianism. 
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A new approach from Harding and lreland14 is to lay stress on the significance of cultural 
context in establishing penal methods and purposes. They have extended penology to 
include means of social control outside legal processes. Thus for them, punishment is the 
way members of a society (or its rule-enforcing authorities) make apparent their 
disapproval of the violation of that society's norms. The history of punishment is not an 
evolution from "primitive" to "civilized", but a 'constantly adjusting balance of techniques 
of social control determined by the physical resources, moral basis, and belief system of 
any given society.' 15 Garland argues for a social approach to punishment believing that the 
philosophies of punishment in their traditional form are based on an idealized and one- . 
dimensional image of punishment which poses the problem of punishment as a variant of 
the classic liberal conundrum of how the state should relate to the individual. 16 Rather the 
need is for a pluralistic, multidimensional interpretative approach which considers 
punishment as an overdetermined, multifaceted social institution. His study seeks to 
construct a composite picture of the phenomenon by superimposing different perspectives 
to suggest a fuller, more three-dimensional image than is usually perceived. The advantage 
of thinking of punishment as a social artefact serving a variety of purposes and premised 
upon an ensemble of social forces, argues Garland, is that it 'allows us to consider 
punishment in sociological terms without dismissing its penological purposes and effects. It 
avoids the absurdity of thinking about punishment as if it had nothing to do with crime, 
without falling into the trap of thinking of it solely in terms of crime control. We can thus 
accept that punishment is indeed oriented towards the control of crime - and so partly 
determined by that orientation - but insist that it has other determinants and other dynamics 
which have to be considered if punishment is to be fully understood. d 7 Coleman has 
recognized the particular value of such a perspective when applied to a society like Rome 
which 'differed radically in its economy, value system, and social hierarchy from those 
post-Enlightenment western societies on whose penal practices modem sociologists have 
based their models of punishment.' 18 
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ROMAN PENAL AIMS 
What were the aims of Roman punishment? Coleman correct! y cautions that distinctions 
drawn between various aims can frequently be misleading because an individual penalty 
and its governing legislation usually serve a complex of purposes rather than a discrete 
aim. 19 ~evertheless, these purposes need to be isolated if we are to arrive at a proper 
understanding of Roman punishment. It was a prominent feature of Roman social life. Like 
most societies the Romans believed that wrongs should be punished. In the Annals 
Tiberi us, in connection with the charge of maiestas against Silanus, says: 'sic a maioribus 
institutum ut, si antissent delicta, poenae sequerentur. ne verterent sapienter reperta et 
semper placita. satis onerum principibus, satis etiam potentiae. minui < i > ura quotiens 
gliscat potestas, nee utendum imperio ubi legibus agi possit. '20 That Tacitus has Tiberi us 
express such highly uncharacteristic sentiments is clear indication that the Romans 
themselves believed that punishment should be left within the judicial sphere.: that is 
regulated within a specific structure after a trial procedure which has been adjudicated by a 
suitably qualified person' and not in the political or administrative sphere where 
considerations extraneous to the case at hand might eclipse justice. 
For Cicero, writing about the powers of state officials and the legislative and judicial 
powers of the State, the courts are the organs through which society (or the state) enforces 
its will. Law on its own, is not enough: 'legesque cum magis iudiciis quam verbis 
sanciendae sint.' He immediately follows this with a statement on punishment: 'noxiae 
poena par esto' - the punishment shall fit the crime 'ut in suo quisque plectatur, vis capite, 
avaritia multa, honoris cupiditas ignominia sanciatur. ' 21 The Digest too, makes it plain 
that there should be a relationship between the severity of the punishment and the 
seriousness of the crime. The court should arrive at a sentence only after due 
consideration:22 'Perspiciendum est iudicanti, ne quid aut durius aut remissius constituatur, 
quam causa deposcit: nee enim aut severitatis aut dementiae gloria affectanda est, sed 
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perpenso iudicio, prout quaeque res expostulat, statuendum est.' 
RETRIBUTION 
The determining factor in Roman punishment was retribution; the extraction of 
recompense,or requital for evil that has been done. Seneca who considered emendatio as a 
possible aim of punishment acknowledged that severitas was the best corrective. 23 In its 
most primitive form this was expressed in the maxim "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a 
tooth" and in it was enshrined the principle of talio. 24 An arsonist, for example, would 
suffer the penalty of crematio.25 Aulus Gellius, discussing the lex talionis, and how delicts 
should be compensated, relates that for some of the more serious injuries retaliation was 
even prescribed. He concedes that this is an unsatisfactory way of restoring the balance of 
social relations because it is an extremely difficult task. 26 The intention of the Decemviri in 
talio, was to diminish and abolish such violence as beating and injuring, thinking that this 
would be done by inducing fear of such a penalty. They aimed at exacting the same spirit 
and the same violence in breaking the same part of the body but not the same result. 27 
In Rome vengeance was also a religious obligation. This explains the ritual nature of many 
of the punishments. Brigands were executed at the site of their crime not only for deterrent 
value, but principally as a method of offering consolation to relatives and friends who 
survived the victim - 'solacio sit cognatis et adfinitibus.'28 Moreover, the punishment 
inflicted at the scene of the crime allows the balance of social relations to be restored. In a 
discourse on the penalties for theft, Gellius29 traces their history from Draco to Solon to 
the measures of the Twelve Tables to his own time. Solon's laws decreed a penalty of 
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twice the value of the stolen goods. The penalty iri Gellius' time was four times the value 
for manifestun furtum or three times the value for conceptum furtum or oblatum furtum. 
There is more than principle of restitutio in integrum evident here. The aggrieved party is 
not only to be compensated to the extent of the damage he has suffered. Retribution must 
be the predominant aim at work here. 
Gellius30 also comments that the wronged person must be compensated not only 
economically, but also his status must be asserted and due respect paid to him. Coleman 
calls this a refined version of the retributive principle,31 which is expressed by Gellius' 
teacher who accepted Plato's condemnation of retribution as vicious and futile: 'ea causa 
animadvertendi est, cum dignitas auctoritasque eius in quem est peccatum tuenda est, ne 
praetermissa animadversio contemptum eius pariat et honorem levet.' 
In the Early Empire, the infliction of pain as a retributive principle began to enjoy greater 
prominence. This is in some degree due to the greater role the state in the person of its 
disguised monarch, the emperor, came to play in what had hitherto been delicts suffered by 
individuals in the sphere of private law, and the consequent public nature of these 
proceedings. MacMullen believes that the political aspect to penal vengeance should not be 
ignored. 32 Tacitus' story of the burning of the Christians is a prime example of how the 
emperor used criminal penalties in an administrative manner in order to extract maximum 
political mileage. 33 
Nevertheless, since the offender caused harm and suffering, it was only right that the 
offender should also suffer for his offence. The worse the offence, the harsher the 
punishment. Maximum physical suffering had to be inflicted. Therefore, a person who 
suffer~ the summum supplicium - the death penalty had not merely to lose his life but do 
so as painfully as possible. Of the sources Juvenal stood alone in his doubt as to the 
effectiveness of vengeance. To him vengeance was always the delight of a weak, small and 
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petty mind, 34 and the infliction of cruel, vindictive and immoderate punishment succeded 
only in teaching people how to be cruel. 35 But this sentiment was an exception. The 
majority of authors considered vengeance not a legitimate but an essential aspect of Roman 
punishment. 
DETERRENCE 
Closely linked to retribution as an aim of punishment is deterrence. Other penal aims, such · 
as correction and prevention of repetition of the offence, are concerned solely with the 
offender himself; the purpose of deterrence is to inhibit potential offenders in society at 
large, as well as to intimidate proven criminals from repeating their offence. 
For Gellius, deterrence is one of the three principle aims of punishment: 'tertia ratio 
vindicandi est quae paradeigma a Graecis nominatur cum poenitio propter exemplum 
necessaria est, ut ceteri a similibus peccatis, quae prohiberi publicitus interest, metu 
cognitae poenae deterreantur. •36 Deterrence is important for Seneca too. Society punishes 
wrongdoers 'aut ut eum, quem punit, emendet, aut ut poena eius ceteros meliores reddat, 
aut ut sublatis malis securiores ceteri vivant. .37 When the purpose is deterrence, 
punishment is inflicted more rationally and with greater self-confidence than when it is 
revenge: 'difficilius est enim moderari, ubi dolori debetur ultio, quam ubi exemplo. •38 The 
jurists too recognized deterrence as a penal aim, as when the execution of brigands at the 
site of their crime was intended as a public deterrent. 39 
That deterrence is rarely acknowledged by the ancient jurists as a penal aim may be 
because the prominence of gallows at public places rendered this purpose obvious, 40 as 
Quintilian can suggest 'quotiens noxios crucifigimus celeberrimae eligiuntur viae, ubi 
plurimi intueri, plurimi commoveri hoc metu possint. omnis enim poena non tam ad 
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< vin > dictam pertinet, quam ad exemplum. •41 
Penal intimidation extends beyond the limits of the juridical. In order to quell the mutiny at 
Nauportus, Augustus' general, Blaesus, had mutineers flogged and thrown into prison- 'ad 
terrorem ceterorum. ' 42 Seneca exhorts his listeners to consider penalties such as 'the jail, 
the cross, the rack, the hook, and the man pierced right through so that the stake comes out 
his mouth. '43 These images are presented to arouse dread not abhorrence. 44 
There are two essential requirements for deterrence to be effective. The first is that a 
penalty should arouse horror and aversion, the second that there should be sufficient 
opportunity for the public at large to experience these emotions. Here the authority 
responsible for punishment needs to moderate the frequency of exposure of punishments to 
its public lest the efficacy of the deterrent value be compromised. It also needs to acquire 
control of where (and how) such exposure is to take place. Much of the public punishment 
of the Early Empire occurred where great public exposure could be ensured - in the circus 
or the amphitheatre. This is particularly true when one considers the size of the 
amphitheatres and the frequency of the shows. From Augustus onwards a trend towards 
formalisation of these structures can be discerned, from the limitation and monopolisation 
by the emperor of the giving of games, 45 to the increase in the numbers of fixed stone 
amphitheatres. 46 
The scenes that took place in these arenas of punishment were indeed horrific, but 
MacMullen47 rightly points out that 'in a society where gladiatorial combat was a fixture, 
they were not likely to be judged literally intolerable.' Indeed, as the physical formalisation 
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of the spheres of public punishment in amphitheatres meant that a physical and moral 
I 
separation was created between the public and the spectacle itself, much of the deterrent 
effect came to be lost and the dominant reaction to these punishments was one of pleasure 
rather than horror and aversion. 48 
EDUCATION 
The violent punishments which took place in the arena were also occasions where the great 
Roman virtues were celebrated, which may indicate a definite educational value to the 
cruel punishments being displayed to the Roman public. Here the Roman public were 
incited to pulchra vulnera, amor laudis and cupido victoriae. 49 The educational element 
was strengthened by the fact that the participants and performers were outcasts, as Romans 
could be expected to emulate and surpass them. 50 Education moreover is a most effective 
means of social control, especially if it succeeds in making people believe in the norms and 
standards presented to them. Success would result eventually in reducing the need for 
coercive intervention. 51 However, the lack of evidence makes it impossible to say whether 
the Romans were successful in teaching virtus through the violence played out in the arena, 
or not. 52 
PREVENTION 
Unlike deterrence, prevention is not directed at the society at large and there is no aspect of 
example inherent in it. Rather, it is aimed at the offender himself and attempts to make it 
impossible for him to repeat the offence. This can be attained in two ways. Either the 
offender can be permanently removed from society, as Seneca suggested53 'ut sublatis 
malis securiores ceteri vivant', or he can be deprived of the means to commit further 
offences. 54 Today imprisonment has prevention as one of its aims as well as the 
retributive purpose of deprivation of freedom. But this was not evident in antiquity except 
in the case of forced labour, damnatio in metallum, which combined the removal of the 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
Coleman, 49. 
See Plin. Paneg. 33.1. 
Wistrand, 15. 
Wistrand, 67. 
Wistrand, 73-74. 
Sen. Clem. 1.22.1. 
An extreme example is Galba's moneylender (Suet. Galb. 9.1), where the 
retributive measure of amputating the hands is also preventive. 
104 
criminal from society with making him perform an enervating but profitable duty. 55 In the 
Early Empire imprisonment was not a means of prevention of punishment: use of the 
career as a place of sentence was always resisted. 56 Nevertheless, there was an increase in 
custodial penalties as the Empire progressed even though imprisonment was not (in 
principle) a long term penalty. Opus publicum is frequently referred to in the legal sources 
and was a development which, Millar argues, 57 represented a radical innovation in the 
coercive capacities of the state and in the attitude of individuals. 
CORRECTION AND REHABILITATION 
Although correction is mentioned by both Gellius and Seneca as a purpose of punishment, 
if it was ever taken into account during sentencing by the Roman authorities, it is unlikely 
that it influenced the average person's attitude towards the fate of criminals especially 
when they believed that a criminal should get what was coming to him. 58 
Gellius, quoting the views of Taurus in his Gorgias commentary, considers correction to 
be when punishment is inflicted so that one who has accidentally done wrong may become 
more careful and scrupulous. 59 It is notable that the use of the word fortuito strictly limits 
the applicability of this principle. 
Seneca proposes correction as a penal aim, but suggests the best means of achieving it is 
through severitas, as long as it is sparingly applied- 'severitas, quod maximum remedium 
habet, adsiduitate amittit auctoritatem. •60 He does entertain the possibility of redemption, 
but warns that this raises the problem of distinguishing between curable and hopeless 
characters.61 Mercy, a fundamental component of correction, he recommended, should be 
given only to those judged capable of redemption. The worthy rather than the needy 
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deserved kindness. 62 Dio similarly has Maecenas advise Augustus that if 'you temper the 
letter of the law with leniency and humanity, you may succeed in bringing the offenders to 
see reason. ' 63 Occasionally mercy could be shown to the unworthy; but only for reasons of 
expediency. In a later passage Livia advises Augustus that the death penalty for conspiracy . 
was inappropriate and that other methods of correcting their behaviour should be found to 
prevent any future crime. 64 These, however, are the principles as expressed by historians 
and philosophers. It is clear that a different situation operated in reality. 
HUMILIATION 
Whereas physical suffering is to some extent quantifiable by the number of lashes or 
amount of bleeding, humiliation, which seems to be an integral part of punishment, and 
which entails mental and emotional suffering, is far more difficult to ascertain and 
quantify. 
In the military context, humiliation was clearly intended in the punishments Augustus 
meted out to soldiers of rank who had deserted their posts: centurions were punished · 
'itidem ut manipulares.' Lesser transgressions were punished 'variis ignominiis' such as 
being made to stand all day long in front of the general headquarters, sometimes 'tunicatos 
discinctosque, nonnunquam cum decempedis vel etiam caespitem portantes' as though they 
had been private soldiers whose task it was to measure out and build the camp ramparts. 65 
It is not surpnsmg in a society as status-conscious as Rome that humiliation was an 
aggravating factor. Status-consciousness intensified during the course of the empire, and 
punishment 'became a sphere par excellence of the distinction between honestiores and 
humiliores. '66 According to the Digest the marks of an honestior were his dignitas, 
existimatio and auctoritas,61 which, if damaged, could mean infamia - the loss of 
particular rights and privileges, amongst which was a different scale of penalties. 68 · 
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Humiliores, therefore, suffered more degrading and humiliating penalties due to their lack 
of status. An honestior, for example, did not suffer the cross because it was the penalty for 
slaves and therefore symbolised extreme humiliation, shame and torture. 69 There were 
other, less violent penalties reserved for the honestior. 10 
These status divisions which characterized the Roman penal system, and Roman society, 
cannot be overstressed. The cognitio system afforded the judge a greater scope in a 
criminal trial for the variation of penalty according to the social class of the defendant. The 
spirit of the criminal law became less humane because of the political developments, 
particularly the change in the nature of political authority in Rome, and the increased 
activity of the state in the judicial sphere. Conservative Roman social values, and the 
hierarchical structure of Roman society contributed to a climate of increased repression 
which was unfavorable to penal reform. 71 
One of the consequences of humiliation as a penal aim is that a distance between 
community and criminal is achieved thus validating the legal process and entrenching 
authority. In the case of crucifixion, it was not only a matter of removing all possibility of 
sympathy for the offender, but it also brought contempt on them. 72 This separation 
between the public and the victim, and the exaltation of the former, was achieved most 
effectively in the arena. 73 
Humiliation extended beyond the moment of death as the crucified victim served as food 
for wild animals and birds of prey.74 Augustus' callous answer to a humble request from a 
supporter of Brutus for a decent burial, that it was a matter to be settled for the carrion 
birds, was motivated not only by revenge 'but also by the need to inflict humiliation.75 It 
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was felt that guilt and humiliation should not only affect the wrongdoer himself but also his 
·posterity: for example, it was proposed, after Libo's suicide, that his statue should be 
excluded from his descendants' funeral-parades, that no Scribonius should ever again bear 
the name of Drusus, and that the day of his death should become a public holiday. 76 
Similarly the noose and hooks displayed to Germanicus' son, Nero by the camifex, 
intended humiliation as much as terror. The noose denoted strangulation and the hooks 
were used to drag the body for display on the Gemonian steps: a most degrading end for an 
aristocrat. 77 Tiberi us claimed credit for saving Agrippina from disgrace by allowing her to 
starve herself in exile, and not having her strangled in prison and thrown on the Gemonian 
steps. 78 
The denial of burial was the final humiliation. This is a critical aspect of Roman 
punishment, for it ensured the separation of criminal and community beyond the grave. 79 
This does not only apply to crucifixion. The throwing of offenders from the Tarpeian Rock 
also established this separation between community and criminal by virtue of the victim's 
failure to have contact with the earth after death and meant that the soul or spirit of the 
deceased was condemned to a restlessness between heaven and hell. 
There were other ways in which humiliation was effected, most notably the infliction of the 
tattoo, or, less frequently, a brand on a part of the criminal which was visible to the 
public. 80 It was certainly a method of identifying a lower class, most particularly 
criminals, slaves and prisoners of war. Suetonius records with indignation how Caligula 
ordered men of decent family to be branded ('stigmatum notis') and sent down the 
mines. 81 
Humiliation was to become a more important element of Roman punishment in the context 
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of punishments in the amphitheatre. The public ridicule of a criminal attempted to 
eliminate the threat he posed or represented to the prevailing order. 
PURIFICATION 
Once the separation between criminal and community was established, it remained for the 
community to deal finally with the offender by way of his expulsion from that community. 
The community, free from contamination by the criminal and his world, was then able to 
continue with life cleansed and more whole. Purification was achieved through the ritual of 
punishment. The religious mentalitie~ of ancient societies often invested the penal process 
with a wholly religious meaning so that punishment was understood as a necesary sacrifice 
to an aggrieved deity. 'In these cultures crime is associated with impurity and danger and 
the act of punishment involves a process of expiation as well as a process of ritual 
cleansing of polluting elements of society. •82 
It was important for the punishing authority to follow the rituals of punishment as purely as 
possible so as not to risk becoming contaminated itself. This can be clearly observed in the 
violation of virgins before suffering the ritual punishment of strangling, 83 not out of 
sadism, but rather through respect for the ancient custom according to which it was 
impious to strangle a virgin. 84 In this aim of purification ritual and public aspects of 
Roman punishment meet. The military punishment of decimation requires the ritual 
sacrifice of victims so as to redeem the remaining members of the community. 85 Again, 
punishment at the Tarpeian Rock was a ritual of separation and purification which was 
similar to stoning. 86 This cannot be illustrated in better fashion than by Cicero's words in 
his defence of Sextius Roscius, charged with the most heinous of Roman crimes, parricide: 
'ita vivunt, dum possunt, ut ducere animam de caelo non queant, ita moriuntur, ut eorum 
ossa terra non tangant.. ' 87 
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These aims of punishment must be borne in mind when considering specific Roman 
punishments. They are not to be considered exclusively from each other, and they will 
afford us profound insights into the dynamics of particular methods of punishment, as well 
as the society which inflicted them. 
PUNISHMENT AND CRUELTY 
Inherent in the trend of Roman punishment to greater severitas lie dangers which, if not 
given due consideration, can lead to erroneous and misleading conclusions. Firstly, a 
catalogue of Roman cruelties might induce arguments that the Romans were entirely unique 
in the severity of their punishments. This is simply not so. Other periods in history have 
yielded equal cruelty. 88 Secondly, one must avoid the bald notion that the Romans took a 
sadistic pleasure in their cruelties, unlike Kiefer89 who argues that the Romans were by 
nature and character brutish, immoral and cruel, incapable of naturally appreciating the 
higher ends of civilization. He interpreted cruelty as an expression of hatred and of the will 
to power, and this made Rome a vicious and violent society. 
Such simplistic views must not go unchallenged. Considering the gladiatorial shows and 
the methods and philosophies of Roman punishment, Lintott concludes that the Roman 
upper class, being that section of society responsible for these phenomena, was callously 
indifferent to physical suffering, an attitude which was removed from naked sadism. 90 
What distinguishes this attitude from others is that the Romans followed policy and not 
passion. Reasons could be found to justify what we would consider extremes of cruelty. 
The absence of good reason could render a less shocking act cruel. The passions 
accompanying cruelty were rejected and the results were of minimal concern. Lintott 
suggests that this indifference is explained by the familiarity with sudden death. This is 
particularly true in acts of mass brutality where it is the scale of the action and not the 
individual act that is striking. Punishment of the innocent, according to Lintott, seems to 
have been a policy of expediency founded on fear, compounded on indifference. 
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Like Lintott, Auguet too, rejects the idea that Roman savagery was a symptom of a 
bloodthirsty or sadistic psyche. For him sadism is not compatible with the Roman 
mentality. The Roman was a realist; a slave to utility in the narrowest sense. He obeyed 
the dictates of calculation and not a bloodthirsty instinct, and their sometimes excessive 
harshness which they showed towards their own people as well as to their enemies is not to 
be confused with cruelty. 
For Hopkins, however, Rome was inaeed a cruel society and brutality was built into its 
culture, in private life as well as its public shows. The tone was set by slavery and military 
discipline and proceeded to the realm of paternal powers which were extremely wide-
ranging.91 The Romans did set limits to cruelty, but not where we would set them. He 
suggests that the circulation of stories of excessive cruelty, such as the one of Vedius 
Pollio92 are instruments of social control which helped set the boundaries to the open 
cruelty which could be socially condoned in the private domain. Pleasure formed no part in 
Roman cruelty. 
The public dimension of Roman punishment is another aspect which requires scrutiny. The 
Roman public always participated to some extent in the punishment of society's offenders. 
This role was to change in the first century of the Empire. As Coleman points out, 93 the 
growing popularity of gladiatorial displays and wild beast fights, the protagonists of which 
were almost always condemned criminals strained the resources of the Roman Forum as a 
facility for public displays before an audience. The growth and formalisation by the state of 
the amphitheatre and its attendant goings-on afforded the opportunity of deriving the 
maximum moral and political benefit from the punishment of society's deviants. 
Nevertheless, there had always been a strong public and ritual component in the carrying 
out of punishment which bore a significance beyond the mere political. 
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In modern society penal measures have become professionalised and bureaucratised so that 
they are removed from direct public participation and involvement and have been cast in a 
form which de-emphasises their moral content. 94 What had once been an open ritualised 
dialogue between offender and community is now a much more oblique communication 
performed in institutions which give little expression to the public voice. 95 Penalties have 
ceased to be social in the full sense and have become increasingly technical and· 
professional. 
The public rituals of punishment in Republican Rome clearly expressed a strong moral 
content. Later, in the Early Principate, they began to assume a greater political dimension. 
Public executions in Rome, whether in the amphitheatre or in the Forum, were not only 
public entertainment or political theatre to keep the masses appeased and under control, but 
also a means of propaganda in which the might of the emperor and the consequences of 
defiance were unmistakeably displayed. A complex system of ritual and political dynamics 
were involved. In the context of the transition from Republic to monarchy, these dynamics 
become particularly significant, in that punishment is one of the many ceremonies in which 
the legitimacy of a regime is tested and established, and in which the distance between 
sovereign and subject is measured and the ascendancy of authority is publicly revealed. 
'The public execution takes the form of a theatrical spectacle in which the sheer force of 
the sovereign's power is publicly displayed upon the body of the condemned. At the same 
time, the vital connection between the sovereign and God is reinforced, not just by the 
display of the sovereign's power over life and death, but also by the religious language and 
symbolism which tie the law of the sovereign to the will of God and the natural order of 
things. ' 96 Consequently the execution itself was a ritual display of strength and an 
affirmation of power, conducted like any other great ritual with the pomp and 
fastidiousness of public ceremony. 
Punishment of a criminal was an opportunity to constitute sovereign power and re-establish 
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law and moral and political order through ritual. 97 A violator of this order was a violator 
against the sovereign himself since the law represented and embodied the emperor's will. 
The source of the emperor's power was military, and in accordance with this, justice was a 
manifestation of armed violence, an exercise in terror intended to remind the people of the 
unlimited power behind the law. 98 
The princeps, then, as the embodiment of law and order, confirmed the relationship with 
his subjects in public punishments. The separation between princeps and plebs was 
emphasised through the exhibition of state power through the violence of public 
punishment. Yet the roles are reciprocal: 'the spectators by their presence endorse the 
workings of justice and by their participation help to fulfil its aims. '99 Hopkins explains 
the growing public slaughter of unarmed criminals in the arena by suggesting that the 
social psychology of the crowd helped relieve the individual of responsibility and that there 
were psychological mechanisms by which some spectators identified more readily with the 
victory of the aggressor than with the sufferings of the vanquished. 100 Public executions, 
for him, helped instil valour and fear in those left at home. They were rituals which helped 
maintain an atmosphere of violence even in peace. Bloodshed and slaughter joined military 
glory and conquest as central elements in Roman culture. The Early Principate is important 
in this regard because it was such a time of peace when real battles and military glory were 
rare. 
SYMBOL AND RITUAL IN ROMAN PUNISHMENT 
Nevertheless, it is with the acceptance of symbol and ritual ceremony that Roman 
punishment was achieved. The symbols of Roman authority were also the instruments of 
punishment - the fasces - the rods and axe. 101 The place of execution was also symbolic: 
in the Republic it was Rome's most popular place, the Forum Romanum - where the 
magistrates were accustomed to sit, where they addressed the people and where the people 
themselves gathered. It was the most visible public place in the city, the most appropriate 
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location for rituals of consent and participation. 102 In the Republic, the community was 
organised around the arrest of the condemned and his ritual march from the place of 
detention to execution. This march symbolised the separation of the condemned from the 
community and manifested publicly the symbolic expulsion from the world of the living. It 
was during the course of this ritual that the community intervened, if they thought that 
execution was inappropriate, or made evident their consent by abstaining. In the Principate 
punishment in the Forum gave way to the amphitheatre where different political dynamics, 
above all the power of the princeps, dictated different rituals and different codes of 
participation. 103 They are exemplified by the exposure on the Gemonian Steps of the 
bodies of criminals executed in the career, a new development first manifested during the 
years of transition between Republic and Empire. 104 The display of bodies on the 
Gemonian steps105 was the only moment of publicity in a procedure of execution which 
became more secret during the Principate at which the people could express their will. This 
it did by the posthumous laceration and violent mutilation of the corpse, thus showing their 
approval and the recognition of the legitimacy of the punishment. Sejanus' body was 
abused by the rabble for three days before being thrown into the Tiber. 106 Exposure was 
also the fate of Titius Sabinus. 107 Symbolic violence constituted participation in the real 
violence of the execution. 108 There is no evidence in the Republic for this kind of custom. 
Popular participation in the process as seen under the Republic was unpredictable and could 
be viewed as a possible political threat, so in the Empire arrests and condemnations were 
conducted more surruptiously and occasionally not revealed to the public. Exposition and 
the cruel savaging of a corpse became the principal ritual of separation and participation. 
The Republican rituals of separation were displaced, and the means of displaying 
opposition to imperial will were channelled into other arenas more predictable and 
manipulable by authority. 
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SPECIFIC PUNISHMENTS OF THE EARLY EMPIRE. 
The Early Empire saw the legalization of many punishments which, in the Republic, had 
never been recognised or prescribed by any statute defining particular offences and setting 
up jury courts for their punishment. The only penalties the Late Republic knew were death 
(normally by decapitation), the monetary fine and outlawry or interdiction. The new legal 
process, characterized by cognitio, allowed other penalties such as crucifixion and 
cremation to be drawn into the legal process and become formal penalties for specific 
offences. In the Republic they wen~ penalties inflicted as a political and administrative 
action on offenders with no standing in Roman law. 
THE MONETARY FINE, EXILE AND BANISHMENT 
The fine 109 was a fairly common minor sanction, motivated by the principle of restitutio in 
integrum and as such it remained within the sphere of private law. They were avenged by 
the individual (rather than punished by the state) by a private suit, the object of which was 
compensation. However, the innovations of the first century AD in the judicial process 
caused by, and combined with, a new political scenario meant that new crimes began to 
make their appearance many of which had previously been treated as private delicts. 
Consequently financial compensation to a wronged party began to disappear in favour of 
penalties which demonstrated more emphatically state power and controi. 110 
Exile was one of the ways this could be achieved without physical violence. In the 
Republic, however, there was no official penalty of exile. In the Empire, exile evolved 
from a self-imposed and voluntary sanction by which death penalty was avoided, to a 
regular sentence enforced by the state. 111 Suetonius records Caesar's frustration with exile 
as an unsatisfactory penalty, and his resultant course of action: 'poenas facinorum auxit; et 
. 
cum locupletes eo facilius scelere se obligarent, quod integris patrimoniis exulabant, 
parricidas, ut Cicero scribit, bonis omnibus, reliquos dimidia parte multavit. ' 112 An 
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Augustan jurist, Labeo, referred to exile and death as two capital penalties. 113 Defendants 
on capital charges, who were not normally able to choose whether to flee or to wait for a 
verdict, were usually arrested or kept under surveillance before trial. If convicted, they 
were escorted out of the country, often to a specific place of banishment. Imperial rulings 
determined the terms of the exile which included loss of status (even citizenship) and 
partial confiscation of property. 114 
There were two kinds of exile: capital - for which the terms most commonly used were 
interdictio aqua et igni, deportatio' and exilium; and non-capital exile, or relegatio. 
lnterdictio was a regular administrative measure to prevent the re-entry of exiles into 
Roman territory on pain of death. It involved loss of citizenship and property, and usually 
banishment to an island. It was the regular penalty for senators convicted of maiestas when 
the death sentence was not used, as well as for vis publica, 115 repetundae and saevitia. 116 
Deportatio as a technical term seems to have made no headway until the early second 
century. 117 As a penalty it deprived the condemned of citizenship but not freedom. 
Relegatio on the other hand, was in the Republic a measure of coercion which might be 
used by a father against his wife and family, by a patron against his freedman, or by a 
master against his slave. It was made the legal penalty by Augustus for adultery, 118 which 
marks its appearance as a penalty in the criminal court. As a sentence relegatto was 
imposed in the Principate's new criminal courts. It might involve banishment to a place 
(often an island) or exclusion from Rome, .Italy or specific provinces. 119 It might be 
temporary, or permanent, 120 but involved the loss of neither citizenship, 121 nor 
freedom,122 nor the power to make a wi11. 123 A relegatus could receive from a will, 124 
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own property, 125 and have rights over his sons. 126 
Nevertheless, exile remained an alternative to what was still more unpleasant - either 
execution or penalties of a servile nature such as metallum or opus publicum. 
CONDEMNATION TO HARD LABOUR 
The early evidence for forced labour127 as a criminal sentence is thin. Under Tiberius and 
Gaius both metallum and opus publicum were recognized penalties, 128 yet by the second 
century the legal sources often referre<:J to opus publicum as a regular custodial penalty. 129 
Metallum became the most severe secondary penalty in the Empire's penal code. 130 In the 
Hadrianic rescript, condemnation to hard labour ranks only behind summum supplicium in 
the severity of custodial penalties. 131 
Metallum, next after death in severity, 132 differed from opus publicum mainly in that it 
was a life sentence. The man condemn~d to metallum lost both citizenship and liberty. 133 
He had no rights to inheritance or testament. 134 Beating regularly preceded the 
sentence. 135 He was loaded with chains136 and probably also branded .. 137 The 
consequences for his status were profound: His existimatio was extinguished altogether, 
reducing him almost to the status of slave and incurring infamia. Opus publicum - labour 
on public works and services - was a milder penalty of the same kind. It entailed the loss 
of dignitas but not libertas. Existimatio was diminished but not removed altogether. But 
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necessarily for life. 139 
The subjection of citizens to beating, fettering and hard labour was a radical innovation in 
the state's coercive capacities and emphasises particularly the violent nature of this type of 
punishment. The close association between social class and either exemption from, or 
exposure to, beating, shackling, incarceration, prolonged and painful forms of death, and 
forms of labour which were either degrading or physically destructive or both, was 
significant. Labour was viewed as a form of bodily violence closely comparable to 
flogging, the cross or exposure to the beasts. 140 
Millar further claims that there was an economic dimension to such custodial penalties, but 
attributes its significance as secondary. He believes that the principal motivation for its 
emergence as a punishment was not so much for the service of the state but for the sake of 
ill-treatment and hardship. 
IMPRISONMENT 
As a penalty imprisonment141 was to be avoided if possible. Custodia covered the holding 
of a defendant before trial or sentence and methods of punishment after sentence. It also 
stands for imprisonment as an act of coercitio by a magistrate. 142 The judicial authorities 
in the Early Empire, using their cognitio powers, in an effort to contain the movements of 
low-status criminals, had contrived a set of medium-range penalties which were, in 
essence, forms of custody. 143 The use of preventive detention was uncontroversial and is 
well documented, 144 but the most effective form of custody, long term imprisonment, was 
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(Agrippa Postumus); Dio. 59.8.8 (Piso). 
See Dig. 48.3.5; 48.4.4; 47.10.13.2; Imprisonment before execution during the 
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58.1.3 (Titius Sabinus); Dio 58.10.8 (Sejanus); Tac. Ann. 5.9.2; Dio 58.11.5-6 
(Sejanus' children); Tac. Ann. 6.39.1 (Paconianus); 6.40.1 (Vibulenus Agrippa); 
6.48.4 "(Albucilla); Suet. Tib. 75.2; Dio 59.6.2 (prisoners on Tiberius' death). 
Imprisonment before exile: Dig. 28.3.6.7; 48.19.27.2; 48.22.6.1; 49.4.l.praef 
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considered an abuse. Even temporary detention involved the defendant or convict in being 
chained and was consequently regarded as inflicting infamia. 
That imprisonment never enjoyed official recognition as a penalty, has led Garnsey to 
conclude that the Romans did not appreciate fully the direction in which their legal system 
was moving. 145 Nevertheless, I shall argue that imprisonment was to become a penal 
measure if not in policy, certainly in practice, above all because it lent itself, by its nature, 
to becoming a definite punishment. The political advantages were obvious. The offender 
was surreptitiously removed from society, and despatched later where he could gain no 
sympathy from onlookers and where the legitimacy of state authority could not be 
compromised should the victim be politically popular. Clutorius Priscus and Sextus 
Paconianus were excellent examples of this: both were strangled in prison. 146 Nero would 
have met a similar fate had he not taken his own life in anticipation of it. 147 Indeed, 
leaders of an enemy were normally strangled in the career or at the foot of the Capitoline 
hi11. 148 A prime example of imprisonment as punishment is Tiberius' sentence to life 
imprisonment of the magistrates of Pollentia for not allowing the body of a chief centurion 
to be removed from the Forum until his heirs had agreed to meet demands for a free 
gladiatorial show. 149 Also, Drusus, sitting as judge in Annia Rufilla's case for fraud, was 
begged to inflict an exemplary punishment - 'daret ultionis exemplum ', and ordered her, 
once convicted, to be held in the state prison. 150 
What becomes important is not the fact of imprisonment itself, but what happened inside 
the prison, and what it meant in practice to be incarcerated. Clearly, prison was an awful 
place. Sallust's description of the Tullianum, 151 where Lentulus the Catilinarian 
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Tac. Ann. 4.70.3: 'in carcerem exanimatus', Dio 57.20.3 (Clutorius Priscus); Tac. 
Ann. 6.39.1: 'strangulatus in carcere' (Paconianus). Both were accused of 
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Suet. Tib. 54. 2. 
See Suet. Tib. 20. Tiberius sent the Pannonian leader Bato to Ravenna instead of 
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Marc. 28.1.57. 
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conspirator was imprisoned and executed, is vivid and horrific. 152 For David the 
Tullianum was a gigantic tomb. 153 Furthermore, the prison was geographically central, 154 
which shows its prominence in the Roman social consciousness. Vitruvius, the Augustan 
town planner and architect, believed that the career should be close to the Forum, Curia 
and other such public places. 155 
Prison was a place of torture and death. The unfortunate who entered prison could not 
emerge without the authority of those who put him there, or the aid of a tribune of the 
plebs. 156 There is a significant difference between death in prison and public execution. 
Where those condemned through due process were executed publicly in ceremonies and 
rituals which established and confirmed the legitimacy of authority, executions which took 
place in prison occurred removed from public view through strangulation, 157 hunger158 or 
thirst159 without the spilling of blood. Voisin believes that the Roman repugnance for 
strangulation is the reason why it took place in prison away from the sight of the public. 
The twisted corpse and the flushed and grimacing face which strangulation caused held for 
them evil, diabolic and malevolent omens. 160 Moreover, the prevention of the spilling of 
blood meant that society (through the executioner) minimised the risk of contamination and 
that society remained pure and unpolluted. 
Bloodless execution in prison was particularly applied to women, the price of their 
impurity. 161 A vestal virgin who had violated her oath of chastity, sentenced to die buried 
alive, was an example of this. 162 And since her's was the most serious sexual crime, her 
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undique parietes atque insuper camera lapideis fomicibus iuncta: sed incultu, 
tenebris, odore foeda atque terribilis eius facies est.' 
David, 144. 
David, 132-3. 
Vitruvius 5.2.1. 
See for example the case of Naevi us Gell. NA 3.3.15. 
See Tac. Ann. 5.9.2 (Sejanus' children); 6.39.1 (Paconianus); 
Suet. Tib. 54.2. Drusus, imprisoned by Tiberius in a cellar, was so tortured by 
hunger that he tied to eat the stuffing out of his mattress. 
For examples see David, 142-3. 
Voisin 431, quoting G. Matzneff, Le Suicide chez les Romains, (Paris, 1977), 144-
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Thomas, 542 
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sentence combined the two methods of torture for females. Tiberius' boast that he had 
exercised clemency in not having Agrippina strangled and thrown on the Gemonian steps 
confirms strangulation in prison as a capital punishment for women. 163 
Prison also was a place below ground which did not belong to the world of the living. 164 
Those who entered it left the living human world behind them. The victim was taken away 
from his family and friends and he lost his place in the community which gave him his 
identity. This exclusion by the civic community illustrates the evolution of the public and 
criminal law which resulted in the reinforcement of the princeps' power. 165 
Prison was thus a place where state violence was exercised in a clandestine and covert way. 
The public nature of the violence which characterized Roman punishment, was not evident. 
This carried sinister ramifications, particularly in the Early Empire. 
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 
Beating and flogging 166 were very common general punishments for minor offences which 
under the Republic, had been a Roman citizen's privilege to escape. In the Empire, 
however, they came to be used regularly against men of low-status (whether citizens or 
not) as an alternative to the fine, or as a preliminary to more severe low-status 
punishments. 
The coupling of beating with the fine was particularly appropriate. If beating was a handy 
punishment for any minor offence, a fine was levelled when no special penalty was laid 
down. 167 Naturally, beating was considered more severe, 168 because all corporal 
punishment was regarded as degrading. The impact of a beating on the dignitas of an 
honestior was great. Yet economic considerations often made a beating preferable to a man 
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milk and honey. . 
Suet. Tib. 53.2. This carried with it the insinuation of Agrippina's immorality. See 
also Tac. Ann 6.24.3. 
David, 145. 
David, 171. 
See Mommsen (1899), 981-985. 
See Dig. 50.16.131.1. CfGamsey (1970), 138. 
Dig. 48.19.10.2: 'solus fustium ictus gravior est quam pecuniaris damnatio.' 
121 
of meagre means and little dignitas. In the Republic, when the fine was statutory, and the 
cognitio procedure was unavailable, the loser in litigation was often forced to sell his 
possessions, or take unfavourable credit in order to pay his fine. The Empire saw an 
increase in the number of beatings. In the criminal courts at least, the beating replaced the 
fine for the man of low status and little property. 169 Also with those delicts which were 
handled extra ordinem either a fine or beating could be applied. 
Corporal punishment regularly preceded a more severe penalty, especially execution. This 
was a long established practice. 170 The reason for this was clearly to maximize the 
physical suffering which the victim has to endure. As Coleman observes, 'the death penalty 
should not merely deprive the offender of his life but do so as painfully as possible for the 
worst types of offender. d 71 The notion of a speedy, dignified and discreet execution is a 
modem one. 172 
Flogging to death was a measure traditionally reserved for certain crimes. 173 However, it 
was rare in the Empire, but not unknown. Suetonius recalls the punishment - more 
maiorum - which entailed flogging a victim to death with sticks, after he had been stripped 
naked and his head thrust into a wooden fork. 174 In AD 16 one of the magicians whom 
Libo had consulted was beaten to death in public outside the Esquiline gate in the 
traditional fashion - 'more prisco. d 75 In the military context it was also an ancient 
procedure to draw lots in a discredited legion and have every tenth man flogged to 
death. 176 Eventually, beating to death as a punishment, where it did not precede execution, 
became illega1. 177 
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If flogging was intended to maximise the suffering of victims before execution, it was also 
the form of punishment with which Romans were most familiar. Slaves and persons of low 
status experienced it regularly, while those who were at school could not escape the 
discipline of the school master. The instruments by which corporal punishment were 
inflicted ranged widely according to the degree of harshness. Instruments were classified 
according to their effect. 178 For the schoolboy punishment was indeed formidable. 179 This 
was inflicted most commonly by the Jerula which corresponded roughly with the cane, and 
was, by comparison with the rest, the least damaging. The narthex, cut from the stalk of 
the giant fennel, was light and easy to manipulate but might have in it a few knots. 180 The 
jlagrum or flagellum, was a scourge of straps generally used for punishing slaves. The 
scutica was a whip also made of several straps, .reserved for the most serious offences. The 
virgae were rods formed of a bundle of pliant withies, which were quite ghastly in their 
effect. 
The virgae, which were also traditionally borne by the lictors, 181 were replaced by the 
Justis, the military staff, as the instrument of civilian beating. Beating by the Justis was not 
necessarily heavy. A verberatio was invariably a heavy beating; 182 castigatio, or admonitio 
were light beatings which can also be administered by fustes. 183 A governor was entitled to 
investigate and punish extra-judicially certain minor offences by beating: 'levia crimina 
audire et discutere de plano proconsulem oportet et vel liberare eos, quibus obiciuntur, vel 
fustibus castigare vel flagellis servos verberare.' 184 
Beating, therefore, not only formed part of other, more severe punishments, but also 
became a readily accepted penal measure on its own. It assumed a greater role in the 
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verbera non vereor'. 
Bonner, 143. 
See Pliny NH 13.42.1-3. 
On the symbolic significance of the virgae, see Gladigow, 307-313. 
Dig. 47.10.5.praef 1 (contrast between pulsatio and verberatio). 
Dig. 1.12.1.10; 1.15.3.1; 1.16.9.3; 47.10.15.30; 47.11.7; 48.2.6. 
Dig. 48.2.6. 
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Beating, therefore, not only formed part of other, more severe punishments, but also 
became a readily accepted pencil measure on its own. It assumed a greater role in the 
exercising of social control by authority. 
EXECUTION 
The death penalty witnessed the most significant change in practice. The development was 
manifested on two fronts. Firstly, the application of the cognitio system, combined with 
the political and social context of the time, meant a growing number of capital offences. 185 
Secondly, the mechanics of execution changed. 
Under the Republic there is little evidence that the death penalty was actually applied to 
citizen members of the population, or at least, to members of the higher orders. 186 
Maiestas was however, a special case. From the beginning of the Empire, death sentences 
were expected to follow convictions for maiestas whatever the offender's status. The 
susceptibility of maiestas to imaginative interpretation by a sycophantic court or an 
insecure princeps, both exploiting the cognitio procedure, inevitably resulted in an increase 
in death penalties many of which were anticipated before conviction, by the suicide of the 
accused. But this development only began to gain momentum during the reign of Tiberius. 
According to Dio, Augustus was reluctant to sentence conspirators to death, since he 
recognised that their execution would contribute nothing to his safety. But he also realised 
that to let them go might encourage others to plot against him. 187 Even early in his reign 
Tiberius did not execute maiestas offenders. 188 Dio uses the episode of the conspiracy of 
Gnaeus Cornelius189 to discuss (through the contrivance of a dialogue between Augustus 
and Livia) the various methods of retaining state security and whether to sentence 
conspirators to death. It was Livia's opinion that the death penalty should not be inflicted 
for such offences, but that one should find other means of correcting behaviour so that 
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conspirators will not commit any crime in the future. 190 
Like other punishments, the death penalty was executed in accordance with rituals and 
ceremonies, using instruments of symbolic value. These symbols and rituals changed at the 
beginning of the Empire. 191 The rituals of separation which had been organised around the 
arrest of the condemned and his march to death, and at which the community could express 
its consent or disapproval, were replaced by new rituals and ceremonies. The intense 
emotions which had accompanied the old rituals and ceremonies could be exploited, 
controlled and monitored at the games which now appealed to the civic sensibilities. The 
symbols became manipulated or inappropriate. As the princeps' power became absolute, 
and arrests and convictions were made in secret, the community lost an opportunity to 
express their opposition to the imperial will. The public execution afforded a great 
opportunity to confirm state power and establish social control. 
Decapitation (by the sword) was originally the simple death penalty, denoted by the 
expression capite puniri. 192 Simple beheading was usually denoted by decollare. 193 In the 
Republic it was performed by means of the axe - securi percussio. 194 The securis was the 
axe in thefasces, the visual symbols of imperium, borne by the lictors who were always in 
attendance on consuls and praetors, a constant 'reminder to Roman contemporaries of the 
military basis of civic authority. '195 The condemned was bound naked to a post, his hands 
tied behind his back, first lashed, then cast to the ground and beheaded. 196 During the 
Empire however, the axe was replaced by the gladius. 191 
The carnifex, played a critically symbolic role in these proceedings, whether he strangled a 
victim in prison, pushed him off the Tarpeian rock, or beheaded him in public. He stood as 
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link between the living and the dead, 198 was rejected by the community and considered so 
disgraceful that he was not permitted to live in the city. 199 He belonged not to the world of 
the city, but to the world of the dead. Consequently, contact with him risked 
contamination. 200 He differed from the person who handed down the sentence (in the 
Republic' the lictor or tribunus plebis) in that he was not protected by the sacred character 
of his function. In performing an execution, he shared in the fate of his victims. The issue 
of contact with the dead was sensitive. At the gladiatorial combats to commemorate 
Agrippa's funeral, all who attended (except Augustus) wore black. 201 Rich believes that 
the reason for Augustus' not doing so was due to the belief that the emperor should not be 
in contact with death. 202 When Augustus delivered the funeral oration for Agrippa, a 
.curtain was stretched before the corpse. 203 Dio, in a rare comment on his sources, rejects 
the explanation that either as pontifex maximus or as censor, Augustus was prohibited from 
viewing a body. But Rich supplies other evidence to confirm its correctness. 204 
While capite puniri signified the normal death penalty by decapitation, summum 
supplicium205 denotes aggravated forms of death penalty including crucifixion, burning 
alive, and throwing victims to wild beasts. The Hadrianic constitutions place summum 
supplicium and capite puniri at the head of two distinct groups of penalties. 206 Therefore 
they are not likely to have been identical. Summum supplicium however is characterized by 
the variations of torture which preceded different punishments whereas capite puniri 
followed lashing. The Digest informs us that honestiores escaped summum supplicium. 207 
This, coupled with the fact that it was the least painful and degrading form of execution, 
suggests that capite puniri was applied only to high-status victims. 
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The most obvious example of summum supplicium is, of course, crucifixion. Under the 
Republic, this form of punishment had been employed only on slaves and deserters with 
any degree of regularity. 208 The Empire saw the novelty of its application to free men of 
low status whether citizens or non-citizens. Garnsey correctly cautions against undue 
exaggeration of the rate at which this situation worsened. 209 But he suggests that by the 
Severan period, what had once been irregular had now become the norm. The roots of this 
development are to be found in the Early Empire. 
However, one must guard against finding too much significance in crucifixion in the Early 
Empire. It is correct to say that it was a singularly dramatic form of punishment, but 
Hengel's position that it satisfied the primitive lust among the Romans for revenge and 
sadistic cruelty and that it was a 'manifestation of trans-subjective evil - a form of 
execution which manifests the demonic character of human cruelty and bestiality,' is surely 
a product of a Judaeo-Christian perspective. 21° Crucifixion must be viewed as the chief 
summum supplicium, and the contempt, fear and repulsion Romans had for it added to its 
value as an effective deterrent. 
Not that it was a form of punishment unique to Rome. Crucifixion had been practiced by 
many other contemporary civilizations, such as the Indian, Assyrian, Scythian and Taurian. 
Its origin is to be found in Persia. 211 That it was widely used by the Romans is a clear 
indication of its efficacy as a punishment in terms of the penal aims discussed earlier. 
There were also, however, religious and political aspects to the crux which afforded it 
deeper meanings than mere deterrence, retribution, humiliation, purification or 
prevention. 212 Certainly crucifixion had some practical advantages as a summum 
supplicium: it could be carried out anywhere, whereas other summa supplicia, such as 
crematio or damnatio ad bestias required a city arena and other facilities. There was 
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relatively little required in the way of equipment. Victims could be crucified on trees, 213 
attached naked to afurca, 214 or be nailed or bound to a stake. 215 The slow and agonising 
death which accompanied crucifixion was unspectacular relative to what an arena 
demanded, 216 but it could be combined with damnatio ad bestias to produce a more 
spectacular form of execution. 217 
While crucifixion offered to judge and executioner variations and possibilities it gave it a 
more horrific aspect than most: 'cruces, non unius quidem generis, sed aliter ab aliis 
fabricatas: capite quidem conversos fn terram suspendere, alii per obscena egerunt, alii 
bracchia patibulo explicuerunt. '218 One constant was the customary beating before the 
crucifixion, which usually took place where maximum exposure to the public was achieved 
whether it was at a crossroads, 219 in the theatre, on high ground or along the Via Appia. 
The bodies were not removed after the moment of death, but were left to disintegrate in the 
face of the elements, or to be eaten by wild beasts or predatory birds. Consequently 
humiliation, shame and torture was maintained even after death. Hengel suggests that there 
was in this an element of religious sacrifice. 22° Certainly the fact that the body was never 
buried was of some significance. Voisin postulates a similarity between those who have 
been hanged221 and those who have been crucified which lies in the fact that in both cases 
the victim does not make contact with mother earth. As a consequence of his crime and 
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punishment he can enter neither heaven nor hell. He belongs to the insepulti and his soul is 
condemned to roam eternally the place of his death which was often the place of his crime, 
and the place he had contaminated, ready to torment the living and the dead. To bury him 
would have been sacrilegious.222 Yet hanging never became fashionable as a method of 
punishment; which perhaps explains the Roman distaste for public strangulation. 
Crucifixion must be seen as an administrative and political punishment motivated by 
considerations of retribution and deterrence. The crucifixion of the 6000 followers of 
Spartacus on the road from Capua 'to Rome is a well-known example. 223 So too the 
soldiers who collected tax from the Frisian tribes in AD 29. 224 But it was also a sanction 
against criminals of low status; for example Caepio's slave who had betrayed him was led 
through the Forum carrying an inscription explaining why he was to be crucified. 225 It was 
a punishment which was widely practiced with origins in the Republic as well as other 
parts of the ancient world. In the Empire it became applied to Roman citizens,226 
something unheard of in Roman society and an innovation almost entirely due to a different 
political context legitimised by new legal and court procedures. 
In the Pauli Sententiae, crematio and damnatio ad bestias follow the crux in severity as 
summa supplicia. 227 In the Digest crematio stands with furca and capitis amputatio at the 
top of the table of penalties compiled by Callistratus. 228 There is little to be said about 
crematio because its occurrence in the Republic and Early Empire is rare, but not 
unknown. 229 The Twelve Tables records it asa penalty for arson, one fitting the crime. 230 
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See Cic. Fam. 10.32.3 where Balbus performs this atrocity against the Pompeian 
Fadius. Also Suet. Cal. 27.4 in which Caligula burned a writer alive in the middle 
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It appears the reason for this re-emergence is to intensify the torture and entertainment, of 
the summum supplicium. There may have been a link between cremaJio as a punishment 
and as a funeral rite. The crowd at Tiberius' funeral, for example, called for his corpse to 
be taken to the amphitheatre and given only a half burning - 'semiustilandum' ,231 a 
farcical humiliation. 
Damnatio ad bestias232 and mortal combat233 were punishments which grew in 
prominence in the Early Empire. Garnsey writes that it was little known in the 
Republic. 234 Yet it did seem to occu·r.235 By the Early Empire it had become a regular 
punishment. Seneca records men being thrown to lions and bears. 236 Caligula did not even 
look at the charge sheets but fed criminals to the wild animals when he discovered 
butcher's meat was too expensive. 237 Claudius had men thrown to the beasts for serious 
breaches of the law. 238 Nero had Christians torn to pieces by dogs. 239 The growth of the 
amphitheatre as a means of testing political attitudes and diverting social unrest is 
responsible for the corresponding increase in the instances of this punishment. The increase 
in the numbers of capital crimes along with the demand for new penalties and the changes 
in the legal process, provided the numbers of noxii required to satisfy the "market force" 
demand for punishment as public entertainment. Furthermore, the pool of persons 
considered humiliores grew, so that penalties previously reserved for slaves, became 
applicable to free aliens and perhaps even to low-status citizens.240 Damnatio and mortal 
combat were unlike other capital penalties in that they afforded the condemned an 
opportunity at temporary survival depending on his skill and good luck. In the end, 
however, they proved fata1. 241 Auguet writes that damnatio ad bestias was an idea which 
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originated from Carthage and since it was specially reserved for foreign deserters from 
Roman armies, was therefore the most shameful and infamous of all punishment. It was 
later "developed" for humiliores - particularly brigands - as an aggravation of the death 
penalty. This "development'' took the shape of tying the condemned man naked, facing the 
public, to a column of shame (stipes) on which the reason for condemnation was nailed, 
and then releasing the animals. 242 The opportunity at temporary survival was removed 
once and for all. 
The use of the Tarpeian Rock saw substantial change in the Early Empire. It was mainly 
used against those condemned for parricide, a crime particularly repugnant to Romans. It 
was, like other punishments subject to ceremony and ritual. Suetonius mentions the case of 
a person who appeared before Augustus on a charge of parricide. Had he been convicted, 
he would have been thrown into the Tiber, or the sea, or a nearby river, sewn up in a sack 
along with a monkey, a dog, a cock and a snake. 243 This, Suetonius tells us, was to typify 
the four different vices which led him to his crime.244 Again, this follows a flogging. The 
Rock itself was a focal point at the heart of the city. 245 In this punishment too was the 
ritual of collective purification and separation frbm the community. Here also the notion 
of absence of contact with the earth to ensure that the condemned's soul remains homeless, 
is evident. 246 Yet, in this punishment too, there were important and profound mutations: 
In the Republic the punishment was performed by the tribune alone, but under the Empire, 
an executioner assumed the role. 247 
So repulsive was parricide248 to Roman society, that the aim of the Tarpeian Rock was to 
rid society from the risk of contamination completely. It was the only type of homicide 
which did not belong to the sphere of private law in the Republic. In the Empire, the 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE PHYSICAL CONTAINMENT OF VIOLENCE- THE FORCES OF LAW AND 
ORDER 
INTRODUCTION. 
For someone establishing a "new order," as Augustus did, the maintenance of law and 
order is essential. 1 To secure political stability, as well as his own position in politics it 
was imperative for Augustus that not only political violence, of the type which is apparent 
in the late Republic, be managed and preferably eliminated altogether, but also that the 
violence potential in a highly populated and socially pressurized city, be controlled. Rome, 
after all, was the centre of politics. If Augustus could solve the problems evident in the 
city, then wider political problems could be addressed with more efficacy. The last years of 
the Republic, especially the 50s BC, witnessed mob violence of a kind uncontainable 
without the highly irregular measure of bringing troops into the city. 2 Indeed the decision 
to authorize the employment of troops in the city marked the breakdown of the Republican 
system which had always excluded the deployment of troops; that the aristocracy was no 
longer able to cope with genuine mass protest without sacrificing the fundamental 
principles of Republican government, is significant. 3 Augustus was sensitive to this 
problem. Suetonius tells us that the princeps took great pains to avoid the appearance of a 
military occupation of Rome, and never kept more than three cohorts on duty in the city at 
one time which wen~ not permanently billeted in a camp. 4 Thus in the popular mind 
Augustus (then Octavian) would be distanced from the recent dictators from whose logical 
successor he might reasonably have seemed to be.5 
Moreover, the growth of population in the city as a result of the Civil War, amongst other 
factors, and the pressures it created caused problems of law and order of a different kind. 
Juvenal, for example, although writing in the 1st century AD, complains of a city plagued 
by latrones, where it is unsafe to venture out at night, vulnerable to frequent outbreaks of 
fire. 6 The existing structures for the physical maintenance of law and order, and indeed for 
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the well-being of the city as he perceived it, were becoming inadequate. Furthermore, the 
inability of Agrippa, the princeps' unofficial representative in 21 BC, and Satuminus, the 
sole consul in 19 BC, to control serious riots occasioned by election disputes while he was 
away, led Augustus 'to recognize the necessity of providing the city with a permanent 
force of reserve police. '7 For Augustus therefore, there was a social and political necessity 
to attend to this problem. 
The Augustan age witnesses the introduction of three new forces which had a significant 
impact: the Praetorian guard, the cohones urbanae and the vigiles. These military or quasi-
military bodies had several distinct functions: the protection of the emperor and his family, 
the maintenance of order in the capital, and the prevention and suppression of fires. These 
forces reflected a social and political picture which was quite different from that which 
prevailed in the Republic. It is the aim of this chapter to examine the circumstances 
surrounding their creation and their role in limiting and containing the violence of the time 
and to contrast them with the forces available to the authorities in the Republic for the 
purpose of maintaining law and order. 
I shall use as guidelines the two questions which Robinson has posed. 8 Firstly, what were 
the forces at the disposal of the authorities for the maintenance of law and order and what 
were the resources available to those forces? These questions, Robinson believes, require 
separate treatment for the Republic and Principate, on the grounds that there was a 
different approach on the part of government to the problem of violence during the 
Principate. Secondly, what kind of behaviour, even when not specifically criminal, was 
regularly regarded as needing control? In this respect a distinction must be drawn between 
between large scale civil strife9 (which, in the Republic, would have been beyond the 
powers of repression of the magistrate concerned - that is, the aedile)10 and the small 
scale, minor violence in which the aediles would have been the appropriate magistrates to 
quell, but did not have adequate executive powers or sufficient men at their disposal. 
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However, there is the danger of concluding erroneously that military might in the city was 
the principal means of retaining political power. While it is true that the new forces in the 
city helped Augustus greatly in maintaining control, they were neither the sole guarantors 
of the princeps' power nor were they solely responsible for the maintenance of order. 
Rather, social and political stability and consensus, and respect for legitimate authority, 
were the main factors which ensured the maintenance of law and order in the city of Rome 
both during the Republic and during the Principate. 11 The legitimacy of government was 
therefore a significant feature in the containment of violence; and legitimacy was acquired 
more through appeasement of the plebs than through their participation in the political 
structures, which offered them very little benefit at all. Appeasement, especially through 
the supply of corn and public games, was the main way in which the princeps kept the 
urban plebs peaceful, despite the fact that he had available to him thousands of troops for 
the purpose of repressing violence. 12 
Nevertheless, I shall argue that the new forces instituted by Augustus were an essential 
element of his administrative and political reform programme, even though they were used 
much less than is often supposed. 13 Their mere presence in the city as a military force and 
the threat of their use ensured that violence did not occur readily. 
However, the notion of a force of law and order in ancient Rome raises serious conceptual 
problems which must be resolved in order to understand the role these forces played in the 
combatting of violence. 
THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER IN THE LATE REPUBLIC 
Although this has been discussed much in detail elsewhere, 14 nevertheless it is important to 
discuss some aspects of the forces of law and order available in the Late Republic because 
they have a direct bearing of the forces which evolved during the Principate. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Nippel (1988). Reviewed by Rich (1991), 193-5. 
Rich (1991), 194. 
Cf. Nippel (1988), 161-9. 
See Echols, 377-379; Lintott 1968, 89-106; Robinson, 174-180; Nippel (1984), 20-
23; Nippel (1988), 108-144. 
136 
The two main office-bearers responsible for the maintenance of law and order were the 
aediles and the tresviri capitales, both of whom can be considered minor magistrates. The 
aediles15 fulfilled a variety of tasks which contributed as a whole to the maintenance of 
public order. They were particularly responsible for the cleaning, maintenance, repair, and 
accessibility of streets and public places. 16 Lintott believes that theoretically the aediles 
would have been the appropriate magistrates to deal with small-scale violence. They were 
impeded, however, by the lack of underlings available to assist them, and by an inability to 
proceed in the face of forcible resistance carried to any great lengths. They could be 
effective only if supported by other magistrates. In practice they were required to do the 
equivalent of some "police" work - that is to deal with petty crime and violence as it 
occurred, but their tasks had little to do with security of the city and large-scale prevention 
of crime and violence. 17 There is little direct literary evidence suggesting that the ~diles 
were general maintainers of security, law, and order, 18 and the evidence has to be 
augmented with references to their activities under the Empire and the anachronistic early 
Republican notices. 19 
More focus has been placed on the tresviri capitales and noctumi. By day the former 
fulfilled their duties as magistrates and governors of the prison and may have been content 
to investigate breaches of the peace reported to them. 20 The latter went on patrol at night 
to guard against fires and to watch for runaway slaves. 21 Lintott and Robinson agree that 
the tresviri capitales and the tresviri noctumi must have been identical.22 Robinson 
suggests that the tresviri were used against the riff-raff and were a cross between justices-
of-the-peace and police-superintendents and that for major public disorder there was no 
remedy.23 Nippel, however, believing the evidence too meagre to establish certainty as to 
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their duties as a "sicherheitsdienst", ascribes the assumption that they had such duties to the 
conviction, rooted in modem experience, that such methods of policing were simply 
necessary. 24 
From this there are two important points to be made. Firstly, a common feature is that 
both the aediles and the tresviri had limited jurisdiction and power. 25 For major public 
disorder there was no remedy. 26 Their effectiveness was severely limited and the violence 
of the Late Republic showed that they had become inadequate. 
Secondly, although Augustus created new forces to deal with the problem of law and 
order, it did not mean the immediate supersession of the old authorities. They did 
however, fade away. The vigintisexvirate, which had been reduced under Augustus to the 
vigintivirate, 27 remained for most the first step in a public career. 28 As the Digest shows, 
the aediles still had a place up to the second century. 29 Dio relates that in 7 BC the aediles 
were still responsible for the supervision of the city. 30 Dio and Tacitus record that the 
aediles rather than the tresviri (who had lost their fire fighting responsibilities to the 
praefectus vigilum31) were responsible for the burning of Cremutius Cordus' books in AD 
25. 32 However, it was clear that Augustus was not entirely happy with the way the aediles 
were performing their wider duties. As early as 22 BC Augustus ordered the aediles to see 
to it that no building caught fire, and to have any conflagration which did arise, put out. 
This was in specific response to the Egnatius Rufus affair. 33 As aedile Rufus had won 
popularity with his private fire brigade. 34 Augustus must have appreciated the political 
dangers the office of aedile could pose and in AD 6 this function was transferred to the 
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praefectus vigilum, an office respo!}sible to Augustus alone. 35 However, even in Tiberius' 
reign the aediles were responsible for duties such as restricting the amount of food offered 
for sale in cookshops and eating-houses, 36 measures specifically designed to ensure public 
order. 37 Moreover, a remark by Tacitus suggests that the aediles kept a register of 
prostitutes. 38 These may have been part of the "police" records which Robinson says were 
kept on a considerable scale in the offices of the relevant magistrates and officials. 39 They 
also controlled brothels, baths, taverns and other public places from which violence could 
spring. But these references, argues Robinson, fall more under "control of services" in the 
cura urbis. Street crime seems to have fallen under the jurisdiction of the praefectus urbi 
and his subordinate, the praefectus vigilum. 40 
Nevertheless, Augustus felt that these mechanisms of control were not only insufficient but 
also unreliable. 41 It was time to create forces which were more dependable and which were 
responsible to him alone. 
THE PROBLEMS PERTAINING TO THE EXAMINATION OF THE FORCES OF 
LAW AND ORDER: DID ROME HAVE A POLICE FORCE? 
The immediate problem is the sources. Much of the evidence for each of the forces is 
sparse and scattered and we have to rely to a large extent on epigraphy. 42 But although 
literary sources provide little information, there is enough evidence available to us from 
which sound and valid conclusions can be drawn about the functions of the three new 
forces Augustus instituted in the context of the containment of violence. 
It is generally held, for example by Freis and Lintott, 43 that the absence of a police force 
was a serious weakness in the Roman Republic and helps to account for its downfall. 44 A 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
Dio 55.26.4-5. See also 52.24.6. 
Suet. Tib. 34. 
Robinson, 136. 
Tac. Ann. 2.85.2. Goodyear believes that it is uncertain whether they actually kept 
such a register. See Goodyear (1981), 439. 
Robinson, 140. 
Robinson, 189. 
Freis, 3. 
See Rainbird, 147. Nippel (1988) at 161, has identified this scarcity as a particular 
problem in interpreting their functions as forces of order. 
Freis, 3. 
See Rich (1991), 193. 
139 
further obstacle was the lack of a suitable official to whom control of such a "police force" 
could be assigned. 45 These circumstances led to the inevitable summoning of professional 
troops to Rome to uphold law and order.46 For Gruen also,47 the lack of a police force 
made it difficult to nip disturbances in the bud. But that absence, he argues, also betokened 
a recognition that demonstrations and vociferous actions were legitimate expressions of 
political desire. More interestingly, he claims that the lack of a police force did not stem 
from an oversight or miscalculation, but from a desire to avoid exacerbating discontent by 
harsh repressive measures and to respect the traditional idea 'that recourse to private force 
could often be a legitimate means of expressing grievances or correcting justice. '48 For 
Lintott self-help in the Early and Middle Republic at least was the only effective form of 
"policing" available. This was a significant weakness in the Roman system, and it meant 
that in the Late Republic the executive was frequently unable to control violence without 
themselves having recourse to overruling the law. 49 The remedies that self-help provided 
the citizen were no longer adequate. Under the Empire, however, he believes that with 
increased supervision by magistrates and the existence of a police force, there would have 
been less need and scope for popular justice. 50 
But what is a police force, and what specifically are its functions? A police force can be 
defined by its duties; the maintenance of public order and safety comprises a large part of 
its tasks. The concept of "public" can be deceptive, however, because it carries with it 
implications of operating for the "public good". This may not necessarily be so, and is a 
question which must be addressed in this examination. It is impossible to say whether the 
Roman authorities had an appreciation for such a concept, or whether these forces 
maintained law and order for the purposes of protecting a political system. Secondly, it is 
concerned with the enforcement of the law. There is very little evidence for the new forces 
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operating in such a fashion, that is making arrests according to the provisions of specific 
leges. Thirdly, there is the aspect of the detection of crime. Again, we cannot say that 
there was a force in ancient Rome, which at any stage fulfilled this function. 51 Nor can we 
say that any of the forces were either equipped or specially trained to fulfil these tasks. 
What I shall argue, however, is that these forces were employed primarily to maintain a 
political system, the Principate. 
Gruen assumes that the Roman authorities knew and understood what a police force was 
and what their functions should be. It is nevertheless an assumption which illustrates an 
important aspect of this issue. Roman attitudes to ·law and order may have had a different 
starting point from ours, but objectively they do not seem so different. 52 Although the 
introduction of troops into the city does not suggest that the Romans had a sophisticated 
appreciation of the role of a specialised police force of the kind evident today, they need 
not have viewed the problem of law and order in a different way. In the Roman state the 
nature of the confrontation between central authority and local power was dimorphic; it 
was a confrontation that had a bolder "face-to-face" aspect than in most modern societies: 
there was simply neither the need nor the means to maintain a disguise. The state itself 
lacked any coherent centrally organized police force to serve as an effective civic 
counterpart to its military rule of an empire. 
In this respect, if we are to seek any equivalent to the modern police it has to be found in 
the army. The army's role as an internal police force is a neglected subject. Even an 
examination of the day-to-day activities of soldiers stationed in garrisons not on frontiers 
but in the interior of the provinces (and also in the cities) would yield evidence enough to 
demonstrate this critical police function. 53 If so, Rome did not understand the function of a 
police force in the way it is understood today. For Finley, however, what is of crucial 
importance is that the army was not available for large-scale police duties until the city-
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state was replaced by a monarchy. 54 
Nippel, in the most detailed discussion of the question, maintains that complaints about the 
absence of police forces from earlier societies are not only anachronistic, but also distort 
our perception of the ways in which those societies succeeded in maintaining public order 
and the reasons why they sometimes failed· to do so. 55 The word "police" has been too . 
loosely applied to these new forces and their magistrates. 56 He believes that there is a 
fundamental question already implied in the use of the word, and that the nineteenth 
century works which deal with the question reflect a usage of the word "policing" which 
swings between the description of a function - that is securing public order - and the 
designation of a specialised agency to fulfil this function. While specialized forces of law 
and order only began to evolve in the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 57 and pre-
modem societies, such as the Rome of the Early Empire, did not have police forces, many 
of them did develop expeditious systems of criminal justice. 58 Therefore, it is not the 
absence, but the very existence of such forces which is exceptional in universal history. 
The principal significance of a specialized, professional police force, argues Nippel, is that 
it represents a fundamental change in societal and individual attitudes towards and demand 
for public order. The delegation of the functions of law enforcement to public authorities 
has had such a decisive impact on the modem perception of law and order that pre-modem 
societies are often portrayed as lacking the necessary institutions and provisions. 59 
However, I shall argue that Rome managed in the Early Principate to maintain public order 
more effectively than in the Republic not only because of a new political scenario but also 
because of a different perspective on the subject which required the presence of military or 
at least para-military personnel in the city. 
Nippel argues that 'the indisputable gain in security and public order had to be paid for 
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with a considerable loss of flexibility in the interaction between rulers and ruled, and with 
an intensification of control and discipline in the everyday life of most members and strata 
of society.'60 In the Principate, however, I shall argue that flexibility was not lost, but in 
fact, increased. If anything, the interaction between rulers and ruled, became less formal. 
Ironically, though, control and discipline were extended and intensified by the creation of 
these new forces. It remains to be seen, however, whether these forces can be considered 
"police" in the way in which the concept is understood today. More importantly, those 
functions which can be identified as "police" functions must be isolated and examined. We 
should not concentrate too narrowly on the competences of magistrates and institutionalized 
forces, but understand "policing" as a function not necessarily fulfilled by a force specially 
trained for that purpose. 61 
Nippel concedes that the new forces in the Principate represented a new means of policing 
Rome. Moreover they could always be employed when the princeps felt his own position 
under threat. Importantly, he points out that equations with modem police forces should be 
avoided particularly since the decision to deploy these forces to suppress riots was of a 
highly discretionary character. Ultimately they were the product of problems concerning 
the maintenance of law and order during the Late Republic which, he suggests, have to be 
seen within the broader framework of the aristocracy increasingly losing their ability to 
integrate all parts of the urban population socially and politically. The new institutions of 
the Principate are fundamental elements of a new, comprehensive attempt at regaining 
stability by intensifying welfare as well as control. 62 
This raises one particular difference between modem police and the new forces put in place 
by Augustus. The social welfare element which one accepts so readily in police forces 
today, is conspicuously absent from the praetorian guards or the urban cohorts. The notion 
of protecting and serving a community was one that only gained prominence in the 
nineteenth century.63 Indeed, the repressive and preventive measures which formed part of 
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the duties of the Praetorian Guard, the cohones urbanae, and the vigiles were aimed at one 
thing only - the control and stability of the city in order that the emperor could confirm his 
political position and could govern unchallenged or unthreatened. These new forces owed 
their allegiance not to the general public, but to their emperor who had created them. 
There was certainly no culture of service to the community. The objective of welfare, what 
Nippel calls "wohlfahrtszwecke," was important only inasmuch as it ensured the emperor's 
position. 
To a large extent, therefore, the function of a police force is determined not only by the 
way in which a community perceives them, but also by that community's perception of law 
and order and of what requires policing. In this respect, the forces established by Augustus 
(and carried on by Tiberius) cannot be considered "police" since the relationship between 
themselves and the community or public they serve, was essentially a passive one. The 
main remedies available to the public were still determined by self-help. The public never 
approached these forces for assistance in the way which characterizes the modern 
relationship between community and police. The forces in the city of Rome in Augustan 
times were neither equipped nor designed for such a function. Consequently, the question 
of the legitimacy of these forces cannot be addressed. They were not in a position to 
establish their own. Their legitimacy was derived from that which the emperor enjoyed. 
I shall argue that these forces did execute policing duties even though they were not 
expressly intended to be police. I shall also argue that their impact on the maintenance of 
law and order was substantial and cannot be ignored. They were, in terms of law and 
order, not only a necessary and logical development from the chaos of the Late Republic 
and Civil War, but also an improvement to Roman society as a whole. 
THE PRAETORIAN GUARD 
The praetorian guard has its origin as a permanent corps in the city in 27 BC when 
Augustus decreed that his future bodyguard was to receive twice the rate of pay which was 
received by the rest of the army. 64 According to Rich, they were not a new creation, 
64 Dio 53.11.5. 
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however: Republican commanders had been customarily accompanied by a praetorian 
cohort, a hand-picked escort, and from 42 BC both Antony and Augustus had 4,000 
praetorians. 65 Watson, on the other hand, holds that, apart from the name, there was little 
in common between the Republican bodyguards and the Augustus' new creation. 66 At 
Augustus' death there were nine cohorts strong, each of 1000 men. 67 Three cohorts were 
left in the city while the others were stationed in nearby Italian towns. However, by AD 23 
this number had decreased to nine cohorts under Tiberius,68 whose praetorian prefect, 
Sejanus, had exploited his position to fashion the Guard personally into a powerful, 
cohesive unit to be feared not only by the general populace of Rome but also anyone who 
might challenge the authority of the emperor or his prefect. Augustus' initial retention of 
no more than three cohorts in the city is entirely consistent with his policy of avoiding the 
appearance of a military occupation of Rome. The presence of the cohortes praetoriae 
could easily be justified because they were the princeps' personal troops. 69 
Until 2 BC the Praetorians served as a genuine bodyguard whose primary function was to 
protect the emperor and provide appropriate military ceremonial in the capital. 70 They 
were kept under the direct control of the emperor Augustus and their principal function 
was the protection of the emperor's person. However, in that year Augustus transferred the 
command to two praefecti praetorio who were regularly equites. 71 Rather than suggesting 
that the office was considered minor, the post of praefectus was the pinnacle of the 
equestrian career. 72 The office of praefectus was to become politically pivotal. The 
appointment of two praefecti in 2 BC was probably a measure to reduce the potential 
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political influence of the prefects at a time of crisis for the dynasty. 73 The full potential of 
the post of praefectus, however, was realised by AD 23 when Sejanus had so far modified 
Augustus' conception of the praetorians as to concentrate the entire praetorian force in one 
large barracks near the porta Viminalis. 74 The proclaimed justification for this 
concentration of troops was that orders could be given more efficiently, and troops be 
under better discipline. 75 Sejanus · had centralised the guard into one camp so that 
'numeroque et robore et visu inter se fiducia ipsis, in ceteros metus oreretur. '76 Tacitus' 
expression 'si quid subitum ingruat' implies a professed explanation in the combatting of 
violence. 
Augustus required a bodyguard because he had no illusions about the enemies he had made 
in his revolutionary career. 77 Tiberi us was also sensitive about his personal safety. One of 
his first acts as princeps was to ensure the provision of a bodyguard by the praetorians. 78 
The Praetorians' broader function, the control of the capital city,79 stemmed from their 
duties as bodyguards and was not one with which they were specifically charged. Their 
high profile and closeness to the emperor was a serious deterrent to those· who might 
challenge his authority. On one occasion Tiberi us gave the senators an exhibition of the 
Praetorian Guard at drill, a display of strength and number intended to intimidate them into 
cooperation. 8° From the very beginning the guard was intended to be distinguished from 
the rest of the army. The main difference was pay, as a guardsman received more than 
three times as much as an ordinary legionary. 81 A praetorian could also expect more 
privileges on discharge. 82 In fact, the praetorian guard was an excellent option for the 
ambitious soldier. The net effect of these benefits was to bind and ensure the loyalty of an 
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elite and highly visible force. It was a loyalty well rewarded, for example, by Tiberius for 
the guard's not joining Sejanus' conspiracy. 83 
Their elevated position was derived from their special function as bodyguard to the 
emperor, as a consequence of which they had a vital responsibility of permanent 
vigilance. 84 Moreover, they accompanied the princeps wherever he went in the city. For 
example, the guard accompanied Tiberi us in the Forum and in the Senate house. 85 The 
Quintus Haterius incident demonstrates the close attention the guards paid to the protection 
of their ruler. 86 They were particularly visible at the games87 and were regularly on duty. 
at the theatre. 88 Here they were not only became an integral part of the ceremony, but 
were also available for riot control. 89 Robinson suggests that in this context they could be 
used like the 19th century British militia, or the 20th century American National Guard.90 
Their visibility, as an elite force served not only as an effective deterrent against those who 
plotted to overthrow the emperor, but also advertized the emperor's might.91 They could 
also be deployed for the purposes of intimidation. An example of this is Tiberius' decision 
to surround the house of Libo Drusus with guardsmen. The sight and the sound of them, 
clanking about in front of the door produced the desired effect of Libo's suicide in front of 
his dinner-party guests. 92 The praetorian guard stood as a powerful symbol of the 
emperor's command of his armies, and helped ensure the stability (and legitimacy) of his 
rule. 93 
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The powers enjoyed by the praefectus reflect the guard's role as a force for law and order. 
Dio has Maecenas suggest to Augustus that the holders of the post should first and 
foremost have military experience, but that they should also have proficiency in 
administrative matters; they should have authority over all the other troops in Italy as well 
as powers of capital punishment over offenders. 94 Although it reflects the position some 
five centuries later, the Digest shows that the jurisdiction of the praefectus was quite wide. 
The purpose of the fuller range of authority given to them was to attain improved publica 
disciplina. 95 It adds that the powers of the praefecti have expanded so greatly that there is 
no possibility of appeal from their decisions. 96 Clearly, therefore, the powers of the 
praefectus included the limitation of violence within the city. 
Although the praetorian guard cannot be said to be a force specifically designed to maintain 
order within the city, the effect of its presence was that law and order was maintained. 
Conspiracies and revolutions against the emperor were quelled, and its high profile at the 
games and other public events which the emperor attended, had a highly intimidatory effect 
on the population at large. This effect was limited to the immediate vicinity of the 
emperor since their principal function was 'the protection of his person. The task of 
maintaining order on a wider scale was left to another force - the urban cohorts. 
THE COHORTES URBANAE 
The urban cohorts perhaps correspond most closely with the idea of modem police,97 and 
made a significant, perhaps the most significant, contribution to the containment of 
violence in the Early Principate. Like the Guard and the vigiles, the cohones urbanae were 
a necessary social and political introduction to Rome. They were a brand new type of unit 
which, unlike the Guard or the vigiles, had no Republican or Hellenistic precedent. 98 
Again two problems immediately present themselves. The first is one of evidence: there is 
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too little in the literary sources about the cohortes urbanae to draw adequate conclusions 
about their role and effectiveness as a force concerned with law and order. 99 I shall 
nevertheless argue that while we cannot say conclusively that the cohortes urbanae fulfilled 
the role of police, 100 there is enough evidence to reveal them as a force better equipped 
than any other at the time to deal with the maintenance of law and order. 
The second problem concerns dating. Since there is no record of the cohortes urbanae 
before 27 BC, we know that they must be an Augustan creation. Relying on a passage from 
Suetonius, Freis assumes that both the praetorian and the urban cohorts were formed 
simultaneously. 101 Again a link may be made with the creation of the praefectus urbi in 
26 BC and his new powers of disciplining slaves and those other inhabitants who needed 
threats of force to keep them in order. 102 Alternatively the appointment of L. Calpurnius 
Piso in AD 12 may mark the creation of the urban cohorts as a completely separate entity 
from the Guard. 103 For Echols a crucial date is 16 BC when, he maintains, Augustus 
detached the three "urban" praetorian cohorts from regular praetorian status and assigned 
them, as regular city police, to the personal command of the urban prefect. Then, asserts 
Echols, the urban prefect took command of the unit regularly assigned to him throughout 
the Empire for the first time. 104 
By AD 23 Rome had its own standing army; nine praetorian cohorts - each one thousand 
strong, and three urban cohorts. 105 This is a substantial number of trained troops in the 
city. Griffin postulates a possible six thousand men in the vi giles and an additional four to 
six thousand in the urban cohorts. Along with nine thousand, at times twelve thousand, 
praetorians, this constituted a force of up to twenty-four thousand soldiers which provided 
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one soldier for every fifty people on an estimate of one million people for the urban 
population. Even on the most conservative estimate (praetorian cohorts of five hundred and 
not a thousand) we have one soldier for every hundred citizens. 106 This is a greater ratio 
than is to be found in most modem societies. 107 Consequently, Griffin ascribes the 
comparative peacefulness of Rome in the Early Empire to the deterrent effect of these large 
·forces stationed in and around the city. 108 
The permanent introduction of such an armed force into the city was unprecedented and the 
citizens of Rome were very uncomfortable about it. Augustus had no guide or precedent 
for the establishment of the cohortes urbanae as a force for the maintenance of law and 
order. 109 Freis believes that the establishment of the urban cohorts reflects the changed 
political situation in Rome and the constitution of the Principate. 110 
Tacitus believed that the situation merited the creation of a new force within the city to 
establish and maintain law and order. Augustus was prompted to create the office of urban 
prefect 'ob magnitudinem populi ac tarda legum auxilia sumpsit. ' 111 This is significant, 
because it indicates clearly to what extent the legal and constitutional structures which were 
available for social control had become inadequate. Dio too stresses the impact the size of a 
population has on the extent of civil strife. 112 The creation of the urban cohorts had 
become a matter of social as well as political necessity. 
Like the praetorians, the urban cohorts were an elite corps which enjoyed privileges not 
accorded to the ordinary legions and which were distinguished from other forces in the 
city. 113 Augustus left in his will more money to the city cohorts than to the citizen 
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soldiers. 114 Campbell notes that Augustus would have appreciated the political implications 
of such large military force at the centre of power and the necessity of ensuring their 
loyalty. 115 It was therefore important both administratively and politically that the new 
forces in the city, particularly the urban cohorts, should be distinguished from the others. 
The urban cohorts also differed from the praetorian guard: 116 while the praefectus urbi was 
a proper magistrate, 117 and always a senator, with the toga as his official dress, the 
praetorian prefect was charged specifically with the safety and security of the emperor's 
person against assassination, conspiracy and revolt. The urban prefect had wide jurisdiction 
within the city which encompassed all criminal matters which have been claimed by him as 
his own domain. 118 The praefectus urbi was charged with the duty of keeping the peace 
among citizens and maintaining order at public games. 119 It is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that he functioned as a superintendent of police. Tacitus notes that it was an 
unpopular office, and that the citizens reluctantly showed obedience to it. 120 
The methods the cohortes urbanae employed are a matter of deduction. Physical force was 
clearly available to them since they were armed soldiers. They differed from many modem 
police forces in that they were organized in a para-military fashion for deployment in 
particular situations. 121 However, it is unknown to what extent they were called upon to 
use physical force. Like most police forces they were most effective in a preventative 
capacity in that they achieved social control through high visibility and intimidation (they 
were the only ones allowed to carry arms in the city) rather than through retroactive action. 
For example, in accordance with the duties recorded in the Digest122 as supervisor of the 
games, Suetonius confirms that guards were posted in different parts of the city in a purely 
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preventive role 'ne rarite remanentium grassatoribus obnoxia esset. ' 123 These would almost 
certainly have been the urban cohorts. 
Administrative decisions also point to the urban cohorts' role as a preventive force. In 
about 7 BC Augustus divided Rome into fourteen wards, abandoning the old four 
regiones. 124 This did not only increase administrative efficiency, but also, as Augustus had 
assigned seven cohorts to duty in the fourteen wards, improved their preventative function. 
Their even distribution in their duties throughout the city increased the frequency and 
visibility of their patrols. 125 
The Digest hints at another function which can be equated with a modern police function: 
'et sane debet etiam dispositos milites stationarios habere ad tuendam popularium quietem 
et ad referendum sibi quid ubi agatur.' 126 Here two "normal" police duties are indicated. 
Firstly, there is the aspect of the policeman on patrol whose very presence prevents the 
occurrence of the kind of street crime which came directly under the jurisdiction of the 
praefectus urbi. The second is the aspect of the gathering of. intelligence which enabled the 
prefect to perform his tasks as curator of the city more effectively. It is important to point 
out here, as Freis does, 127 that the cohortes urbanae were not security police in the 
political sense. They were not a secret service. 128 The cohortes urbanae fulfilled the role 
of security police only in the widest sense, and the intelligence they gathered was of the 
kind helpful to the smooth functioning of a large city. For example, we know that lists of 
undesireables.were kept, presumably by the praefectus urbi and the praefectus vigilum and 
that they monitored brothels, prostitutes, gambling houses and sources of alcohol - the 
presumption of innocence for people running such places, writes Robinson, is weaker than 
normal. 129 This intelligence was of very little help to Augustus in quelling conspiracies or 
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revolutions, but it was essential for a praefectus urbi who took his responsibilities 'ad 
tuendam popularium quietem' seriously. 
Visibility was also an essential part of the effectiveness of the urban cohorts. This was 
attained partly through administrative moves which saw the city divided up into districts 
which the urban cohorts patrolled. Moreover, recognisable uniforms must have been useful 
in maintaining order on the streets. 130 Also the ratio of urbani to population contributed to 
their visibility. Echols compares the 'modem Italian carabinieri, supra-policemen, walking 
the streets in full-dress uniform, armed with t~e sword rather than the stick, reserve police 
whose presence had a powerful inhibiting effect upon potential lawbreakers and a no doubt 
disabling effect upon felons actually apprehended in their employment. .131 
The cohones urbanae contributed significantly to the containment of violence in Rome in 
the Early Principate. The face of Roman politics and society, in this respect was changing. 
However, there was another force which would complete the picture of social control in 
Rome, and would make a similar contribution to law and order. 
THE VIGILES 
The vi giles occupied a peculiar position in the structure of the Roman army. 132 Their role 
as fire-brigade meant that they were perceived differently by the citizens of Rome. It is this 
role which causes Nippel to suggest that the establishment of the vigiles in AD 6 belongs in 
the context of the efforts of the princeps to monopolize the welfare of the plebs urbana. 133 
This is an argument that can only be applied to the urban cohorts and the praetorian guard 
with some difficulty. For Baillie-Reynolds it was one thing to prevent sedition and violence 
with the praetorian and urban cohorts, but quite another to provide against petty crimes, 
while at the same time addressing the question of conflagrations. He believes that the 
solution to both these problems was the vigiles. 134 Nevertheless, in their functions as fire-
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fighters, the vigiles came to exercise duties also as keepers of the peace and as agents of 
law and order. 
However, we are yet again confronted with a difficulty with the evidence. In the entire 
Annals, for example, there is no mention of the vigiles or their work; such mention that is 
made of them by the historians describes their use as a purely military force (often in 
conjunction with the urban cohorts). 135 In AD 31, for instance, at the fall of Sejanus, the 
vigiles guarded the Temple of Apollo on the Palatine where the meeting of the Senate was 
held, because the praetorians were not to be trusted. 136 
The vigiles were originally a force specifically designed and trained for the combatting of 
fires. Augustus had realized the city's vulnerability to fire and had acted accordingly in 
terms of town planning. 137 But his creation of the fire brigade was not only a necessity but 
also had political overtones. It was necessary because the inefficient and somewhat 
haphazard arrangement characteristic of the Republic could not be allowed to continue. 138 
The tresviri noctumi, who had been responsible for fighting fires, 139 were no longer 
adequate in this regard. It was only in 22 BC that Augustus, probably in response to the 
fire of the previous year, 140 took concrete steps by forming a special corps of 600 slaves as 
a fire brigade and put them under the command of the aediles. 141 It had political overtones 
because it was important for Augustus not to allow his role as grand patron be usurped by 
the likes of Egnatius Rufus who had formed his own fire brigade. 142 There were obvious 
dangers in this. 
A serious fire in 7 BC precipitated a second reorganization of the city fire brigade. The 
city was divided into fourteen different regions eac~ of which was assigned to an official 
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(Dio calls them "commissioners") who was responsible for its safety. 143 The striking thing 
about these early attempts is that they were efforts to contrive some sort of working system 
out of the old Republican institutions; but the old weakness of having amateurs in charge, 
which pervaded the whole Roman constitution, made efficient control of such a technical 
branch as firefighting impossible. 144 Twelve years later, another serious outbreak of fire 
prompted a third reorganization. Augustus took the matter into his own hands. 145 In AD 6 
the vigiles were formed. 146 They consisted of seven cohorts, each under the command of a 
tribune (in total a force of 7000 men). 147 They were organized on a para-military basis and 
had military ranks and drill, which meant that they could be used as soldiers should the 
need arise. 148 Watson doubts though, that they were ever regarded as milites in any real 
sense of the word. 149 The vigiles are excluded from Tacitus' review of the armed forces 
for the year AD 23. 150 By the following year, however, the vigiles had attained acceptance 
through the lex Visellia by which members obtained citizenship after six years' service. 
The whole force was under the orders of a praefectus vigilum of equestrian rank, and 
subordinate to the praefectus urbi. The fact that he was appointed by the emperor extra 
ordinem151 indicates how seriously the emperor considered the vigiles. 152 
This, then was the origin of the vigiles as a fire brigade. Yet their duties were to expand to 
include enforcing order and fighting crime as well. Baillie-Reynolds points out that they 
differed from the modem fire brigade in one crucial respect, that their duties were not only 
remedial but also preventative. They performed intensive nightly patrols153 in order to 
discover fires while they were still small and therefore easy to extinguish, and also because 
there was a need for greater care at night, as people tend to be more careless at night and 
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flames may be left unattended or neglected. 154 It was also when most crime was likely to 
take place. The praefectus vigilum therefore had a specific mandate to deal with (and 
indeed try) cases of arsonists, burglars, thieves and robbers. 155 The exception was if the 
case was so vicious and notorious that it had to be remitted to the praefectus urbi. These 
patrols were evidently quite effective, as Petronius attests, 156 largely because of their 
scale. A force of 1000 men per region could cover a lot of ground quickly. The added 
advantage of this was increased visibility of armed troops and the consequently heightened 
intimidation factor. These patrols furthermore, gave the vigiles the status of a quasi-police 
force, a side of their activities which, says Baillie-Reynolds, 'was considerably extended 
and the military nature of the force more and more emphasized, as the Principate 
developed into a purely military monarchy. •1 57 
For Watson the position of the vigiles would not have been unlike that of many modern 
police or fire brigades. 158 This view is resisted by both Rainbird and Nippel. Rainbird's 
view is that we do not need to seek an explanation for the large number of vigiles in 
anything other than firefighting. Their firefighting duties took priority over any minor 
police duties they may have had. Their method of patrolling would probably appear police-
like to the modern reader. 159 To Nippel there are no concrete examples of the vigiles 
. 
having a regular function of maintaining law and order (Ordnungsfunktion). 160 What is 
important to consider however, is that like the praetorian and urban cohorts there is a very 
significant visibility factor with regard to the vigiles. It is impossible to quantify what 
violence they might have prevented from their mere presence. Although there may not be 
many examples of the vigiles acting as agents of law and order, they were clearly equipped 
and empowered to do so, and their presence alone would have achieved the desired effect 
of dissuading people from considering violence or anything else illegal. 
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See Rainbird, 151. 
Dig. 1.15.3.1. 
Sat. 78: 'Itaque vigiles, qui custodiebant v1cmam regionem, rati ardere 
Trimalchionis domum, effregerunt ianuam subito et cum aqua securibusque 
tumultuari suo iure coeperunt.' 
Baillie-Reynolds, 17. 
Watson, 19. 
Rainbird, 151. 
Nippel (1988), 168. 
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The vigiles were a new creation under Augustus. Although their duties intially 
encompassed firefighting alone, they came to have a significant impact as a force for the 
maintainance of law and order throughout the Empire. Along with the other forces created 
by the emperor, the occurrence of violence of whatever nature, was substantially 
contained. However, it required a significant change in political and social administration, 
to such an extent that they can be seen as manifestations of the new order, the Principate. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IN THE EARLY EMPIRE 
INTRODUCTION 
I have hitherto discussed the means by which the princeps, as personification of the state of 
the Early Empire, created structures to limit the occurrence of violence. I have attempted 
to show that there was a significant difference in the Empire from the way in which the 
Republic confronted or perceived the problem. What remains to be addressed is the manner 
in which collective violence manifested itself, and the way in which the state reacted to this 
particular phenomenon. In this regard I shall argue that the new social and political context 
of the Principate created different motivations for crowd violence as well as necessitated 
new perspectives as to its control. 
The approach to the issue of collective violence will be made from two angles. Firstly, the 
manner in which mob violence occurred must be dealt with. This incorporates how the 
"crowd" in question was constituted, what precipitated specific incidents and whether any 
pattern can be discerned. Secondly, the state's reaction must be considered, which includes 
its efforts to anticipate and prevent outbreaks of this nature as well as the immediate 
response to them. Moreover, the collective violence under investigation here is that 
committed by people who constitute the lower stratum. Indeed, one of the major themes of 
this thesis has been that the state has had separate responses to the violence of different 
status groups or classes. The specific composition of the Roman mob will be addressed 
later as an essential aspect of collective violence. 
We need first to consider the incidence of collective violence in the late Republic. Gruen is 
one of many scholars who has described the late Republic as a period generally regarded as 
violent and tumultuous. 1 The advent of the Principate made evident certain changes in this 
respect. Yet it is remarkable that the basic social structure of Roman society remained 
relatively intact despite the pressures to which it was subject. Why was it that the masses 
could never mobilize their resources to translate their riots into revolutions even though, as 
Finley says, 'armed violence or the threat of armed intervention seriously distorted the 
Gruen, 405. 
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substance of city-state politics?'2 The social tensions and conflicts of the Early Empire 
hardly ever led to open revolts. 3 The wider empire suffered few nationalistic revolts. 
Though the masses made their demands, they never rebelled against the basis of the 
regime. 4 Even in the Late Republic demonstrations, even the violence, of the plebs did not 
present a challenge to the government. 5 At times of real suffering when popular uprising 
might have been anticipated, Tacitus could describe discontent and frustration going no 
further than 'iuxta sedition em'. 6 Why was this so? 
The answer must lie in the relationship that the plebs sordida (as the "rebellious" or 
"revolutionary" class) had with structural politics in the Early Empire as dominated and 
controlled by the emperor. Tacitus gives an indication of the plebs' disaffection with 
politics when he paints a picture of a Rome in which 'cuncta discordiis civilibus fessa. '7 It 
was under these conditions that Augustus could impose his own brand of rule, 'nomine 
principis sub imperium accepit'. In Tacitus' view this was achieved by seducing the Roman 
people with the enjoyable gift of peace, 'cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit '. 8 But there were 
constitutional considerations, too. The political situation had changed to such an extent by 
AD 14 that no one could remember truly republican government 'quotus quisque reliquus 
qui rem publicam vidisset. igitur verso civitatis statu nihil usquam prisci et integri moris '. 9 
The interest that the Roman plebs may have had in politics had all but disappeared. It is 
hardly surprising, then, that when Tiberius transferred the elections from the assembly to 
the senate, in AD 14 there was no resistance to the removal of this right. 10 It had become 
clear to the masses that the political sphere offered them nothing, and that they had very 
little formal participation anyway. 11 What power the citizen did have had been seriously 
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Finley, 4. 
Alfoldy, 153. See also MacMullen (1967), 190. 
E.g. Yavetz (1969), 105. 
Gruen, 448. 
Tac. Ann. 6.13.1. 
Tac. Ann. 1.1.1. 
Tac. Ann. 1. 2. 1. 
Tac. Ann. 1.3. 7-4.1. 
Tac. Ann. 1.15.1. Tacitus' assertion is problematic. The Tabula Hebana of AD 19-
20 indicates that Tacitus may have been incorrect. The use of solent suggests that 
popular elections still occurred at the time of Germanicus' and Drusus' deaths. See 
Ehrenberg and Jones (1979), 76. 
See Brunt (1966), 5. See Dion. Hal. Ant.Rom. 4.20.5, 21.1. 
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devalued to have only ceremonial effect. 12 Yet the plebs still managed not only to make 
their social and political feelings known but also to have them accommodated. These 
means included protests at public spectacles or riots in the streets. 13 When the Roman 
masses took to the streets they were not motivated by dreams of equality or power. Riots 
were not aimed at tearing down a government or renewing society in a political way but 
were spontaneous and had very specific and particular objectives. Gruen14 denies a 
connection between urban tumult and the downfall of authority, and cautions against 
equating turbulence with revolution. 15 For him, the proletariat had nothing to do with the 
downfall of the Republic. He interprets demonstrations, even violence, as extensions of 
the plebs' prerogatives to voice its needs and argues that this practice was common in pre-
industrial societies. Violent disorder initiated by the plebs was essentially conservative. 16 I 
shall argue that in the principate, the princeps appreciated the danger that lay dormant in a 
mass demonstration and its political and social implications, and that he directed much of 
his efforts at preventing, minimising or channelling it into a structure which would 
facilitate its control. 
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE OF THE LATE REPUBLIC 
It is impossible to understand fully the character of mass violence in the Early Principate 
without some reference to the nature of collective action during the Republic. The first 
factor which favoured the growth of violence in Rome was that there were too many 
checks and balances in the Roman constitution which operated in practice only in the 
interest of the ruling class. 17 Reformers had to use force, or at least to create the 
conditions in which the senate had reason to fear its use. 18 
The nature of violence during the Republic was more specifically political, e.g. to force 
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In AD 5, for example, the elections were used as an occasion for honouring dead 
princes of the imperial house. In AD 19 the gesture was repeated for Germanicus, 
and in AD 23 for Drusus, even after the pretence of of a real choice for the 
electorate had been abandoned. 
Garnsey/Saller (1987), 150. 
Gruen, 434. 
Gruen, 405. 
Gruen, 448. 
The other two are population, and misery and squalor. These will be dealt with 
later. · 
Brunt (1966), 8. 
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measures through an assembly, to influence the outcome of an election or trial, or to 
intimidate or even kill political opponents. 19 This kind of violence reached a climax in 52 
BC, when Milo succeeded in killing Clodius outside Rome and a violent mob brought the 
body into the senate-house, tore down the tribunal and benches and burned everything, 
including the senate-house.20 Similarly, at the cremation of Caesar's body, the mob tore to 
pieces the poet Cinna believing him to have sympathised with Caesar's assassins. 21 
Both Brunt22 and Newbold23 have inferred in certain incidents the existence of "class 
hatred" - in 52 BC a mob attacked and killed those who betrayed their wealth and class 
through their jewelry and fine clothes.24 But Gruen's explanation is perhaps more realistic: 
that in mob action such as this, the poor would often seize the opportunity to harass the 
rich, destroy property, and take out their frustrations against their economic betters. It is 
merely an opportuJity seized by the poor to capitalise economically on a situation that 
would not often have been presented to them. To him this is a natural practice and one 
which was often repeated in most other times and places. 25 The basic issue was political. 
In the Republic the majority of violent outbursts had little connection with social 
grievances. Most demonstrations were arranged by politicians and political factions who 
were mobilising clients and supporters for their own purposes. Agitation revolved around 
legislative proposals, criminal trials and electoral contests. Collective violence of the Late 
Republic was organized by opportunistic leaders who espoused plebeian causes for the 
purposes of mobilising a crowd with the aim of satisfying their own political ambitions. 
Alternatively crowds could simply be hired or bribed, as by Clodius, who directed the kind 
of mob violence and abuse which was a far cry from the spontaneous outbursts of feeling 
of the time of the Gracchi. He was able to capitalize on the old traditions which lived on, 
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Lintott (1968), 204. Cf. Brunt, 4; see pages 18-21 for a short sketch of the progress 
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Asconius 32-3; App. B. C. 2.20-23; Dio 40.48.2-49.3. 
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and create a 'solidarity among his gangs like that of the old plebs and to give his movement 
a momentum of its own. '26 It was felt though, that crowd violence of this nature had the 
potential within it to jeopardise state security, something which was of paramount 
importance. 
The control or containment of violence of this nature necessarily became problematic, as 
the difficulty in formulating effective legislation against it testifies. 27 The executive was 
frequently unable to control matters without recourse to overruling the law. A complicating 
factor was a political culture which vigorously rejected the use of armed forces to suppress 
disorder in the city. For Lintott, the cause of collective violence was the tendency to use it 
to enforce political beliefs and personal claims, with or without official sanction. 'Its 
causes were the nature of Roman society and law, the character of the Republican 
constitution itself, and not least the cult of the expedient when using force on other human 
beings. •28 
THE ANATOMY OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE. 
Mob violence must be viewed within the broader context of collective behaviour generally, 
for it is from collective behaviour that mob violence will occur. It is necessary here to 
make the distinction between a demonstration and a riot. Both phenomena can be seen as 
interactions between state authority and its subjects. This is particularly true of the Early 
Principate where the plebs had recognised the structures of political expression as 
ineffective and largely abandoned them. Moreover, demonstrations, which are actions not 
intrinsically violent, do not always result in violence. The American social scientist, 
Charles Tilly has postulated a definite connection between the two, and suggests that the 
use of the word "riot" obscures this connection.29 Riots grow out of actions which are 
similar to a much larger number of collective actions which occur without violence. The 
composition of a demonstration, therefore, does not differ significantly from that of a riot. 
Those demonstrations which occurred during the Early Principate carried with them an 
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Lintott (1968), 10. 
For the development in the Republic of legislation against violence, see chapter 2. 
See also Lintott (1968), 107-124. 
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enormous potential for violence, and given the ratio in numbers between the upper and 
lower strata, 30 as well as the chronic disparity in wealth, it is remarkable that there was no 
wider scale mob violence at the time. 
One of the reasons for the lack of mob violence is the way in which collections of 
individuals behave. Tilly has reduced collective action to five basic components, all of 
which must be evident with sufficient intensity before a demonstration occurs. In the first 
place there must be interests which are the gains and losses resulting from the group's 
interaction. Here there is a degree of conflict between individual and collective interests 
which, Tilly argues,31 we should treat as a variable affecting the likelihood and character 
of collective action. 
Secondly, organization must be apparent. Tilly defines this as that aspect of a group's 
structure which most directly affects its capacity to act on its own interests, and entails 
those structures within the group which best achieve group cohesion. 32 The third 
component, mobilisation, 33 is the process by which a group acquires collective control 
over the resources needed for action. It identifies the process by which a group goes from 
being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant of public life. The group 
may require a catalyst, such as a leader to champion the interests of a group in order for 
both organisation and mobilisation to be realized. 
The fourth component, opportunity, 34 concerns the relationship between a group and the 
world around it. Changes in the relationship sometimes threaten the group's interests and 
sometimes provide new chances to act on them. The group must be given the opportunity 
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In Tacitus' day the senatorial class constituted two thousandths of one percent of the 
Empire, while the Equites probably totalled less than a tenth of one percent. If the 
population of the Empire was around 50 million souls, the senatorial class and the 
Equites amounted to fewer than fifty-five thousand (MacMullen (1974), 88-89). 
Even in Rome, the population of which at the time of Cicero was around 750 000, 
the odds were demographically stacked against the upper strata. See Brunt (1966), 
9. 
Tilly, 59-62. 
Tilly, 62-69. 
Tilly, 69-84. 
Tilly, 98-115. 
163 
to act together. Finally there is collective action itself, which comprises people acting 
together in pursuit of common interests, and results from the changing combinations of 
interests, organisation, mobilisation and opportunity. 
Augustus and his successors addressed each component in one way or another. The new 
political scenario allowed him, through his tribunicia potestas, to act ostensibly as patron 
to the plebs and put him in a position to regulate both individual and collective interest. It 
also allowed him to usurp the functions usually reserved for champions of the plebs. 
Consequently mobilisation was inhibited. Those, like M. Egnatius Rufus35 who attempted 
to obtain popular political support by providing better services, and so eclipsing the image 
and influence of the emperor, were soon dealt with effectively in the maiestas courts or 
elsewhere. His reforms affected social mobility to such an extent that group organisation 
was limited and the threat to the state minimised. Through the creation and monopoly of 
the games and the circus, the opportunity to act together was afforded, but rigorously 
controlled. If it came to violent collective action, the forces required to quell it were put in 
place. 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE ROMAN MOB 
The composition of the Roman plebs is one of the reasons why collective action at Rome 
never evolved into open rebellion. It is difficult to understand how the plebs functioned as 
there are few detailed or favourable references to them in our sources. The Roman upper 
class felt contempt for the urban plebs - 36 Tacitus certainly despised them, 37 and Dio 
regarded the masses as insolent and fickle, always searching for new solutions to crises and 
ready to cast blame on those who had already fallen from power. They were capable only 
of idle prattle. 38 
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Dio 53.24.4-6. Rufus had won popularity as an aedile in 21 BC by organizing a 
private fire brigade. In the following year he illegally held the praetorship and, in 
19, he sought, no less illegally, the consulship from C. Sentius Satuminus. Veil. 
Pat. (2.92) describes how Egnatius sought to stand for the consulship 'florentem 
favore publico sperantemque aedilitati ita consulatum praeturae se iuncturum.' 
When Senti us refused to accept his candidacy, rioting ensued. Rufus was executed 
when a plot to assassinate Augustus was discovered. See Millar (1964), 87-88. 
Alfoldy, 135. See also MacMullen (1984), 114-117. 
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The precise composition of the plebs, is a vexed question. The plebs cannot be seen to be 
homogeneous. 39 The social composition of the lower strata, which was even more 
heterogeneous than the upper strata, limited the possibility of any meaningful or 
threatening solidarity. The economic, social and cultural diversity within the lower strata 
created frictions which were impossible to ignore. The lower strata consisted of motley 
sections of the masses from town and country, which can in no way be termed ordines, but 
can at best be described as various strata, without implying that these social groups were 
stratified in a hierarchy. These strata shared common characteristics, particularly with 
regard to their economic activities and their legal status as ingenui, Iiberti and servi. The 
border lines between the various lower strata ran vertically in accordance with these 
characteristics. There were no clear social divisions running horizontally through the lower 
strata. 40 The plebs was composed of slaves, freedmen, shopkeepers, craftsmen, 
professionals, skilled and unskilled labourers, displaced farmers and the poor generally. 
For our period there were also those who had sought refuge in the city from the civil wars. 
To expect solidarity in this context would be unrealistic. 41 For example, when the 
freedmen rioted in 30 BC in response to tax increases, the other elements of the plebs did 
not join in, and order was fairly easily restored.42 
Through the establishment of a stable and enduring social order an armed revolution 
offered the plebs little benefit. Under Augustus the Principate evolved a political 
framework best fitted to hold together Roman society: 'the divisions and tensions deriving 
from the unequal distribution of wealth, rank and status were counterbalanced by forces of 
cohesion such as family and household, structural, vertical and horizontal relationships 
between individuals and households and the ideological apparatus of the state. ' 43 It is 
tempting at this stage to entertain the idea of "class struggle" in this context. Garnsey and 
Saller, and AlfOldy reject class analysis as unrealistic.44 One difficulty is that of specific 
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"class" membership which is open to conflicting interpretations. Class boundaries are 
inevitably in a state of flux. More importantly, however, Roman society cannot be 
considered a "class" society because a middle class would have to be introduced between 
the upper and lower classes which would not only own the means of production, but would 
also play a direct part in production itself. Moreover, the application of Marxist "class 
analysis" is inappropriate to a pre-industrial, pre-capitalist society such as Rome. There 
was no genuine "middle class" or bourgeoisie in the sense of an intermediate group with 
independent economic resources or social standing, 45 and which was a burden weighing 
heavily on the working class on the one hand, and increased the social security and power 
of the upper class on the other. The social structure rendered "class struggle" impossible, 
and prevented the development of a revolutionary middle class which would have acted as 
catalyst for rebellion. The bonds of dependency on the upper strata were too strong for the 
lower strata to resist. The system of patronage and clientage, for example, a central 
feature of Roman social and political life, meant that a large proportion of the proletariat 
had closer ties to their patroni and domini than to others of their own social class. 46 The 
social structure of the early Principate was such that the forces which divided the lower 
strata into competitive sections, were greater than those forces which unified them into one 
cohesive entity. Consequently the lower strata could not develop as a universal 
revolutionary "class". 
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Garnsey/Saller, 116. MacMullen (1984), 89, warns against the insistence that there 
must be a middle class and that it must be sought where we are used to finding it 
today. 
Alf6ldy, 153; Gruen, 435. The importance of patronage as a distinctive and central 
element in Roman culture and ideology cannot be underestimated. Wallace-Hadrill 
(1989), 63-89, argues that Dionysius of Halicarnassus' analysis of patronage as an 
instrument of social control that kept the population subject to the ruling class, and 
was well designed to avoid social conflict (sedition), is essentially correct- it was a 
flexible method of integration and simultaneously of social control (See Dion. Hal. 
· Ant. Rom. 2.9-11. Johnson and Dandeker, 235-6, add an extra dimension in 
relation to the state and the community: 'Whether we conceive of the state as those 
"agencies" or an "apparatus" mediating the common affairs of a political 
community, or, as sometimes defined, as a set of functions (e.g. social integration, 
goal attainment) or follow Weber in identifying such functions with the 
monopolization of means (i.e. of the means of violence, taxation and 
administration) we are forced to the conclusion that in Roman society such agencies 
are patronage structures; that the operation of such functions and the utilization of 
such means are impossible even to describe except in terms of patronage.' On the 
plebs as the "client" of the emperor, see Veyne, 390-393. On Augustus as patron, 
see Veyne, 255-257 and Griffin (1991), 32-34. 
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The strength of the Principate also made any serious thoughts of rebellion pointless. 
Although it cannot be said that social harmony existed, there was far less reason for social 
unrest than in the last two centuries .of the Republic. The redefinitions of the positions of 
power meant that there were hardly any conflicts within the upper strata which could not 
be resolved peacefully. Augustus saw to it that the needs of the urban plebs were regularly 
met. In this he set a precedent. Consequently those riots which did occur, were relatively 
spontaneous, sporadic, isolated and had specific objectives in mind, rather than part of an 
ideological programme in search of political equality or renovation. 
THE CAUSES OF RIOTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS. 
It is in the needs of the plebs and the princeps' provision for them that the causes of 
disorder can be detected. Addressing the needs of the masses was one of the principal 
methods of preventing social and political violence from below. Here the relationship 
between the executive and the masses became "informal", that is the relationship operated 
not through any structured political process characterised by representation and 
participation, but more on an ad hoc basis where grievances and needs were voiced as they 
were felt. The question is whether a pattern was established in the violent (or non-violent) 
group confrontations between authority and the masses so that a system of unwritten rules 
can be perceived which eventually achieved more for the masses than the formal political 
structures of the Republic could provide. 
There were, however, certain areas, which came to be, or remained, areas of sensitivity 
and which provided the spark for demonstrations or riots. Here the emperor could 
anticipate the needs of the masses and accommodate them accordingly, while the masses 
could,effectively articulate their grievances. 
THE POLITICAL SPHERE. 
Although the plebs had lost faith in the political system, and although their political 
influence had become almost negligible, there were instances when political events stirred 
the crowd into violent action. The riots of 22 BC had a specific political purpose in the 
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installation of Augustus as dictator - an office which was anathema to the Roman upper 
classes. 47 Dio reports riots over the consular elections the following year, an incident 
which the historian used as proof of the futility of democratic government. 48 In 20 BC 
there were disturbances over elections for the prefect of the city. These were riots which 
could not be quelled, so the city went without a prefect for that year. 49 There were also 
factional disorders when Augustus refused the consulship for 19 BC. On this occasion lives 
were lost and murders were committed. 50 In AD 4 the faction of Julia the elder which had 
always been strong with the people began to clamour for her recall from exile. Although 
Augustus stubbornly refused to entertain this idea, there were scenes in which firebrands 
were thrown into the Tiber as a means of protest. Eventually there was such pressure that 
she was at least brought from the island to the mainland. 51 In AD 7 there were more 
factional disturbances as a result of elections. Augustus considered them serious enough to 
appoint all officials because of them. 52 
Demonstrations were often related to people prominent in politics. They could either be 
admired or despised. The prospect of the return of Agrippa Postumus caused great popular 
excitement in AD 16, to such an extent that Tacitus was moved to speak of the imminence 
of discordia and anna civilia. 53 The imposter Clemens was eventually suppressed. 
Germanicus' death also precipitated a serious crisis at Rome. 54 The whole city shut down 
at the news of his death. Rumours of his recovery from illness caused crowds to run 
through the city and break open the temple doors. 55 In the following year, when it became 
apparent that the senate might spare Piso, who was suspected of murdering Germanicus, 
the crowd gathered outside the senate-house and shouted that they would lynch him, should 
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he be acquitted. Then they dragged statues of him to the Gemonian steps56 and began to 
destroy them. 57 The Gemonian Steps also feature when Tiberi us died. The crowd had 
gathered and threatened to drag his body off with a hook and fling it on the steps. 58 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STRESS. 
Economic stress is one of the major factors which lead to riot and demonstration. Burdens 
of debt, the increase in rents and in rates of interest, crippling taxes, and the housing 
shortage which was the legacy of the rapid urbanisation because of the civil wars, and the 
collapse of homes due to fires or the flooding of the Tiber all made the life of the lower 
strata very difficult indeed. 
However, one issue to which the masses were especially sensitive and which was to be the 
greatest cause of crowd violence was that of food shortage. In the context of the Late 
Republic four factors made the problem particularly acute. 59 War was the most significant 
factor responsible: an army made crippling demands on the city's grain reserves, while 
campaigns and battles in the country rendered production difficult, to say the least; piracy 
interfered with the delivery systems of grain from the provinces to the capital. Natural 
causes such as flood, pestilence and harvest failure severely affected the provision of 
grain. 60 These factors led to speculation and the manipulation in the price of com. Some of 
these factors persisted into the principate. Although Augustus could boast in the Res Gestae 
that he had freed the sea from pirates,61 the natural phenomena were uncontrollable: in 23 
and 22 BC the Tiber burst its banks and flooded Rome, there was plague in Italy; fields 
went untilled and people were starving. 62 The riots of 22 BC were provoked by the 
scarcity and exorbitant price of com. The people demanded that Augustus be given special 
charge of the corn supply as well a dictatorship. Although he refused the dictatorship he 
did accept charge of the com supply, to such an effect that he was able to deliver the city 
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On the significance of the Gemonian steps see chapter 4, pl07, 114. 
Tac. Ann. 3.14.4. 
Suet. Tib. 75 .1. 
Garnsey (1989), 203-6. 
In 56 BC, for example, there were infertile fields and poor harvests. See Rickman, 
55. 
25. 
See Dio.54.1.1-2. 
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from apprehension and immediate danger within a few days, and could advertise that it had 
been done 'meis impensis'. 63 
The people's common reaction in the Late Republic to food shortage was hostile 
demonstration which often turned into riot. The authorities in the early 30s BC had to use. 
repression to quell mob violence which erupted in serious and prolonged riots. There was 
neither agent nor mechanism to mediate between the consumers of Rome and Octavian who 
posed as their leader. Appian describes the resultant confrontation between Octavian and 
the crowd, an ugly scene which included stoning and threats of burning and plunder. 
Indeed, Octavian himself almost lost his life. Dio writes of statues being torn down, 64 
which is a common action of a frustrated Roman mob. 
Augustus could not fail to take personal interest in the matter of corn supply to the city. To 
ensure stability, a repetition of the famine and crowd violence of 43-36 BC had to be 
avoided. Augustus' personal intervention in the food supply to Rome developed a tradition 
of liberality which his successors could not ignore, 65 since the standard response to food 
crisis was simply largesse. Moreover, the acquisition of Egypt as a Roman province in 30 
BC and the creation of the office of praefectus annonae sometime between AD 8 and 14,66 
not only reduced the capital's vulnerability to food crisis, but gave the emperor the means 
of greater social control through the manipulation of its supply. 
Nevertheless, there were two periods in Augustus' reign when Rome was frighteningly 
short of corn- 22 BC, and in AD 6.67 It is difficult to understand the events of 23-19 BC 
without taking into account the riots and angry outbursts of the enraged crowd. 68 
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RG 5 .2. Carter, 175, suggests that if this is true, it must raise the suspicion that 
Augustus had been stockpiling corn (and thus helped to create the shortage?) against 
such an eventuality, in order to emphasize his image as benefactor to his stricken 
people. He finds it impossible to believe, given the difficulties of the delivery and 
transport systems of the time, that Augustus was able to relieve a major shortage in 
a city of almost one million, 'intra paucos dies', without having massive stores 
ready to hand. 
Appian. B.C. 5.67-8. Dio 48.31. 
Garnsey (1989), 218. 
See Rickman, 63-4. 
Vell. Pat. 2.94.3. See Garnsey (1989), 219; Rickman, 64. 
Yavetz (1969), 26. 
170 
From AD 5 to 9 there were intermittent food crises at Rome and the possibility of violent 
demonstration could never have been too far away. In 5 AD there was flood, fire, 
earthquake as well as well as riots and famine. 69 The situation was so grave that Augustus 
had to protect himself by increasing the pay for the Praetorian Guard. 70 Dio tells us that in 
AD 6 a food crisis compounded by a serious fire put the masses in a revolutionary mood, 71 
which did not pass until the following year when the grain shortage was over. But disorder 
and unease returned the same year and Augustus was forced to 'do anything that would 
make the crowd cheerful, regarding such measures as necessary. '72 In AD 9 the Varus 
crisis worsened yet another food shortage. Augustus was so nervous of an uprising that he 
despatched those Germans and Gauls who were serving in the Praetorian Guard to various 
islands and expelled those who were unarmed from capital. 73 
Under Tiberius, the people protested against the price of corn in AD 19. The emperor's 
reaction was to set a maximum price, while compensating the merchants. 74 In AD 32, the 
grain price again caused disturbances - 'iuxta seditionem '. 75 The only response from 
Tiberius was to scold the magistrates and senate, and to rebuke the people through a 
consular edict. These instances explain just how sensitive the princeps was to food shortage 
in the Early Empire. 
The plebs were also beset by chronic indebtedness and financial crisis. Tacitus wrote that 
not only was money-lending an ancient problem in Rome, but also 'seditionum 
discordiamque creberrima causa. •76 Rent riots had a bloody history: in the 40's BC there 
had been prolonged agitation about urban rents. There was bloodshed in 48 after the consul 
had driven out of the city Marcus Caelius who had proposed a year's remission from rent. 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
Dio 55.22.3, 26.2; Suet. Aug. 42.3. According to Dio the floods were so severe 
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Dio 55.23.1. 
Dio 55.26-27. 
Dio 55.31.3-4. 
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This remission was eventually granted by Caesar the following year, and even extended 
after further disorders had resulted in the deaths of over eight hundred rioters. 77 Augustus 
must have been mindful of these events when he embarked on his programme of reform. 
Socio-economic crises had far-reaching ramifications. Fire, flood and housing collapse 
increased _the number of money hungry-landlords and building contractors who exploited 
the existing natural and social difficulties. Augustus countered this exploitation by being 
the first to regulate by legislation the hitherto neglected field of building.78 This was 
clearly an effort to minimise the frustrations of the masses and satisfy their grievances. 
The other two factors which Brunt highlights as responsible for the growth of violence in 
the Late Republic are so interrelated that they can be treated as one. These are the 
problems of over-population and the consequent misery and squalor which the population 
had to endure. 79 The civil wars had caused people to flock to the safety of the city which 
meant that Rome had become home to almost a million people - a city too large for its 
resources. 80 Speculation, large scale profit-taking and exploitation had reduced the masses 
of Rome to such squalid conditions that they became responsive to politicians who held out 
the possibility of their improvement, and also bred hostility towards the upper strata who 
were indifferent to their interests. 
The huge population of Rome exercised enormous pressure on all aspects of plebeian life. 
Yavetz writes of unemployment, unhygienic conditions and a resultant high death rate. 81 
Frequent fires and floods made the city physically a dangerous and unhealthy place to be. 
The notion of planning a city as a means of preventing these calamities had not been 
addressed comprehensively until Augustus' time. 82 The insulae which the masses inhabited 
were overcrowded and extremely dangerous. 83 Narrow streets, inadequate water and 
sanitation increased tension. MacMullen paints a gloomy but realistic picture of urban life 
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Caes. B. C. 3.20-22. Dio 42.29.2, 32.2. See also Brunt (1966), 13. 
Yavetz (1958), 500-17. 
Brunt (1966), 8, 11. 
See footnote 30. See also Yavetz (1958), 500; and Robinson, 8. 
Brunt (1966), at 11 (footnote 30) cautions that references and interpretation of the 
texts are not all reliable. 
Robinson, 5-32. 
Aul. Gell. N.A. 15.1. See also Yavetz (1958), 505. 
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which, due to the Mediterranean climate, invited people to live out-of-doors where there 
was very little space. The disparity in ratio between public and private space meant that the 
crowded parts were very crowded, while the open parts and public buildings which the 
wealthy · provided, were generous. It was here that brawls and riots might start. 84 
Moreover, any disturbance in such a crowded city was likely to cause a crowd to 
congregate. The vigiles would more than likely have had to deal with it, thus creating a 
situation of conflict between state and subject. 
Augustus' response by way of building programme was not motivated by an altruistic 
desire to raise the quality of life of the masses, nor was it merely to make the capital 
architecturally worthy of her position, 'pro maiestate imperii. ' 85 ,Although he realised the· 
city's vulnerability to fire86 and flood, the improvement and control of services, 87 the 
tightening of building regulations, 88 the better provision of food and water and the 
monopoly of its provision, 89 all had the appeasement and control of the masses of Rome as 
a specific objective. The economic life of a plebeian was always hard. Nevertheless, 
Augustus was able to give the impression that he was addressing their grievances. But in 
this he set a precedent which his successors were not always able to follow. 
MOB VIOLENCE AT THE THEATRE AND AT THE GAMES. 
The theatres, arenas and circuses of Rome, as assembly points for large crowds, in some 
cases as large as 250 000, justify their discussion in the context of collective violence. The 
classic statement on the plebs and the games comes from Cicero, in which he states that 
there are three places above all where the will of the people makes itself known: the 
contiones, the comitia and /udorum gladiatorumque consessus. 90 Since the masses lost 
much interest in the formal structures of political participation, co~sidering them 
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MacMullen (1967), 166-7. 
Suet. Aug. 28.3. 
Robinson, at 108, he argues that the use of concrete and brick in the early 
Principate had a significant impact on the limitation of fires. · 
See Robinson, 130-143. 
Robinson, 33ff. Augustus was the first to limit the construction of houses to a 
height of 70ft. See Strabo 5. 3. 7. 
Robinson, 95-110. At 95 he makes the point that the supplies of water to Rome 
seem to· have been more lavish than those of modern western cities. 
Sest. 106. 
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ineffective, the arenas and theatres and the violence that occurred in them and the potential 
for violence that they held, must assume a political importance. 91 For the plebs the games, 
the circus and the theatre became the context in which meaningful communication and · 
exchange between authority and subject could take place. 92 They became the places where 
the masses expressed themselves politically. 93 But it also became a means through which 
large scale mob violence could be dissipated and controlled. 
Nevertheless, the theatre and the games regularly witnessed instances of crowd violence. A 
distinction should be drawn between the violence which had its roots outside the physical 
confines of the arena, and that which was specifically arena or theatre related. In the 
former case, the grievance at hand could be aired directly at the face of the person whom 
they considered best equipped to deal with it. In AD 32, for example, the high price of 
com caused serious disturbances in the theatre: Tacitus tells us that the demands were made 
with a presumption rarely shown to emperors and that it almost led to revolution. 94 In the 
latter case, the theatre itself became a source of disturbance. The theatre already had a long 
history of disorder which, according to Goodyear, the introduction of the pantomimi 
exacerbated. 95 For Cameron, the pantomime riots of AD 14 fitted the classic pattern for 
the factional riot of the Late Empire. 96 The pantomime riots were important events in the 
context of political developments at the time. Slater, in his detailed treatment of the 
subject, believes that the pantomime as a theatrical event possibly contributed to a popular 
demand for theatre, for by 11 BC at the latest, two more permanent theatres had b~n 
built, providing a seating capacity unparalleled in the ancient world. 97 His view is that 
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Cf. Auguet, 196: 'the more the public shouted itself hoarse at the circus, the less 
importance its voice had in the assemblies.' 
See Veyne, 400-401. 
Tengstrom, 54 argues that the theatre can be regarded as a substitute for the contio 
and that this development started towards the end of the Republic. See also Auguet, 
200. On the politicization of the circus, see Veyne, 398ff. 
Tac. Ann. 6.13.1: 'isdem consulibus gravitate annonae iuxta seditionem ventum; 
multaque, et plures per dies, in theatro licentius efflagitata, quam solitum adversum 
imperatorem.' 
Goodyear (Vol.2), 173. See also Suet. Aug. 45.4. 
Slater, 223. 
Slater, 122. Humphrey, at 2-3, writes that the theatre of Pompey, dedicated in 55 
BC, was Rome's first permanent theatre. Two more theatres were built in the 
Augustan period, those of Marcellus (13 or 11 BC) and Balbus (13 BC). These 
remained Rome's three chief theatres to the Late Empire. 
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these riots have to be examined against the background of the death of Augustus, who had 
enjoyed both the amphitheatre and theatre and had been careful to please the people by his 
presence, 98 and the accession of the somewhat more stolid and conservative Tiberi us who 
neither relished spectacle nor regularly attended them. 99 The riots of AD 14 at the ludi 
Augustales were caused by popular opposition to attempts by Tiberius and the senate to 
control the power, and the costs, of the pantomimes beyond the level they were willing to 
tolerate. 100 This was done (a barely a month after the death of Augustus who had after all 
been responsible for the rise of the pantomimes) because of the senate's concern with the 
public processions of the pantomimes, which could evidently attract crowds huge enough to 
constitute a public threat. 101 Tiberius had misjudged their popular appeal. 
The following year; AD 15, saw the resurgence of pantomime riots. 102 This time they 
were more serious and violent. There were civilian casualties and soldiers including a 
centurion were killed. 103 Tiberius and the senate realised that more effective steps had to 
be taken. The senate moved for flogging the pantomimes, but this was vetoed by a tribune 
on the grounds that Augustus, who had admired the pantomimes, would not have 
approved. Specific measures were introduced to limit the monies paid to the actors and to 
check the unruliness of their supporters - 'adversus lasciviam fautorum.' Senators were 
forbidden to go the houses of the pantomimes; equites were barred from joining their 
processions. The pantomimes could not appear, except in the open public (and not in 
private houses), and praetors were to have the power of punishing offending spectators 
with exile. 104 
However these measures proved ineffective, and the trouble continued. In AD 23 they 
recurred with further loss of blood - 'caede in theatro per discordiam.' 105 Tacitus, 
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Suet. Aug. 45.2. See also Newbold, 110-143. 
Suet. Tib. 47.1. 
Tac. Ann. 1.54.2-3: 'ludos Augustalis tunc primum coeptos turbavit discordia ex 
certamine histrionum.' See also Dio 56.47.2, who states that the reason for the riot 
was that an actor would not enter the theatre for the stipulated pay. 
Slater, 129. 
Tac. Ann. 1.77; Dio 57.14.10; Yell. Pat. 2.126.2; Suet. Tib. 34.1. 
Tac. Ann. 1. 77 .1. 
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considering the 'immodestia histrionum', claims that the ballet dancers were fomentors of 
sedition against the state - 'in publicum seditiose.' The Oscan farces, in which the ballet 
dancers performed, had become so degraded and influential that it required the auctoritas 
patrum (not just the praetors) to restrain it; quarrels connected with the pantomimes were 
genuinely hard to control, since they could spark off more serious mob actions - 'gravioris 
motus terrore. ' 106 Consequently the histriones were expelled from Italy. 107 In the context 
of Tiberius' measures against city riots Suetonius records the expulsion of the faction 
leaders as well as the actors who had caused the riots. 108 
It is clear, however, that although the authorities felt that the factions were a threat to 
public order, they never had any particular or consistent political agenda. Cameron, 
discussing the typology of a faction riot, likens them to the kind of violence one witnesses 
today in soccer hooliganism. 109 However, a distinction drawn by Wistrand, between the 
theatre and the arena illustrates that this is too simplistic and naive a reading and that there 
were more profound reasons behind the crowd violence at the theatre and the arena. The 
arena and the theatre were events with completely different social functions. The arena, 110 
where all kinds of violent entertainment such as public punishment and gladiatorial fights 
took place, was viewed in a positive light particularly for its educational value. 111 Here the 
Roman virtue of virtus, could be taught and demonstrated in the form of fortitudo, 
disciplina, constantia, patientia, contemptus mortis, amor laudis and cupido victoriae, 
even by those who were considered vilis sanguis. Here also the power of the Emperor -
numen Caesaris - could be given full expression. Consequently, unless in radical 
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Veyne, 393. Tac. Ann. 13.25.4. 
Tac. Ann. 4.14.4: 'variis dehinc et saepius inritis praetorum questibus, postremo 
Caesar de immodestia histrionum rettulit; multa ab iis in publicum seditiose, foeda 
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Pulsi tum histriones Italia.' See also Yell. Pat. 1.126.2: 'compressa theatralis 
seditio.' Dio 57.21.3. 
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Cameron, 271ff. 
Wistrand, 15-29; 56. 
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circumstances, the crowd did not protest the violent entertainment provided. 
By contrast, ancient writers had great contempt for the theatre. 112 The best they had to say 
for it is that it was innoxia remissio, but their main objection was its lack of severitas and 
gravitas. The theatre epitomised vitium. 113 In Livy's words the theatre was a 'vix 
tolerabilis insania '. 114 Suetonius regularly associates the theatre with the absence of order 
and uses words such as licentia, 115 tumultus, 116 discordia, 117 seditio118 to indicate this 
negative attitude. Wistrand suggests that it was the fact that riots frequently occurred in the 
theatre which prompted him to have this view. 119 But also bound in this is the generally 
negative attitude the upper class writers had towards the plebs. Of the contemporary 
Tiberian writers Velleius contrasts the theatre with severitas and connects it with seditio, 120 
while Valerius Maximus presents theatres as places - urbana castra - which had regularly 
witnessed bloodshed. 121 Equally negative vocabulary appears in Tacitus: 
immodestia/lascivia/licentia, 122 discordia, 123 dissensio, 124 seditio. 125 Wistrand has 
compiled a list of negative words which the writers used in connection with the theatre. 126 · 
Yet it is clear that the theatre was an essential part of Roman social and political life -
public amusements were a necessary escape from the horrors of life in Rome, 127 and as 
such they functioned as specific mechanisms for social control. Other methods of enforcing 
social control, such as strong military and police forces, politicised courts and persecution 
and elimination of dissidents, were an apparatus of coercion and repression, but had a 
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limited efficacy. The ruler had to win the consent of the ruled in order to establish a stable 
and lasting government. 128 The arena was a tranquilliser to keep the populace in good 
humour and well disposed towards its rulers. It was also a place where the might of the 
emperor could be displayed fully, thereby quelling, through intimidation, any thoughts of 
rebellion-. The games, and the culture which began to build around it, bred and preserved 
popular indifference to politics. 129 Moreover the violent entertainment of the arena served 
perfectly as a means of propaganda and indoctrination of exactly those values the rulers 
considered fundamenta1. 130 So the great and increasing expense of violent entertainment in 
the arena was justified: legitimacy ·was won and control achieved. The theatre was a 
different kind of entertainment altogether in that the violence on display to the crowd was 
unreal, even if acted with great realism. 131 Nevertheless it was also part of a greater 
strategy of social control. 
Wistrand argues that the Roman authorities in the Early Empire appreciated that the plebs 
felt certain tensions and grievances, and that the current structures available were 
inadequate. His view is that the more repressive and disciplined a society is, the more 
necessary it becomes to construct "safety-valves" through which pressure can be released 
and control can be maintained. Consequently, the Roman authorities wanted the theatre to 
work as a safety-valve for letting off exactly the right amount of pressure to keep the 
Roman plebs under controi. 132 
How was the pressure released? In practical terms, a demonstration in an arena was far 
easier to control; its design inhibited the development of a riot. The Colosseum, for 
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Wistrand, 63-64. 
Auguet, 150. 
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· Wistrand, 69. 
131 Suet. Cal. 57.4; in the play Laureolus understudies so vied with the chief actor in 
vomiting blood that the whole stage swam in blood. This play was a favourite and 
may be typical of what the audience liked. 
71-72. The view that public amusements provided a psychic and political safety 
valve for the population of the capital is supported by Hopkins, 30. Furthermore, 
he believes that at the psychological level, the gladiatorial shows provided a stage 
for shared violence and tragedy. They also gave spectators the reassurance that they 
themselves had survived disaster. The idea of a "safety valve" to release social 
pressure was not new to Rome. The tradition of the Saturnalia, in which the roles 
of master and slave were reversed, recognised the necessity of such a device. 
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example, had at least fifty exits, placed evenly around the arena. 133 Since the plebs were 
usually situated higher up in the arena, it took longer for them to leave the arena and then 
reassemble so that the riot could proceed. By this time, much momentum would have been 
lost, and the upper classes (including the emperor), their seats being lower down and closer 
to the action, would have been able to effect a swift escape. 134 Demonstrations within the 
arena were tolerated because they were safe: they posed no threat to the regime, took place 
in a controlled environment and therefore rarely spilled over into violence. 135 Even if they 
did get out of hand, the praetorian cohorts were always ready to prevent a vocal protest 
from becoming a riot. 136 Their presence were to become a regular feature of the public 
amusements. 
The different physical arrangement of the theatre is crucial to the understanding of how a 
theatre riot could come about. The spatial relationships of the theatre fostered tensions · 
more than in other venues in the first century; and this alone is a possible reason why 
pantomimes, rather than gladiators, were troublesome. 137 Through the lex Julia 
theatralis, 138 Augustus had taken great care to organise the seats and places according to 
the social divisions he was fostering, 139 so that the theatre became the geometrical symbol 
of order. The seating of the theatre was intended to 'function as the most evident symbol 
for the organisation of the Roman people, in that it visibly imposed an almost Platonic 
order on society in its central meeting place. But it was, like all imposed order, an order 
that created stress. t140 
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For the entrances and exits of the circus at Lepcis Magna, the best preserved 
Roman circus, see Humphrey, 27-28. For the general design of the amphitheatre, 
especially the entrances, see Auguet, 34, who describes the entry into the 
amphitheatre as wedge-shaped (cuneus) so as to avoid all disorder and to allow the 
crowd to take their place without inconvenience. It follows then, that such a design 
would act as a mechanism for natural crowd dispersal when the spectators leave. 
Cameron, 182, briefly discusses the proximity of the palace to the circus. He 
suggests that this was not to provide the emperor with a quick getaway in the event 
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Despite the physical dangers to which the emperor was subject in the arena or the theatre$ 
it was nevertheless politically imperative for him to attend. Without his presence there 
could not be effective communication between the plebs and the government. From 
Augustus on it became normal and common for people to make requests of the emperor at 
these occasions. 141 These requests, to which the emperor was morally bound at least to 
reply, made publicly in front of a huge crowd of spectators, were not only potentially 
political, but were also not easy to resist. Here the emperor was answerable to his people. 
It was here where collective protest was registered. When the trial of Aemilia Lepida (II) 
was interrupted by the games, she entered the theatre with other distinguished ladies, and 
called upon her ancestors whose memorials and statues were before everyone's eyes. The 
response of the crowd was sympathetic and tearful. They howled savage curses upon 
Quirinus (Aemilia's accuser). It was only because of the revelation of her misconduct by 
slaves under torture that the crowd behaviour did not gain momentum and become more 
serious. 142 
Moreover, it was here more than anywhere else where the emperor expected to be 
cheered. 143 The games were occasions in which the loyalty of his people could be 
confirmed and exploited. They afforded the emperor the ideal opportunity to display his 
civilitas, 144 in allowing the crowds to get away with things he would not tolerate in other 
circumstances. Provided it did not get out of hand, even a hostile demonstration could ease 
a difficult situation. 
The games were a dramatic enactment of imperial power before a mass audience of citizens 
which helped legitimate the emperor's position. Although there was an inherent risk of 
. 
subversion and resistance, but the dangers of political confrontation were mitigated by the 
crowd's lack of coherence, its own volatility and an absence of ideology which could bind 
141 
142 
143 
144 
For example the demands against the high price of corn in AD 32. Tac. Ann. 
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Cameron, 170. 
See Wallace-Hadrill (1982), 32-48. 
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it together in a sustained programme of action. 145 The emperor knew that he was quite safe 
at the theatre or the games but that his attendance was nevertheless essential. 
What, then, was the nature of mass behaviour at the games? Three factors contributed to 
the nature· of the crowd's behaviour at the games. 146 Firstly, the crowd diminished the 
sense of individual responsibility and accordingly increased the prospect of group 
solidarity. In every large gathering the individual loses his identity and becomes an integral 
part of the mass, as even Seneca recognised in his famous letter about the games. Apart 
from the snobbish attitude that a crowd must be avoided because of the vice it holds, he 
explains that the power of a mob is so great that even a Socrates, Cato or Laelius might 
have been shaken in his principles by a mass of people different from himself. Thus 
sensitive and easily influenced persons should be protected from the mob, since it is easy to 
betray oneself and side with the majority. 147 Therefore what an individual would not 
venture to do, the entire plebs would dare collectively. 
This leads to the second contributory factor, the feeling of power at a mass gathering. Here 
the plebs were given the confidence which they experienced nowhere else. The circus or 
arena was the one place where the plebs themselves had authority over people's lives 
through vertere et premere pollicem. 148 The plebs were boosted by the sense of superiority 
over those condemned to appear in the arena. Thirdly, there was a tacit agreement among 
the authorities to tolerate in the arena what they allowed in no other place. The crowd was 
able to express its opinion frankly without the fear of recrimination, and the emperor was 
able to ascertain the general feelings of the common people in Rome. 149 
By its very nature the theatre, the circus and the arena were places which were likely to 
. 
stimulate mob violence and demonstration. Yet they were essential to social and political 
life in Rome. While, on the one hand, they regularly witnessed scenes of violence, on the 
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other hand, they played an efficient role m the achievement of social control, and 
prevented the possibility of serious rebellion. 
THE MECHANICS OF ROMAN MOB VIOLENCE. 
How did mob violence manifest itself! Did riots take place in such a way that a pattem.can 
be discerned? In the Late Republic most violent incidents were either politically stage-
managed or were purposeful acts springing from the common feeling of a mob; there was a 
progression from spontaneous to deliberate violence characterized by organisation and 
planning. 150 I shall assert that there was a reversal of this trend as Augustus made it 
difficult for organised mob violence to occur. Nevertheless, Roman mob or group violence 
does show some common denominators which are in themselves revealing. 
Firstly, there was collective action in some shape or form. Group solidarity was usually 
expressed initially by some form of vocal action, mostly in the theatre or arena, where the 
masses had the best opportunity of assembling. MacMullen describes vividly the scene at 
the theatre: fifty-thousand 'tossed on waves of enthusiasm, on waves of rhythmic shouts, 
on storms of applause and excitement, did together what they would never have thought of 
doing each one by himself: howled, cursed, jeered, and fought in unpredictable outbreaks 
of passion . .t51 This can be positive, such as cheering and clapping, or negative such as 
booing, hissing or chanting. In one incident Clodius' gang expressed their ill-feeling by 
spitting in unison - 'signo dato .. consputare' .152 A crowd can also express itself without 
any vocal action at all. At a gladiatorial show in 59 BC the showmaster and his guests were 
overwhelmed with hisses. When Caesar entered the arena the crowd was dead silent, 
'mortuo plausu ', indicating clearly their disapproval. This was compounded when Curio 
followed and received a huge ovation. 153 Another feature of crowd behaviour at the games 
was the throwing of objects such as scarves into the arena which usually indicated 
excitement or approval.154 
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However, vocal protest does not constitute a riot, but merely a demonstration. When riots 
did occur, a common feature was damage to property either when a specific building was 
targeted by the crowd, or when the crowd inflicted damage in order to obtain missiles or 
weapons such as a broken tile or cobble stone, since the lex Julia de vi publica made it 
illegal to own weapons. The destruction of official buildings in particular was a common 
goal of a rioting mob. In 52 BC, the senate house was invaded, the benches inside tom 
down, and set alight. In 31 BC there was fire damage to the circus, the temple of Ceres, 
and a shrine dedicated to Spes, the goddess of hope. 155 In 22 BC the senate-house was 
again attacked, with the crowd threatening to burn down the building and all its 
occupants. 156 In AD 19 on rumours that Germanicus was alive, crowds ran through the 
city and broke open temple doors. 157 In the following year the senate-house was again the 
subject of popular attention as the crowd surrounded it demanding that Piso be delivered to 
them. 158 
I 
The destruction and damaging of the temples to Ceres, the goddess of agriculture and to 
Spes which had several temples in Rome, cannot be coincidental or insignificant. In these 
actions against public buildings and temples, the crowd symbolically expressed the nature 
of their grievances as well as the extent of their passion and their disaffection with the 
authorities whom they considered responsible for their predicament. But this was as close 
the crowd could get to addressing authority directly. The reconstruction of these temples 
therefore became a matter of important political and symbolic response. In AD 17 Tiberius 
dedicated certain temples which Augustus had begun to restore when they had decayed or 
burnt down. The most important of these were the temples to Ceres and her associates 
Liber and Libera. The temple of the goddess Spes was consecrated by Germanicus in the 
same year. 159 That Tacitus chooses to mention these temples is significant. It is possible 
that Tiberi us was attempting to align himself with his predecessor, both in terms of his 
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benevolence and his building programme, as well as to reassure his subjects that they 
would not have any cause in future to indulge in this kind of iconoclastic behaviour. 
Stoning and arson, or the use of fire was also a regular feature of riots. This was because 
these were the weapons most readily available to. an angry crowd, and it was the most 
effective method of inflicting damage. In a single phrase Tacitus described the two major 
aspects of a Roman riot: 'conglobata multitudine et saxa et faces minante.' 160 Seneca 
wrote that those who neglect the corn supply to the people would face resistance in the 
form of 'saxa, ferrum, ignes. d 61 In the disturbances for Julia's restoration in AD 4, for 
example, the crowd threw firebrands into the Tiber. 162 The intention of the crowd in the 
riots of 22 BC was to burn down the senate-house. That arson was a particular problem is 
proved by the inclusion of specific clauses relating to it in the lex Julia de vi publica et 
privata, legislation directed against collective violence. It was illegal for anyone in a 
gathering, assembly, mob or sedition to commit arson. 163 It was also illegal to remove 
anything from a fire except building materials or to be present at a fire with a weapon for 
the purpose of robbery or of preventing the owner from rescuing his property. 164 
Since they generally had no weapons with which to commit violence or do damage, the 
mob to used whatever came to hand. Cobbles, broken tiles, or rocks became missiles to be 
flung at their targets. 165 Stoning was a common form of group vengeance. Actual or 
threatened it stains the history of all the chief cities of the empire. 166 The mob was 
generally unarmed as the poor would possess no weapons in any event, except knives. 167 
What is more, the city poor were not trained in the use of arms, as the legions were 
recruited mainly in the country and not the city. The lex Julia de vi (publica) made the 
possession of weapons illegal except in specific circumstances. 168 The definitions of 
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weapons (tela) 169 and armed men (annati) 170 are sufficiently vague so as to include all 
objects which can inflict damage. This is not to say that the Romans had a systematic 
policy of disarmament, which Brunt argues was neither practicable nor necessary. What 
they had was a temporary expedient to be used when there was some particular reason for· 
apprehending disturbances. 171 The lex Julia de vi publica covered those situations where 
the possession of arms might lead to seditious violence which threatened public order. 
When the presence of troops in the city became normal, the risk involved in open riot or 
demonstration for the urban plebs was that much greater. 
There was often a specific target against which the mob could vent their anger. In the case 
of the emperor, he was often available in the theatre, circus or arena and the mob could air 
their gievances to him "face to face". The emperor's absence removed this form of 
manageable protest and caused frustration. When Tiberius left Rome for Capri the 
populace became extremely agitated. There was also riot at the news of his death. The 
masses wanted to drag his body off and fling it onto the Gemonian steps. 172 Tiberius' 
absence from Rome certainly harmed relationships between himself and the plebs. The 
customary direct communication between plebs and princeps had been removed, and this 
frustrated them. When an exceptionally destructive fire gutted the Caelian hill in AD 27, 
the mob considered Tiberius' decision to leave Rome as responsible for the calamity. 173 
The real targets of the mob's frustration were usually impossible to injure or damage 
because of their inaccessibility. Consequently they suffered only in effigy. 174 The image of 
the emperor and its desecration was a serious and confusing business in the Early Empire, 
since the same acts were treasonable at one time but not at another. 175 A statue could offer 
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temporary sanctuary to those under threat, 176 while physical damage could render one 
vulnerable to charges of maiestas. 111 Suetonius devotes an entire chapter to this kind of 
iconoclasm. 178 The damaging of a statue was thus the very worst a crowd felt it could get 
away with. In AD 20, for example, the crowd dragged the statues of Piso to the Gemonian 
steps and began to destroy them because they were not able to lynch him in person for the 
suspected assassination of Germanicus. 179 Committing atrocities on corpses also occurred. 
When Sejanus had been executed, the mob abused his corpse for three days before it was 
finally thrown into the Tiber.180 
There were times when loss of life occurred. The disorders of 19 BC witnessed murders 
with the result that the senate voted a bodyguard for the consul of that year. 181 In the riots 
of AD 14 Tacitus records the deaths of soldiers, civilians and a centurion. 182 The riots 
precipitated by the execution of Sejanus saw the deaths by the crowd of anyone who had 
been associated with him. 183 However, the bias of the writers causes them to mention only 
the deaths of members of the upper stratum, or those who supported it. One can safely 
assume that when Suetonius writes that Tiberius crushed riots 'gravissime' extensive loss of 
life was involved. 184 
Since the riots of the Early Empire happened spontaneously and in response to specific 
events which precipitated them, it would be dangerous to postulate any pattern emerging 
from their occurrence. What trends are apparent, however, are determined not by the 
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actions of the mob itself, but by the limitations imposed on it by the state in response to, or 
anticipation of, instances of collective violence. These limitations, to a large extent, 
defined the course of action of the mob, as well as revealed the attitude the state had 
towards it. 
EXECUTIVE RESPONSE TO COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE. 
The reply by the princeps was both reactive and proactive. Augustus' reforms, both 
political and administrative, had a significant impact on the limitation of mob violence. It 
is therefore possible to interpret them as measures designed, in part at least, for that 
purpose. The greater intention was, of course, the entrenchment of his position as first 
citizen of Rome. In this context, it is helpful to return to Tilly's five components of a 
demonstration and investigate how the executive of Rome managed to neutralise each one. 
Much of the emperor's reaction to mob violence must be gauged against the background of 
his relationship with the plebs. Augustus realised that to make an enemy of the masses 
would be a serious political mistake. He had to attain not just legitimacy with them in 
order to make his position safe. By acting as patron to the masses the emperor was well 
placed to identify their needs and interests and cater for them accordingly. In the Res 
Gestae Augustus seized the opportunity to celebrate posthumously the staggering scale of 
his benefits. and services to the Roman people. 185 The control of the corn supply, the 
provision of games, better services such as water and housing, as well as occasional 
distributions of considerable sums of money to all male citizens of Rome, were all 
manifestations of the princeps as the great benefactor of the plebs. The emperor who plays 
the role of great patron well, writes Seneca, requires no military guard as he is protected 
by his benefits - 'hie princeps suo beneficio tutus nihil praesidiis eget'. 186 
More importantly, as universal patron the princeps was able to free the common people 
from the clientela of the aristocratic families and bind them to himself to the greatest 
possible extent, 187 and eliminate political competition from upper-class patrons who sought 
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to mobilize their support through patronage. This aspect must not be overemphasised, 
however. While pointing out that the traditional patronage system failed to cope with the 
problems of mob violence, starvation and land hunger, and that this system was under 
attack, the emperor did not become universal patron in the sense of sole patron in the 
Roman world. Nevertheless he caused a profound transformation in the overall system by 
eliminating the competition in the distribution of resources which belonged ultimately to 
the populus Romanus - the clients: 'There is no longer a vote, and ultimate control of 
public resources passes de facto to the emperor. Thus the network of patronage realigns, 
and all strands converge at the centre. d 88 Therefore, when the plebs did resort to violence 
it was to remind the emperor of his responsibilities as patron. 
Furthermore, the role of patron enabled Augustus to usurp for himself the role of possible 
leader or champion of the masses. Through this role both organisation and mobilisation of 
the masses is minimised and even controlled. This was consolidated in 23 BC with 
Augustus' acquisition of the tribunician power. Anyone who ·challenged him for his 
position had no constitutional or political basis to do so. Such a challenge would not be 
merely one of leadership, but would, in effect, constitute an act contra rem publicam and 
would therefore be treasonous. 
The control and elimination of possible elements around which a crowd could be mobilised 
and organised was of particular concern to the princeps. Rulers knew and realized the 
dangers of an organised and motivated crowd. Livy has Scipio express the sentiments 
which each member of the ruling class must have shared: 'multitudo omnis sicut natura 
maris per se immobilis est, at venti et aurae cient; ita aut tranquilla aut procellae in vobis 
sunt; et causa atque origo omnis furoris penes auctores est; vos contagione insanistis.' 189 A 
well-managed crowd is a docile one. But a crowd could easily be swayed by the rhetoric of 
a rabble rouser. At theatrical events there were people trained in orchestrating the actions 
of the audience. Percennius, the instigator of the Pannonian mutiny was one such 
individual - 'dux olim theatralium operarum ... procax lingua et miscere coetus histrionali 
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studio doctus' - who applied his talents to fomenting violence. 190 
But this was an exceptional case. Of far greater concern in the security context were the 
collegia which had a history of group mobilisation. It was natural that members of the 
urban lower strata organised themselves in these associations which, among other benefits 
gave their members a certain corporate identity. They had elected officers, respectable 
aims, limited membership, and legal status. However, in the late Republic they came to be 
used as a clandestine means of mobilizing a political force. Some collegia were implicated 
in the riots of the 60s BC, and in the 50s Clodius' exploitation and control of these 
associations meant that he was able 'to recruit men for violence and other political 
purposes on a much wider scale than anyone before him had done and with a greater 
degree of organization.' 191 It is hardly surprising, then, that the emperors remained 
suspicious of such plebeian organizations as seed-beds of undercover political activity even 
though they had achieved some respectability because of their long histories in the special 
public services. In the late Republic there were attempts to control them which Augustus 
continued in the Principate. Caesar had dissolved all collegia except those of long-
standing.192 Apparently they reemerged. Augustus' lex Julia de collegiis, which is 
imperfectly known, provided that all clubs should obtain a licence, and that they should 
meet no more than once a month. In a chapter dealing with the suppression of crime, 
Suetonius writes that societies 'titulo collegi novi ad nullius non facinoris societatem 
coibant'. 193 Augustus' reaction was to dissolve them 'praeter antiqua et legitima'. This was 
the emperor's dilemma. The size of some of the collegia necessitated that they be given 
some recognition. Yet it was difficult to know the real extent of their mischief. 
Consequently, legislation against the collegia continued until well into the Empire with a 
clear purpose: 'prohibendarum factionum causa de providentia constant modestiae publicae 
ne civitas in partes scinderetur. ' 194 Moreover, violation of the laws against collegia had 
very serious consequences. 195 
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There were also short-term measures taken by the authorities in response to situations 
which might flare up into crowd violence. The resolution of the food crises entailed more 
than the finding and supplying of supplementary grain. During the crisis of AD 6-7, the 
mob clamoured for more despite the doubling of the com dole. Other ad hoc measures had 
to be taken specifically to prevent the occurrence of violence. A simple strategy was to 
expel from the boundaries of the city those who were, or might become agents 
provocateurs, and those who would make life particularly difficult for the authorities 
should violence occur. This is what Augustus had in mind when he expelled gladiators and 
slaves to be put up for sale to a distance of 100 miles from the city. 196 Gladiators were 
men skilled in arms who could easily tum their talents to revolution for the right price. 
Suetonius adds that all foreigners except doctors and teachers were also expelled. 197 To 
have armed trained men in the city at such a critical time was a risk Augustus simply could 
not take. The same thinking was behind the expulsion of the Germans and Gauls who were 
part of the Praetorian Guard in AD 9. He feared that they might start an uprising after the 
Varus disaster. 198 
Astrologers and philosophers were also considered potential instigators of violence and 
were similarly removed from the city. 199 In AD 16, for example, the senate expelled 
astrologers through a senatus consultum in order to secure public order. 200 Actors and 
ballet-dancers were also viewed with some suspicion and they were, on occasion, banned. 
In AD 23, Tiberius prohibited the performances of the Oscan farces and expelled actors 
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from Italy. 201 Earlier measures to contain the actors had proved ineffective. 202 In 
Suetonius' chapter on the control of riots, he writes of Tiberius' expulsion of both the 
faction leaders and actors who had been the source of the trouble. 203 
Another method of responding to collective violence was to legislate against it. This has 
already been discussed in chapter two. But in this context two things need re-affirmation. 
Firstly, the laws against violence, in particular the leges Juliae de vi, tell us more about the 
attitude and the approach of the authorities to the problem and to some extent about how 
mob violence occurred, than about their efficacy. Secondly, that the sources do not present 
us with many records of successful prosecutions according to Lintott204 'proves that its 
value depended on the previous repression of violence by executive means and the resulting 
atmosphere of security.' 
The most obvious response to crowd violence, however, was simple repression and 
although there is not much detailed record in our sources, it must have been the most 
common method. We know that Tiberius did not tolerate riots at all and quelled them 
'gravissime'. 205 Where, in the Republic the use of troops in the city was eschewed, in the 
Principate the establishment of forces whose specific brief was the maintenance of order, 
created no such unease. The officers in control of these forces were given mandates to deal 
with disturbances as they saw fit. The duties of the Praetorian Prefect entailed authority 
with a view to procuring improvement in public discipline. 206 The praefectus urbi was 
charged with keeping the peace among citizens and maintaining order at public spectacles. 
In this he was given a force of military guardsmen as well as powers of expulsion. 207 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the emperor had forces available which owed their 
loyalty to him alone, and were ready to act, ruthlessly if need be, against any crowd 
violence. Through their prominence in the city they acted as a major deterrent to crowds 
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who may have been frustrated, but were unarmed, unorganized and therefore ill-equipped 
to take on the power the emperor had at his disposal. This prominence and "high visibility" 
was achieved through sheer force of numbers - there was one soldier for every fifty 
citizens, 208 different and noticable dress in the case of the urban cohort or the vi giles, 209 
and positions of high profile (in the case of the praetorian guard) when the emperor had to 
appear in front of the public at the games or at the theatre. The mob was constantly 
reminded of the emperor's might, and that to challenge it was a risk not worth 
contemplating. This threat of force was, as Griffin notes, generally enough to control 
plebeian riots. 210 
CONCLUSION. 
The occurrence of collective violence in the Early Empire is remarkable for its infrequency 
given the nature of socio-political conditions at the time. Equally remarkable are the steps, 
both proactive and reactive, which the emperor took to prevent, minimise, regulate or 
control it and which appear to be disproportionate to its frequency and intensity. This is 
some indication of the sensitivity the emperors felt towards the possibility of its occurrence 
and its significance. Much of the issue entails the question why there was no political 
rebellion at a time when a de facto monarchy was being established, and much of the 
answer concerns the specific relationship between the emperor and his plebeian subjects. 
Nevertheless, mob violence did occur, but where in the Republic it was initiated, organised 
and orchestrated by political leaders with ambitions of power, in the Early Empire it 
appears more spontaneous, in response to specific events - usually food crises, and had 
specific but non-political objectives in mind. The Early Empire saw the introduction and 
perfection of mechanisms which would anticipate and indulge these objectives without 
compromising the emperor's position. In order to limit crowd violence, the emperor had to 
identify and accommodate the plebs' needs. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
In many respects the provisions against violence which evolved during the course of the 
Principate, were a direct response to the violence which had occurred during the Late 
Republic. It would be wrong however, to suggest that the violence of the Late Republic 
caused the evolution of the Principate. The Republic had been in crisis for a long time, and 
the violence of the Late Republic and the civil wars which followed merely signalled the 
inevitable; that there could be no return to the political structure of the Republic no matter 
how much it was desired. This r~isation intensified on the part of the historians an 
idealism of the Republic which was not always justified. It was an idealistic depiction 
which has complicated any realistic assessment of the Principate because of the historians' 
bias against "monarchy." Consequently the administrative measures introduced by the 
Principate, many of which had a positive and far-reaching impact on the limitation of 
violence, were viewed by the historians as products of a selfish and decadent "monarchy." 
The study of violence in the early years of the Principate is justified if only because of the 
proximity in time to the Republic of the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius. Augustus had 
introduced particular measures which, by Tiberius' reign, had established themselves as 
trends. Many of these measures were introduced to stabilise Roman politics and society and 
to secure the princeps' position in power. A by-product of these measures was that they 
provided a new context, or "set of rules" in which violence (particularly institutionalised 
state violence) could take place, be monitored and controlled. 
This has been the main endeavour of this thesis: to establish what this context was and 
examine it against the background of a new political regime - the Principate. It has not 
been .the intention of this study to suggest that the early Principate was more, or less 
violent than the Late Republic. That is a pointless and unproductive exercise. Rather what I 
have attempted to explore, is the response by the new "government" to violence, whether 
reactive or proactive and to show that this response, characterised by the new political and 
administrative structures, was to last far into the Empire. 
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The quality of these structures and the changes to which the existing Republican structures 
were subject had a particular impact on the nature of violence of the Early Principate. In 
the first place, there were attempts to legislate against violence during the Late Republic, 
when the situation became so serious that legislative action was required. These attempts 
proved ineffective, as the history of the legislation reveals. I have argued that this 
legislation against violence reached final refinement in 18 BC in the lex Julia de vi. But 
even here, we are unsure of its effectiveness, since we know of only one person, one 
Vibius Serenus, who was charged under its provisions. 
However, the lex Julia de vi has left us with a very clear indication of how the Roman 
authorities, controlled by the emperor, defined and conceived of violence. Along with an 
examination of the concept of violence in the works of Cicero (as expressed by the Latin 
word vis) I have attempted to discover a contemporary Roman attitude to violence without 
which the conclusions reached in this study would have been misleading and inaccurate. In 
this regard, we must recognise that the Roman attitude to violence was sophisticated and 
intelligent. The Romans appreciated its subtleties and contradictions; for instance that 
ultimately the fundamental sanction against violence must necessarily be violence itself. 
Cicero realised the social dangers inherent in vis as a socio-political concept to be directly 
contrasted with ius which represented the legitimate workings and structures of the state; 
something which has come across clearly in the lex Julia de vi. In this regard, he argued 
that violence is a political instrument to be used when all else fails in order to protect the 
security of the state - in whatever way the state should define itself. 
This notion of state security, is of great importance in an investigation into violence 
especially when considering the new system of government of the Principate. It was, as I 
have argued, due to state security that these measures for the control of violence were 
introduced. Against this background a new law (again produced in the Late Republic and 
refined in the Early Principate) offered the state (embodied in the princeps) an opportunity 
to combat political violence effectively. The lex maiestatis was, initially at least, not used 
that much to remove political rivals from the scene. However, as the reign of Tiberius 
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progressed, and as the politics of the Principate took shape, the lex maiestatis became a 
means by which senators or delators could win favour with the princeps; a method by 
which political threats could be removed even without there being any evidence for it; and 
a way in which citizens (mostly of the upper stratum) could be intimidated into subjection. 
Consequently, the atmosphere of free political activity of the Republic which was so fondly 
celebrated by the historians of the empire, was impossible. 
The implications of this for an investigation into violence are obvious. It would suggest 
that such an atmosphere would be fertile ground for revolution and unrest. Yet no such 
revolution transpired. It has been one of the aims of this thesis to find out why. One 
answer lies in the fatigue and demoralisation (particularly on the part of the lower strata) 
after the crises and trauma of the Late Republic and Civil war. However, I have tried to 
show that a more complete answer is to be found in the nature of the Principate as 
government and measures and structures erected to support and secure it. Many of these 
measures, it is true, were designed to act, or to give the princeps the space and legitimacy 
to act, as effective mechanisms of oppression. Riots, when they occurred, were dealt with 
ruthlessly. The state now had the capacity, the means and the resources to crush resistance 
should it occur. But revolution was controlled in a more subtle manner too. The princeps 
took great care to control violence by seeing to the welfare of his subjects. New services 
were provided. Rome now enjoyed the benefits of an efficient fire-brigade - the vigiles -
under the control of the princeps alone. An adequate com dole was supplied, again under 
the direct supervision of the princeps. The amusement of the people became an essential 
aspect of the princeps' duties. We witness, for example, in the first century of the 
Principate, the growth and monopoly of the "entertainment industry" by the princeps. The 
arena, theatre or circus became a place where political communication could take place 
between ruler and subject without the danger of rebellion or violence. It was also an 
opportunity for the princeps to advertise his glory and might and act as grand patron of his 
people. But most of all, they served (as I have argued) as a "safety valve" which allowed 
the people to "let off steam" in a manner in which they would never have done normally. 
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As I have stressed, these measures were not all designed specifically with the control of 
violence in mind. Most of them, in fact, were instituted in reaction to the social, political 
and administrative demands of the time. Cognitio evolved, rather than was instituted, 
because the Republican system of criminal justice had proved inadequate, expensive, slow, 
unreliable and prone to corruption. The principle of self-help, so long an integral part of 
dispute resolution in the Republic, had become redundant and dangerous. The cognitio 
system attempted to remedy these faults. But it was a remedy which had its own dangers. It 
was responsible for Roman criminal justice becoming more inquisitorial in character, 
where in the Republic the jury court system was accusatorial. Consequently, the judge 
played a more active role since he had the right to call witnesses and interrogate the 
accused, something which was forbidden him in the Republic. This flexibility meant that 
cases were more speedily resolved, but often at the price of justice in the form of arbitrary 
decisions, and judgement determined not by the vote of a jury but by the subjective whim 
of a single judge. 
What the cognitio system represented most, however, was a substantial penetration by the 
state into the lives of its subjects. This expressed itself in the development of three new 
courts which had significant effect on social control. The senatorial court blurred the line 
between political body and court; when the emperor sat as judge, it was rare that legal 
considerations were the sole issue in the resolution of cases, especially in political matters. 
One could hardly expect the princeps to be an objective assessor, and reach a decision 
detrimental to himself; the court of the urban prefect was jurisdiction delegated by the 
princeps to the urban prefect who was accountable to the princeps alone. Powers were 
given to the urban prefect to try offenders and punish them accordingly. In all three 
instances, including Imperial jurisdiction, there was greater room to compromise justice as 
well intrusion into, and control over, the lives of Romans. 
A further result of the cognitio system was that it also gave judges greater discretion in 
punishment. This is the area in which the state inflicts legitimate violence on its citizens. I 
have argued that the Early Principate witnessed a trend towards more severe punishments 
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which reflects the political situation of the time. This trend manifested itself not only in the 
increased severity of the various punishments, but also in the development of a complex 
system of symbol and ritual which accompanied their execution. Through these rituals and 
symbols the punishments, which occurred in the context of specific penal aims, reflected a 
society which, in the Republic, was allowed to participate, rather new ways evolved. 
The security and legitimacy of the state was also secured through the creation of three new 
forces, of a military or para-military nature, during the Principate. Where, in the Republic 
the presence of troops in the city was vigourously eschewed, in the Principate the high 
visibility of the Praetorian guard, the urban cohorts and the vigiles proclaimed the might of 
the emperor and advertised the futility of defiance. With these forces riots in the city, the 
arena, the circus or the theatre were mercilessly quelled and that the princeps secured his 
position. The riots which did occur, however, sprang usually in response to a specific 
issue, whether it was political, social or economic. The princeps had formed a successful 
strategy to deal with them. 
During the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, the response to violence was more effective 
than during the Late Republic. Both emperors had the benefit of the experience of the Late 
Republic to draw from. It was an experience neither emperor wanted to be repeated. The 
quality of their government was influenced but not dominated by this consideration. There 
has been much scholarship on the subject of violence in the Late Republic. The issue of 
violence in the Early Principate has not received much attention. One cannot state with 
conviction that the one period was less violent than the other. But what one can say, 
however, is that the context for violence under the Early Principate was completely 
different. In many ways, it was more difficult for violence to occur since there had been 
various structures established for its control, monitoring and even accommodation. On the 
other hand the Early Principate allowed greater scope for state violence to be inflicted on 
its subjects. 
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